Care in Transit: The Political and Clinical Emergence of Trans Health by Hanssmann, Christoph
UCSF
UC San Francisco Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Care in Transit: The Political and Clinical Emergence of Trans Health
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4j2639zb
Author
Hanssmann, Christoph
Publication Date
2017
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Care la Transit "The MMeai md Clinical Basejrges»c« of Trans 
Health: 
C&n$$6ph L, HatssgmarM 
DISSERTATION 
Sohffl&ted its partial satisfaction of the retpdsmtMfs for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF FHULOSOFHV' 
m 
W 
in the 
GRADUATE DIVISION 
of the 
'UMVBRsSmf OF CALIFORNIA, SAM FRANCISCO 
 ii 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2017 
by 
Christoph Hanssmann 
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Nobody writes alone. This was the unofficial motto of the writing group that played a 
central part in this dissertation seeing the light of day. And it remains true in a much broader 
sense—the reflections that follow owe to the actions, thought, and support of many people, near 
and far. And just as nobody writes alone, nobody thinks alone. Here I thank some of the primary 
supporters, mentors, collaborators, friends, and respondents who made it possible to see this project 
through.   
    First and foremost, I thank the feminist scholars and activists who trained me, mentored me, and 
demonstrated to me that scholarship imagines new worlds into being. I owe a particular intellectual 
debt to my dissertation committee: Adele Clarke and Janet Shim (co-chairs), and members Mel 
Chen, and Lawrence Cohen. Adele took me on as a student despite being on the brink of retirement, 
and for this I am immeasurably grateful. Her incisive reflections, tenacious support, and ebullience 
kept me afloat and significantly sharpened my analysis. I also had the incredible fortune of having 
Janet as co-chair of my committee. Her considered and insightful readings, collaborative approach 
to mentorship, and unflagging encouragement not only deepened and broadened my thought—they 
also set the bar for the kind of mentor I hope to be. Even though they were across the bay at UC 
Berkeley, Mel and Lawrence were wonderfully dedicated committee members, each of whom invited 
me to experiment in thinking well beyond the bounds of my discipline. Through conversations 
about scholarship’s potential that were at once generous and critical, Mel reminded me of the stakes 
of the work and the importance of “thinking with”. Lawrence’s teaching and perceptive engagement 
pointed me towards many of the intellectual conversations in which I strove to invest. As a group, 
my committee’s generosity of mind and spirit has shown me what strong and supportive mentorship 
can mean.  
 iv 
I was also fortunate to have received support and guidance from many scholars outside of 
my dissertation committee. Charis Thompson provided me with many of the gifts of mentorship, 
even without the formal title. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Amy Ross showed interest in my project in 
its formative stages, and their incisive support proved critical to its development. In the first few 
years of my graduate program, Nayan Shah, Priya Kandaswamy, and Aihwa Ong (among many 
others) helped me to develop analyses that proved central to my analyses. Susan Kools and Howard 
Pinderhuges provided important insights and guidance in the pilot stages of my project. Mauro 
Cabral Grinspan, Emmanuel Theumer, Nick D’Avella, Soledad Cutuli, and Mabel Bellucci 
generously helped me to develop a better understanding of Argentinian activism and social 
movements. Emily Thuma, Alisa Bierria, Aren Aizura, Dean Spade, Chandan Reddy, Janelle Taylor, 
Gillian Harkins, Sarah Lamble, Sharyne Shiu-Thornton, Finn Enke, and Paisley Currah initially 
encouraged me to pursue my seemingly somewhat late entry into graduate training. Their work, 
activism, and kind support have been a perpetual inspiration. Steven Epstein, Héctor Carillo, Natalie 
Boero, Julia McReynolds Pérez, Katie Hasson, Lezlie Frye, Emily Thuma, Kate Darling, Natali 
Valdez, Sonia Rab-Alam, Emily Vasquez, Aren Aizura, Dean Spade, and Melissa Creary (among 
others) organized panels and events in I had the opportunity to take part. These were highly 
generative, and helped me to sharpen my arguments and draw new connections. Nancy Burke, Irene 
Yen, Rina Bliss, Juana María Rodríguez, Leslie Salzinger, Susan Stryker, Kalindi Vora, Joe Hankins, 
Ben Singer, Leslie Dubbin, Lindsay Smith, Noah Tamarkin, Rayna Rapp, Ann Travers, Juno Salazar 
Parreñas, Alondra Nelson, James Pfeiffer, Zakiya Luna, Eric Plemons, Christine Kennedy, Seth 
Holmes, Maria Glymour, and many others provided support, guidance, and feedback at critical times 
over the course of my graduate training. I also remain indebted many years later to my 
undergraduate mentors and instructors, particularly Jill Morawski, Jennifer Tucker, Christina Crosby, 
Joe Rouse, Jessica Shubow, and Kate Rushin.  
 v 
My colleagues, writing partners, and interlocutors—many of whom are now also faculty 
members—played critical roles in the development and direction of my scholarship. While its 
membership shifted over time, our writing group at UCSF (including several guest stars from other 
institutions) included Kate Darling, Sonia Rab-Alam, Dilara Yarbrough Krista Sigurdson, Jen James, 
Natalie Ingraham, Jarmin Yeh, Heather Dron, Rima Praspaliauskiene, Jamie Chang, Mike Levesque, 
and Taylor Cruz. Kate, Sonia, and Dilara were especially generous in reading even the roughest of 
drafts over the course of my writing, and their insights were crucial to developing each and every 
chapter in this dissertation. Emily Thuma and Alisa Bierria have long been the interlocutors and co-
conspirators a feminist scholar dreams about. As readers, their insights have been invaluable, and 
their friendship, intellectual engagement, and political commitment have been transformative. Cindy 
Bello’s sharp analysis, moral support, and well-timed humor rescued me from despair on more than 
one occasion. Her intellectual curiosity and warm encouragement helped give me the nerve to move 
in new directions with my thought, and helped me to develop ideas that I might have otherwise 
deferred. Anna Torres, at that point still a new friend, read and provided monumentally helpful 
comments on my dissertation proposal. Oliver Rollins, Martine Lappé, Quinn Grundy, Florencia 
Rojo, Katie Hasson, Anna Jobloner, Gowri Vijayakumar, Melissa Creary, Elizabeth Payne, Rosanna 
Dent, Priya Kandaswamy, Natali Valdez, Sara Matthiesen, Jaimie Morse, J Sebastian, Alexa Hagerty, 
Mark Fleming, Francisco Fernández, and Mauro Cabral Grinspan were also incisive readers and 
collaborators.  
My SSRC DPDF program cohort in “Critical Approaches to Human Rights” nurtured the 
earliest inklings of my project, and their feedback and support were instrumental in assuaging my 
doubts about it. Special thanks to cohort members Jaime Morse, Alexa Hagerty, J Sebastian, Laura 
Matson, Greg Hervouet-Zeiberand, Justin Pérez, and Samar Al-Bulushi and to field leaders Amy 
Ross and Chandra Lekha Sriram. My participation in the São Paulo Advanced School on 
 vi 
Biotechnologies, Biosocialities and the Governance of the Life Sciences proved immensely 
important for my understanding of STS in the global South, and through it I made wonderful 
friends and colleagues. Co-attendees of the annual California STS Retreats also workshopped early 
ideas and reminded me that scholarship should frequently involve beachfront chats and campfires. 
Members of UC Berkeley’s Reproductive Justice Working Group, under the guidance of Zakiya 
Luna, also provided me with vital feedback on what eventually became Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. In addition, the commemorative conference honoring the life and work of UCSF 
Sociology alumna Susan Leigh Star, which took place just as I was beginning the program, was 
deeply influential. Her legacies of feminist creativity, political engagement, and fashioning 
unpredictable connections remained palpable in the remainder of my experience in the program. 
A very special thank you to my collaborators on the Speculative Visions of Race, 
Technology, Science, and Survival conference at UC Berkeley in 2013 through the Center for Race 
and Gender. Planning and co-hosting this event with Alisa Bierria, Mel Chen, Jakeya Caruthers, and 
Elisa Huerta was a highlight of my graduate school career, and the dialogue that transpired there 
strongly resonated with and shaped my intellectual and political commitments.  
From the beginning, Elizabeth Payne nurtured and encouraged my slightly irrational decision 
to move away from my home in the Northwest to start a new career, and patiently helped me to 
hone in on what would become my research focus. Her moral support, unflagging encouragement, 
intellectual engagement, and confidence in my path have been an essential component of my 
completing this project. Many other friends and colleagues have also been indispensable 
interlocutors and inspirations, in manners both direct and less so. These include Kathleen 
Frederickson, Sonia Rab-Alam, Kate Darling, Raphaëlle Rabanes, Pierre Minn, Jason Alley, Jake 
Pyne, Andrea Parra, Jin Haritaworn, Sean Arayasirikul, Aaron Norton, Amanda Armstrong, Munira 
Lokhandwala, Emi Kane, Pascal Emmer, Jakeya Caruthers, Adele Carpenter, Ren-yo Hwang, Natalie 
 vii 
Valdez, Hale Thompson, Chris Roebuck, Pooja Gehi, Florencia Rojo, Anna Torres, Joss Taylor, 
Paige Johnson, Adrienne Skye-Roberts, Lauren Berliner, Calvin Burnap, Canelli, Leah Jacobs, Toby 
Beauchamp, Cristina Visperas, D. Adams, Liat Ben-Moshe, Stephanie Cruz, Alexandria Wright, 
Francisco Fernández, Michelle Potts, Mimi Kim, Sakinah Suttiratana, Susan Miller, Sonny 
Nordmarken, and many others.  
I was privileged to have many people support my fieldwork in both New York and Buenos 
Aires. People put me up, helped me connect with respondents, and asked seemingly casual questions 
that led to important reevaluations of my assumptions. During my fieldwork in New York, I made 
many fortuitous connections and reconnections. Particular thanks to Ronica Mukerjee, Nathan 
Levitt, Lara Comstock, Bran Fenner, Soniya Munshi, Gabriel Foster, Tara Mateik, Belkys Garcia, 
Pooja Gehi, Elana Redfield, Martine Lappé, Dani Heffernan, Luce Lincoln, Leeroy Kang, Nadir 
Souirgi, Pooja Rangan, and Josh Guildford. Many others also contributed to making New York feel 
like a second home—which is no simple task. Prior to my first fieldwork trip to Buenos Aires, Nick 
D’Avella supplied me with books, maps, housing advice, friendly contacts, and crucial knowledge 
about life and research there. Julia McReynolds-Pérez met me on my first day of fieldwork, and I 
returned to the notes I took during our conversation at many crucial points during my research. My 
three summers in Buenos Aires were enriched by many new friends and interlocutors. Special thanks 
to Mauro Cabral, Sergio García, Fran Fernandez, Emmanuel Theumer, Elián Katz, Karen Bennett, 
Lucas Morgan Zstardust, Maria Luisa Peralta, Mabel Bellucci, Peter Pank, Soledad Cutuli, Pablo 
Balcazar, Adrián Landeira, Pao Lin Raffetta, Charlotte Jenkins, Leo Silvestri, Diana Sacayán, Blas 
Radi, Emiliano Litardo, Iñaki Regueiro De Giacomi, Lohana Berkins, Romina Guadagnini, Alan 
Otto Prieto, Julia Amore, Marina Elichiry, Diego Bocchio, and the members of Anthroposex, 
INADI, Capicüa, ALITT, and ATTTA (among others). I am deeply grateful for the time they spent 
acquainting me to the city and cultivating the kinds of connections that have persisted over the years 
 viii 
since my first visit. A very special thank you to all of the respondents who took the time and energy 
to speak with me during my ethnographic research in New York and Buenos Aires. This project 
would quite literally be nothing without them. 
Thank you also to the Bay Area groups that sustained me and taught me, especially Trans, 
Gender Variant, and Intersex Justice Project (TGIJP). Particular thanks to Janetta Johnson, Woods 
Ervin, KellyLou Densmore, dani marilyn west, Miss Major Griffin-Gracy, and Beck Witt. Thank you 
also to Causa Justa/Just Cause, the Temescal Community Safety Coalition, the Do No Harm 
Coalition, and Critical Resistance (among many others).  
Perhaps most crucially, the love and support of friends, comrades, and family (chosen and 
otherwise) sustained me as I undertook this project. The friends I made during my twelve years in 
Seattle have remained close to my heart, even as we’ve been separated by too many miles after my 
move to the Bay Area. Elizabeth Payne, Sarah Brown, Sonja Sivesind, Dean Spade, Calvin Burnap, 
Ellery Russian, Darius Morrison, Kaden Mack, Angélica Cházaro, Devon Knowles, Chandan Reddy, 
Bridge Joyce, Gillian Harkins, gita mehrotra, Alix Kolar, Wendy Somerson, and Huy Nguyen are 
central among these. My move to the Bay Area brought me a wonderful new crew of dear friends 
and comrades. The gift of my neighbor-friends at Melrose Place—Adrienne Skye Roberts, Emi 
Kane, Munira Lokhandwala, and Sherry the pup—is one that keeps giving through the quasi-familial 
delight of semi-co-habitation. Special thanks also to Priya Kandaswamy, Sabrina Wu, Puck Lo, 
Pascal Emmer, Cindy Bello, Ari Banias, Paolo Borja, Amanda Armstrong, Alana Price, Beck Witt, 
Elena Hillard, Adele Carpenter, Molly McClure, Holly Sheehan, Sand Chang, Sathid Pankaew, Bruin 
Runyan, Jenn Bowman, Dunya 'Alwan, Ryder Diaz, Beck Witt, Kathleen Frederickson, Amy 
Vanderwarker, Luke Newton, Raphaëlle Rabanes, Kinneret Alexander, Alisa Bierria, Margaret 
Benson Thompson, and Jen Karlin, who comprise some of the Bay Area dwellers who saw me 
through this project. My parents, Joan and Dennett Hanssmann and my sister Nicole Wood 
 ix 
provided concrete support and respite through visits and adventures with my delightful nephews 
Jono, Drew, and Adam Wood. Emily Thuma and Sid Jordan, whether from LA, Seattle, or the Bay 
Area, have been a consistent source of support and camaraderie. While it’s been half a lifetime since 
we lived in the same city, Sara Jaffe has long provided warm friendship and encouragement. Amory 
Knüt kindly supported me through the taxing phase of finishing this marathon of a project. Amory 
and the collective members of Melrose Place provided particular care during this time, ensuring that 
I was well-fed and reasonably well-slept.  
I was very fortunate to receive fellowship funding for the fieldwork and completion of this 
project. This was made possible with the generous support of the Social Science Research Council’s 
dissertation proposal development Fund (DPDF), the National Science Foundation’s Doctoral 
Dissertation Improvement Grant (DDIG) in Sociology (Grant #1519292), UCSF’s Social and 
Behavioral Science Program’s Estes Research Fellowship and the Graduate Division’s Dean’s Health 
Science Scholarship.  
Generosity also arrived in the form of administrative support. Many UCSF Social and 
Behavioral Sciences staff and administrators were central in helping me to navigate various 
institutional and administrative complexities. In particular, Brandee Woleslagle has been immensely 
patient and impeccably organized. In addition to her kindness and good humor, her gentle 
reminders and investigative prowess have rescued me from numerous potential calamities, and for 
this I thank her profusely. Cynthia Mercado-Scott was a fantastic help in managing grants and so 
many other things, and never made me feel as if my questions were as ridiculous as they were. 
Thank you to my transcriptionists, Javier Moreno-Pollarolo, Murtado Bustillo, and Sabina DelRosso. 
I dedicate this dissertation to the lovers and fighters—both living and no longer here—who 
imagine and enact less treacherous worlds into being. Your commitment to justice, along with the 
levity and forcefulness that you bring to it, keeps us striving, working, thinking, and struggling.  
 x 
 
ABSTRACT 
Care in Transit: The Political and Clinical Emergence of Trans Health 
Christoph Hanssmann 
 
Care in Transit examines the transnational emergence of transgender health care as an 
institutionalizing field and public entitlement. Clinical care for trans people has been classically 
framed as a pitched struggle between providers and patients, but coordination and negotiation 
increasingly characterize this relation. Care in Transit thus turns to examine sites of local and 
transnational collaboration (in addition to conflict), specifically in trans health’s public provision and 
regulation. Looking ethnographically to activists and health care providers in Buenos Aires and New 
York City, the project seeks to explain how these groups work together to assemble, intervene on, 
and refigure the infrastructures through which trans health care takes shape. While such cooperation 
may seem to signal an increased standardization and stabilization, I propose that it instead signals 
the protraction of a period of ambiguity within which a multitude of care practices and political 
claims can proliferate. I call this set of dynamics and practices “transmutable care,” and explore it 
analytically through classification, racialized citizenship, statistical politics, and feminist politics of 
care.  
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PROLOGUE 
The past decade was rife with extraordinary transformations in the set of practices known as 
“transgender health” or “trans health,” a burgeoning field in health care. Trans health thus 
encompasses patients and providers, but also incorporates scholars, activists, advocates, 
policymakers, and many others.1 It both springs from and pushes against the classificatory, 
diagnostic, and legal conditions of its emergence, with “revision” materializing as synecdoche for the 
state of the field. For those of us invested in formations of trans health since the early 2000s or 
before, the rapid shifts in this emergent field appear as a deluge after a drought: sudden, surprising, 
welcome, troubling, restorative, and destructive. The new arrangements, organizations, and practices 
that have sprung forth are still proliferating. But while novelty and growth tend to adhere to notions 
of evolution and advancement, they may also accompany more sinister processes, such as metastasis, 
decomposition, suppression.  
This dissertation aims to describe the emergence of trans health in a transnational sense. 
What practices and actors comprise it? Where is it articulated and in what forms? Does it travel, and 
if so, how? What has it ushered in or enabled? What has it supplanted, amended, or effaced? 
Alongside the broader set of changes that Time Magazine (Steinmetz 2014) recently named the 
“transgender tipping point,” how has trans health become a vital site through which trans life, value, 
and politics are fashioned and circulated?  
This project looks to New York and Buenos Aires—two cities in which trans health 
“leaders” or proponents (activists, advocates, and providers among them) presently work to 
(re)fashion trans health locally and transnationally. I ask how providers and activists are working 
together to “fix” problems with recent historical iterations of trans health and to develop 
“dignified,” “respectful,” “just,” and “effective” forms of care.  
1 
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In the shift from what Ben Singer (2006) characterized as “pathologizing models” to “trans-
health” models of care, providers and activists have slowly moved from positions of antagonism to 
negotiation, and occasional cooperation. Given this, it might seem as if trans health practices could 
begin to settle and stabilize. Why, then, can trans health can convincingly be defined and described 
in such a plethora of ways, perhaps even more than ever? And if, as I argue, trans health is 
increasingly looking outward to the environments within which trans people dwell, rather than only 
looking inward to subjective gendered experiences or diagnostic classifications, what kinds of trans 
health practices accompany this shift in orientation? How do these new forms of trans health care 
reclassify, revise, repurpose, and reimagine the field, and with what effects?   
Present forms of trans health seem to comprise a more mobile, mercurial, and expansive field 
than prior instantiations. Designated clinic nights and health fairs bear its name (Antón 2011; 
Department of Public Health n.d.). International summits and conferences convene practitioners, 
policymakers, advocates, and trans people—usually organized as “experts” and “community 
members”—to engage topics ranging from surgical techniques to police violence (Center of Excellence 
for Transgender Health n.d.; World Professional Association for Transgender Health [WPATH] n.d.). 
International human rights-based organizations are increasingly concerned with health—writ broadly—
in these communities, both in terms of access to medical care and freedom from violence  (Open Society 
Foundations 2013; United Nations Development Programme 2013).  
Yet despite its increasingly ubiquity, it remains unclear just what “trans health” describes in 
practice. Some think of it as a set of etiological or diagnostic assessments, or procedures that partially 
facilitate certain forms of gendered embodiment or enactment and care practices. These varied processes 
go by many names: gender or sex reassignment surgeries or procedures, gender confirming or gender 
affirming care, or (usually derisively) “sex change.”2 Others see trans health as the general practice of 
caring for patients and clients who are varyingly interpellated as “trans” (or trans*, gender 
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nonconforming, gender variant, or any number of other shifting descriptors). They therefore 
conceptualize trans health as a set of capacities and practices that meet the varied health needs of trans 
patients as they interact with all facets of health care.  
Some consider trans health to include all factors contributing to conditions of health and survival 
for gender non-normative people, and understand it as a political objective or imperative, a matter of 
justice, or a “human right.” Dominant conceptions of trans health generally center on the practices that, 
through high- and low-tech biomedical or perimedical practices, enable certain shifts in gendered 
corporeality.3,4 (See Figure 1 for a graphic representation of these different domains of trans health). Yet 
as I will demonstrate, broader notions of trans health are gradually widening the lens of what politics and 
practices people understand to comprise the field.  
The many practices of trans health interpenetrate significantly. Sonya (Interview, August 7, 
2013), a New York nurse practitioner regarded as an expert in trans health, described the many kinds of 
interactions she might have during a visit at the clinic at which she worked. Some of these included 
prescribing or managing hormones, and trying to convince people not to take too many or too much at 
once. They also involved doing Pap smears and prostate exams, checking breasts for lumps, talking to 
patients about their illnesses, prescribing medicines, doing STI checks, trying to convince people not to 
inject silicone even when surgeries are inaccessible,5 and negotiating with patients to find “trans 
diagnoses” that they could live with—or figuring out ways around them. Sonya also described what she 
saw as her political obligation to “write whatever paperwork people need…and be…flexible about it.” 
(Sonya Interview August 7, 2013). She described her political work—she is a non-trans6 and self-
described queer woman of color who has long been involved in leftist activist work—as giving her an 
“affinity” for many of her patients. She recognized the gauntlet of problems that her patients, who were 
mostly low-income and often undocumented trans women of color in New York City, had to navigate 
within institutions, in health care settings and benefits systems, at home, in public, and in shelters, jails, 
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prisons, or detention centers. As a provider in the field of trans health, she understood her role to 
include diagnostic, bureaucratic, legal, and political facilitation, bridging, and advocacy. She felt strongly 
that trans people did not have access to anywhere near the level of resources to which she thought they 
were entitled, and she felt it her professional and political duty to eliminate any barriers to care that she 
possibly could. She also described how she worked towards these goals in broader ways by collaborating 
with activists and advocates, particularly using her standing as a medical professional to influence the 
distribution of health resources and to increase trans people’s access to health care. While Sonya was not 
necessarily characteristic of all the providers with whom I spoke, the multiple registers through which 
she described the practices that she bundled together as “trans health” illuminates the complexity of the 
borders and boundaries of trans health.  
The “where” of trans health matters as much as the “what”: it comprises the difference between 
Sonya’s low-income community clinic in a relatively impoverished borough of the New York City and an 
upscale surgical suite in downtown Manhattan. It also differentiates the legal advocacy networks of New 
York State from groups involved in the provincial politics of Buenos Aires; and the fragmented, mainly 
private insurance systems of the U.S. from the more centralized and largely public systems of Argentina. 
It distinguishes the Lacanian Buenos Aires psychotherapist from the New York psychiatrist invested in 
brain-based notions of gender, and the Argentinian post-dictatorship left from the U.S. civil rights-
oriented left. Questions of place and space, mobility and site-specificity, and universality and particularity 
are thus also central to examinations of trans health. 
In this chapter, I frame the orienting questions of this dissertation, and describe the “formalized 
curiosity” (Hurston 1942:143) that motivated them. In so doing, I situate my research questions and 
central findings within ongoing discussions and debates across the sociology of health, illness, and 
disability; science, technology and medicine studies (STMS); and theories of race, gender, sexuality, and 
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citizenship. This introduction concludes with a brief overview of the three substantive chapters that 
follow, and describes the overall trajectory of the dissertation. 
 
Locating Trans Health 
My own work in the field of trans health was as an activist and health educator. I conducted 
periodic trainings for health care providers and health professional students, drawing from a 
combination of formal and informal knowledge as a trans patient and as a credentialed health educator. 
Navigating the awkward spaces carved out by the discomfiting affinity for “cultural competency” in 
medical pedagogy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, I joined various upwardly mobile trans people who 
somewhat inadvertently and in patchwork fashion assembled the “Trans Competency Training.”7 Such 
trainings aimed to intervene in the quotidian indignities and harms experienced in navigating health care 
systems as gender non-normative people. As a loosely assembled and almost wholly uncoordinated 
group, we tried to right the wrongs of medical pathologization, abandonment, and phenomena such as 
“trans broken arm syndrome”8 through a multitude of approaches.  
However, the more I became involved in such trainings, the more skeptical I became about their 
effects. Racialized, gendered, and classed stratifications shaped the kinds of “professional” trans people 
likely to be hired as trainers. This then influenced what kinds of trans people—typically white and trans-
masculine—were invested with (at least limited) authority and credibility by both providers and students. 
The structures of health professional education were highly resistant to the efforts of (some) trainers to 
frame transness more broadly, and to discuss the simultaneity of varying and interlaced forms of 
subjugation.  
As such, trainings often missed the crucial point that Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1978) raised in 
the late 1970s: in medicine subjugation works in different ways on different people. Embodied, political, 
racialized, and material differences matter profoundly in precisely how subjugation plays out. But instead, 
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trainings often collapsed these differences into a near-monolithic “trans population.” This “population” 
was most often presumed to dwell within the U.S., and when trans and gender non-normative people 
outside of the U.S. were invoked, it was often through a wildly colonialist or culturalist lens.9  
Moreover, the time-limited expectations of groups seeking trans trainings, combined with the 
identitarian parochialism of many trainers, precluded serious discussions about trans health from 
simultaneously discussing other groups of people or forms of health care closely linked to the needs or 
demands of trans people. Many people may encounter similar “barriers to care,” in public health 
parlance, as do many trans people. For example, people with disabilities, people with intersex conditions, 
non-trans women, people who are pregnant, people seeking abortions or contraception, and poor people 
are each and all systematically excluded from adequate health care, or may be aggressively absorbed by it 
against their wishes. In fact, “trans patients” are represented among nearly all of these groups. Yet 
trainings could only gesture towards these imbrications, and rarely did even that.  
 These concerns then led me to wonder about other ways people were intervening in medical 
practices regarding trans health, and whether and how health care providers were shifting their practices. 
The more I considered this, the more I realized that despite being a mobile and oft-repeated term, “trans 
health” was scarcely a discernible field. Rather, it was a set of shifting practices that we as activists, 
advocates, providers, and many others were dynamically and emergently fashioning.  
Instead of continuing to contribute to the relatively anemic strategies enabled by competency 
trainings, I decided to take a step back and consider just what we were engaged in producing. I became 
increasingly curious about where these projects were taking place, who was at work on them, and to 
what effects. I wondered what kinds of objectives and politics were debated and hashed out in the varied 
processes of developing these strategies, and how people decided to undertake specific strategies over 
others.  
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As guidelines for trans health care and diagnostic classifications became sites for broad debate at 
varying geographic levels, I wondered how these ideas, practices, and definitions were and were not 
traveling. Even as I ruminated, trans health kept changing: the term “depathologization” moved from 
protest signs to professional meetings about diagnostic revision, often with vigorous debate. Trans 
activists articulated wider ranging demands for everything from employment protections to 
decriminalization to free health care. Nations, states, provinces, and cities across the world developed 
and sometimes passed laws relaxing requirements for surgery prior to gender reclassification. 
Professional associations and medical experts increasingly threw their weight behind legitimating gender 
confirming care’s increasing legitimation, while some experts still held fast to previous models and 
approaches.10 Laws and regulations changed, some of them enabling broader forms of trans health care, 
and others restricting their use or development. But while trans health remained a charged site of 
contestation—about the meanings of gender, desire, autonomy, recognition, citizenship, state 
governance, sexuality, race, resource distribution, and the boundaries of medicine—the signs of a sea 
change also were increasingly evident. 
 This became especially apparent during the first few years of my research. I started interviewing 
providers in 2012. Within two years, the APA had published its new “depathologized” diagnosis of social 
distress-based gender dysphoria, the World Health Organization had initiated a process to eliminate 
“Gender Identity Disorder” and replace it with a non-psychiatric diagnosis of “Gender Incongruence,” 
Argentina had passed the “depathologized” Gender Identity Law, and New York State had removed its 
blanket Medicaid exclusion. Key themes thus began to emerge that would seem to characterize the 
present landscape of trans health: revision, depathologization, incongruence, environment, and so on.  
Transnational politics were also putting pressures on the ethnocentric hubris of U.S.-centered 
classifications, guidelines, and professional organizations. The World Professional Association of 
Transgender Health (WPATH), based largely in the U.S., encountered criticism for presuming to issue 
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guidelines of care that traveled well and effectively. In response, they adapted their standards somewhat, 
but not before a collection of other regionally-based “PATHs” proliferated. In addition, Argentina’s 
Gender Identity Law enabled sweeping changes in the nation: it ushered in free and streamlined legal 
gender reclassification without medical or judicial support, guaranteed coverage for gender confirming 
care across the health system, and eliminated diagnostic requirements for access to gender confirming 
care (“self-expressed desire” now suffices). Bloggers and reporters referred to these as groundbreaking 
changes, and a multitude of other regions and nations worked to replicate the law. But the story barely 
broke the surface in the U.S. news media. While these actions seemed to resonate with familiar global 
relations of power, I wondered how increasing pushes to “provincialize” the U.S.’s place in trans health 
were affecting the field’s formation more broadly (Chakrabarty 2000). 
 These musings ultimately condensed into several distinct kinds of questions: What kinds of 
practices are central to emerging formations of trans health? What are the classifications, regulations, and 
policies that are central to trans health’s formation and practice? How do these travel and take shape in 
different places and within different infrastructures?  What can these reflections reveal about the shifting 
commitments of biomedical practices and technoscience, the shifting investments of states and nations, 
the changing relations between care providers and activists, and transformations in how health care 
intersects with politics of difference?  
 While Stone (1992) aptly described trans people and providers as opponents on a “battleground” 
of health care access and provision, by 2012, twenty years later, I saw a different set of struggles playing 
out in contemporary formations of trans health. “Trans-supportive” providers occasionally identified 
themselves as such, sometimes joining trans activists in street protests or inviting them to participate as 
“community experts” in classificatory revision processes. They innovated ways to get around regulatory 
exclusions and to connect patients with the “care they needed.” Attorneys filed lawsuits on behalf of 
trans clients seeking access to care, becoming conversant in the lexicon of biomedicine as much as in the 
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broad and specific demands of trans activists. For their part, self-identified trans activists moved between 
a multitude of spaces and fashioned various partnerships, tense and otherwise, with providers and 
professional advocates. This increasing degree of collaboration and negotiation was accompanied by a 
decreasing clarity of the boundaries demarcating these groups. Activists went to nursing school or law 
school and became providers or advocates, or routed their activism through existing professional 
affiliations. Health care providers became politicized in their interactions with trans patients and 
occasionally lost credibility among colleagues. The position of the “advocate”—the paid professional 
who works on behalf of an individual or group—further confused divisions between “providers,” 
“activists,” and other actors. Local, regional, and national politics also further blurred the divisions 
between these ostensibly different “social worlds” and “subworlds.”11 How did each of these itinerant 
groups work on, and work to assemble, trans health? In what domains and at what scales did they 
imagine their work to have an effect? What kinds of practices did they define as being within the bounds 
of trans health, and how were these differentiated from practices they might understand as beyond its 
domain? 
I also sought to learn about how expertise, credibility, power relations, and authority inhere 
in the classificatory and regulatory work of trans health activism and provision. The assemblage of 
expertise and knowledge production that shapes trans health involves actors—both human and non-
human—from heterogeneous geographic regions in the global North and South.12 I thus followed 
these actors to track the rapid shifts in formal and informal classification systems on the one hand, 
and regulatory changes in the public provision of gender confirming care on the other. Noting a 
series of classificatory and regulatory “revisions,” I began to read this term doubly, as Clarke and 
Olesen (1999) do in developing a diffractive optics in accounting for practices of women’s health 
and healing. How did debates around classificatory changes shift when concerns about what certain 
classifications could do partially subsumed concerns about ontology or diagnostic accuracy? How did 
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certain forms of gender non-normativity move from “psychopathology” to “healthy variation?” 
What accounted for these shifts in thinking about classification, diagnostics, and the formation of a 
“trans population?” With regard to regulations, especially those relevant to the public provision of 
health, what enabled the possibility of state investment in trans health (to the small degree that legal 
and regulatory shifts allow)? How are notions of membership, recognition, and citizenship 
“revisioned” in these processes, and in what ways do their accordant stratifications, exclusions, or 
absorptions take new shape? How do national and transnational politics play out in such projects, 
and with what effects?   
Finally, I was interested in the mobility of trans health, and how it takes shape in distinctive 
ways across different sites of practice. I therefore grounded my study in two geographically disparate 
ethnographic sites, each of which comprises sites within which important claims to trans health vis-
à-vis the public provision of care were in struggle.  While this enabled a multitude of comparisons 
(between clinical and activist sites, across the global North and South, between privately and 
publicly-subsidized structures of care, etc.), it also enabled me to trace what elements of trans health 
practice traverse each of the boundaries, which remain less mobile, and which tend to shift and 
mutate more as they move. Such an approach also made possible an understanding of how trans 
health practices (in their many forms) were articulated across scales and with ranging objectives. 
Ostensibly “local” work was sometimes undertaken as a transnational strategy, while highly 
geographically situated work was also imagined to translate across a multitude of sites. I sought to 
learn about how the politics and geopolitics of mobility are articulated in part through trans health’s 
contested field formation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this section, I begin by broadly summarizing some of the key formations that preceded 
and led to trans health’s present, especially transsexual medicine and HIV/AIDS treatment and 
prevention. I then outline some of the central theoretical discussions within which I situate my 
work, and how key concepts guide my inquiries. Next, I describe conceptual and empirical questions 
examined in each dissertation chapter and summarize the overarching arguments of the dissertation. 
In so doing, I describe what trans health—in an empirical, situated, and transnational sense—is, 
does, and aspires to be in the U.S. and Argentina.  
 Changes in the realm of trans health, while they have doubtless seemed plodding to those 
involved, appear to be unfolding with stunning velocity in the past few years. These changes 
accompany and produce new and different accounts of trans health. Its emergent field is populated 
by themes of “facilitating health” rather than “treating illness,” and characterized by a contingent 
embrace of (often delimited) political commitments within biomedicine. This dissertation strives to 
account for and explain these shifts. These are not only tales of ascendance, justice, and triumph—
but also tales of the retrenchment of racialized stratifications, investments in dubious forms of 
recognition, and the tamping down of wilder and broader activist demands. As the U.S. and a 
voraciously neoliberalizing Argentina13 consider and reconsider their national health politics, health 
care is also more broadly being asked to consider what, beyond cellular, molecular, genetic, or 
organic processes, “makes us sick.”14 “Inequity” has been forcefully offered up as one answer, 
reverberating from laboratories to street protests (Loyd 2014; Nelson 2011; Williams and 
Mohammed 2009). Trans health brings to the surface otherwise submerged political debates about 
resource distribution, stratification, and injustice in health and biomedicine. The fact that 
“transness” itself does not bring with it a straightforward politics makes these debates all the messier 
and more revealing (Hsu 2013; Irving 2008; Najmabadi 2013). 
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This dissertation thus contributes not only to scholarly and political discussions about 
transness, health, and transnationality, but also to ongoing struggles over who may be included 
within the embrace of “health” and “health care.” It offers empirically-grounded reflections about 
the persistence of stratification, the openings through which power relations might be partially 
reconfigured, and the relationships through which different arrangements might be imagined or 
articulated. I engage sensitizing concepts from theoretical discussions from various scholarly fields, 
as guides to follow certain lines of inquiry, or “directions along which to look.” (Blumer 1954:7). 
I draw on reflections from science, technology, and medicine studies (STMS) to analyze the 
negotiated power dynamics of classification and to foreground the questions of infrastructure 
throughout my analysis. Also mobilizing feminist STMS alongside the medical social sciences 
(sociology and anthropology), I center questions of care politics and the figure of care.15 In addition, 
I engage early and contemporary insights from the medical social sciences in discussions about the 
formation of expertise, the figure of the “population,” and various notions of structural or 
necropolitical violence. Finally, I draw on insights from critical studies of race, gender, sexuality, and 
citizenship; social movements; and trans, queer, and disability studies to foreground how politics of 
difference are inseparable from infrastructures, state governance, and other shifting structures of 
“population management”—and how various groups respond in more or less coordinated ways to 
these conditions.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
Trans Health and its Predecessors: Pathologization, Revision, and Regulation  
 
Trans health, as Singer (2006) suggests, has superseded the “pathologizing” models of 
transsexual medicine (Meyerowitz 2002). It also far exceeds the domain of transsexual medicine. “Trans 
 13 
health” may refer to several interpenetrating domains that connote 1) gender confirming care practices; 
2) basic or specialty care for trans or gender non-normative people more broadly (including but not 
limited to gender confirming care); and 3) a political orientation or imperative to meet or prioritize the 
health needs and survival of trans people (see Figure 1 below). Amidst the ambiguity of what trans health 
is or does, an intensity of action swirls around various classificatory terms, meanings, and regulatory 
implications of trans health.  
Ascertaining who counts as “legitimately” trans—a designation with social, biomedical, and legal 
ramifications—is primarily accomplished through appeals to diagnostic criteria. As clinical diagnoses, 
medical notions of gender non-normativity have taken many forms and names: Transsexualism, Gender 
Identity Disorder, Gender Dysphoria, and Gender Incongruence, as well as other similar diagnoses that 
invoke the specificity of age, sexual orientation, and other forms of difference (American Psychiatric 
Association 1980, 2000, 2013; World Health Organization 1979, 1992, 2004). Most are still defined as 
psychiatric conditions, but activists and providers (among others) are working to establish non-
psychiatric classifications. Shifting definitions range in scale from localized clinical policies to 
international classification systems and treatment protocols, often under revision. The effects of their 
revisions are manifest discursively and materially: in addition to ontological shifts, they bring about 
reprinted manuals, revised coding schemas, new human rights imperatives, and changes in gender 
reclassification laws. Finding a relatively stable and “universal” diagnostic classification—or at least one 
that can work “well enough”—seems to be a primary objective of the restless redefining.   
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Figure 1. Interpenetrating Domains of Trans Health (Hanssmann 2014) 
 
Trans health appears as an assemblage of varying care practices both related and unrelated to 
gender confirming care. As Singer (2006) suggests, trans health’s orientation around gender confirming 
care springs in part from “transsexual medicine” practices converging in the mid-twentieth century. This 
marginal field involved a scattered set of relatively novel and specialized practices centered largely in 
metropolitan and university-based clinics in the U.S., Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Morocco, and centered in the fields of surgery, psychiatry, and endocrinology (Meyerowitz 2002).16 Its 
current and historical technologies owe to innovations in other specialties and recently emergent fields, 
including post-war reconstructive surgical techniques and reproductive medicine (Franklin 2013; 
Meyerowitz 2002).  
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Trans health in a broader sense also grows out of varying health-based social movements. Its 
infrastructures (particularly in the U.S.) build on those of feminist and women’s health, gay and lesbian 
health, community clinics, and disability activism (Garland-Thomson 1997; Loyd 2014; Murphy 2012; 
Nelson 2011; Ruzek 1980). “Trans depathologization”—a key orienting approach in emergent models of 
trans health—is often traced to U.S.-based activism in the 1970s, when gay and lesbian depathologization 
movements successfully lobbied to remove “homosexuality” from the DSM, which itself can be traced 
to transnational anti-psychiatry and mental health liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1972; Laing 1964; Szasz 1966). Yet such accounts of trans depathologization may 
not be sufficient to understand the implications of trans health’s relationship to rejecting pathologizing 
regimes.  I therefore ask what other dynamics also contribute to trans depathologization commitments, 
and what accounts for their complex relations to clinical and surgical care. 
My dissertation thus builds on the work of scholars who have begun to parse the distinctions 
between medicalization and pathologization. Medicalization scholars account for how phenomena come 
to fall within the “jurisdiction” of medicine (e.g., Conrad and Schneider 1992; Zola 1972). They generally 
focus on how medicine gains or retains the power to define and control specific conditions, often 
drawing on sociological labeling theory (e.g., Becker 1963; Goffman 1963). Here medicine is viewed 
largely as a moral authority and agent of social control, operating in an “imperial” to pathologize specific 
kinds of bodies (e.g., Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich 1978; Klawiter 2008; Riessman 1983; Ruzek 1978). Yet 
other scholars more recently note that medicalization may be a goal, pursued through “bottom-up” 
currents (Brown et al. 2004; Dumit 2006). Pathologization—the process of defining practices, social 
positions, and/or bodily states as simultaneously anti-normative and ill—thus may be part of 
medicalization, but they are assuredly not synonymous processes (Burke 2011:189).  
In addition to building on Burke’s (2011) reflections on this distinction, I interrogate how 
biomedicalization (Clarke et al. 2003, 2010) shifts attention away from concepts of “control” and 
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towards those or “transformation” and “reconfiguration.” Rather than focusing on definitional 
jurisdiction, inclusion, and the ostensibly “positive” or “negative” effects of medicalization, Clarke and 
colleagues instead center on broad and transformative reorganizations of bodies, subjectivities, 
knowledge production and distribution, financing, risk, and the technoscientization of biomedicine both 
organizationally and clinically. I ask how these reconfigurations may also be at play in the emergence of 
trans health transnationally and collaboratively, within and across uneven economies of knowledge, 
technoscience, financing, and practice.    
In addition to transsexual medicine, HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention infrastructures are 
also historically important to present instantiations of trans health, particularly in what is now taking 
shape as “global trans health.” (Aizura, forthcoming).  For some time, epidemiological surveillance in 
global health has statistically folded trans-feminine people who have receptive sex as “Men who have Sex 
with Men,” or MSM. These surveillance mechanisms produced data that were linked to certain funding 
streams in domains of international development and aid. Following significant push-back against this 
classificatory elision, “trans women” were gradually identified as a specific “risk group” distinct from 
“MSM.” Though these shifts, trans health also gained broader transnational legibility in some measure 
through new funding streams, forms of clinical care, and programs of research,17 as well as through 
widespread social movement activism (Cohen 2005; Dutta 2013; Stryker 2008; Swarr 2012).  
These reflections about the centrality of financing and funding streams also link with recent 
analyses of what Lewis and Irving (2017) call “trans political economy,” or TPE. TPE builds on feminist 
political economy to attend simultaneously to free market and neoliberalizing economies and gendered 
and sexualized dynamics of labor and capital accumulation (Bezanson and Luxton 2006; Ferber and 
Nelson 2003). Lewis and Irving (Lewis and Irving 2017:4) describe TPE as focusing on “how 
contemporary ‘architectures’ of power differentially and unequally affect trans and sex/gender-diverse 
people across the globe—and how we all… become implicated in those architectures… across different 
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local and global geopolitical spaces and scales.” This informs my examination of how economic inequity 
is engaged (or not) by the politics organizing contemporary forms of trans health and its travels. How do 
distinct forms of national health financing play out in various instantiations of trans health? How do 
funding streams enable the ascendance of certain conceptualizations of transness, and how do these 
“matter” to trans health formations? How do critiques of racialized economic stratification get taken up 
or excluded from discussions about “trans communities” or “trans populations,” and what are the 
consequences for classifications and regulations? 
Regulatory domains—especially public provision of care—also comprise sites of 
contestation. The legitimacy of gender confirming care for trans people is often in question, and 
public and private hospitals, clinics, and third-party payers have long defined such forms of care as 
“cosmetic” or “experimental” (Baker and Cray 2013). In Argentina, the 2012 Gender Identity Law 
legitimized gender-confirming care, formally resulting in nationwide coverage. In the U.S., 
Medicare—the federal program funding care for people over 65 or disabled—formally lifted a 33-
year ban on gender confirming care in 2014. Medicaid is a federally funded safety-net program that 
covers some low-income individuals, families, and children. Rather than being coordinated centrally, 
though, Medicaid is administered by states in the U.S., and does not have an enforceable policy 
about gender confirming care. Medicare policies tend to inform state policies, but they are rarely 
identical. Presently, U.S. state Medicaid programs have wildly different policies regarding gender 
confirming care. In 2015, New York State’s Department of Health formally lifted its 16-year 
exclusion clause for gender-confirming care.  
These changes have taken place through different avenues of actions. For example, while the 
Argentinian law passed legislatively, changes to U.S. Medicare and state Medicaid programs stemmed 
from legal challenges in federal and state court systems. I am concerned less with these laws as 
objects, and more with the conditions of possibility that enabled them.18 What made these 
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transformations possible? What compromises did activists, advocates, and providers reach in their 
negotiations to attain them? How did these processes encode certain infrastructural arrangements, 
relations of power, and political commitments?  
 
Trans Studies and Transformations in Health and Medicine 
 From its inception, the interdisciplinary field of trans studies has theorized surgical, psychiatric, 
and clinical care, and one of its major strands of inquiry problematizes gender non-normativity as an 
object of medical and/or psychiatric classificatory work and scrutiny (Aizura 2010; Burke 2011; Cabral 
and Viturro 2006; Namaste 2011, 2011; Prosser 1998; Singer 2006; Stone 1992; Stryker 2008; Suess, 
Espineira, and Walters 2014). With notable exceptions, many critiques from trans studies have tended to 
flatten or underanalyze “medical authority” as monolithic and/or geographically untethered.19  
To address these elisions, I integrate social science debates about contemporary transformations 
in health and medicine that interrogate situated specificities and stratifications of trans health in various 
places, asking questions including: How are trans health formations in metropolitan Argentina distinct 
from those in metropolitan U.S.? How do ostensibly transnational trans activist movements (e.g., trans 
depathologization movements) coordinate, and how do they conceptualize broad versus situated 
objectives? How do concepts of “medical authority” range within and between different geographic 
sites? 
My geopolitical focus in the U.S. and Argentina also engages one of the pressing matters 
emerging at the forefront of trans studies: the question of transnationality and situated forms of medico-
legal governance. Aizura and colleagues (2014:314) write of the imperative to broaden trans studies’ 
Anglophone and North American foci and partiality by “interrogating the logic of smooth circulation 
that mobility denotes in progress narratives of globalization”. While the notions of “transgender” and 
“trans health” appear to be mobile, they are far from seamlessly so, and many disparate currents are at 
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play in their uneven and contested movement and uptake. I thus interrogate how shifts in trans health—
particularly those hailed as on the political “cutting edge,” such as Argentina’s Gender Identity Law—
invite broader critiques of globalization and mobility.  
These reflections join a growing number of transnational interrogations of so-called transgender 
subjectivities in studies that consider health care formations (Aizura 2010; Cohen 2005; Dutta 2013; Hsu 
2013; Najmabadi 2013; Ochoa 2014). My dissertation builds on these to ask how and where health care 
providers and activists assemble and define this field in contemporary regimes of practice—described as 
“healthscapes” in Clarke’s (2010) extension of Appadurai (1996). Clarke (2010:105) defines healthscapes 
as  
ways of grasping, through words, images, and material cultural objects, patterned changes that have occurred in the 
many and varied sites where health and medicine are performed, who is involved, sciences and technologies in use, 
media coverage, political and economic elements, and changing ideological and cultural framings of health, illness, 
healthcare, and medicine. 
 
This view enables an engagement with health care not as a discrete institution or industry, and rather as a 
broad, diffuse, and ever-changing set of political, social, economic, religious, cultural, and symbolic 
relations and interactions. As such, I look across multiple fields of knowledge and cultural production—
diagnostic classification, regulatory policy, artistic production, activist culture, and advocacy strategies—
to ask how collaborative relations and geopolitics of trans health develop and travel.  
 Examining formations of health and health care also builds on scholarship in trans studies on 
differential distribution of life chances along lines of race, class, gender, sexuality, and, to some degree, 
disability (e.g., Aizura 2014; Clare 1999; Gehi and Arkles 2007; Krieg 2013; Lamble 2008; Snorton and 
Haritaworn 2013; Spade 2011). For example, Snorton and Haritaworn (2013) describe “trans 
necropolitics” as manifesting in how trans women of color are often memorialized and their deaths are 
mobilized to bring about state protections, rights, and resources that benefit white, economically-mobile 
gender non-normative citizen-subjects. Irving (2012:154) similarly argues that economic relations 
produce an “active/proper/worthy/deserving neoliberal citizen, a construction that disrupts and further 
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devastates the lives of trans people for whom the systemic barriers to emulating these ideals are 
insurmountable.” My analyses thus ask how activist demands of health systems, novel epidemiological 
approaches to population formation, and certain positions on depathologization may demonstrate or 
exceed these dynamics.  
 
Classification, Infrastructures, and the Vexing Problems of Ill Fit 
Classification and its “intended” and “unintended” consequences has long been a focus of 
STS scholarship (Bowker and Star 1999; Clarke and Casper 1996). Engagement with trans 
subjectivities focuses in large part on ontologies and classifications, with much attention trained on 
classificatory revisions of “trans diagnoses” (Burke 2011; Drescher, Cohen-Kettenis, and Winter 
2012; Valentine 2007; Winters 2011). Trans studies and activism also center classifications within 
phenomena of erasure (Namaste 2000), “administrative violence” (Spade 2011), legal impasses 
(Currah and Moore 2009), and formal exclusions (Cabral and Viturro 2006). Each of these strands 
also engages social movements and the push-pull relations of medical and legal bureaucracies on one 
hand and trans people on the other. The figure of the “norm” looms large, with states, medical and 
scientific institutions, and legal bodies as primary producers of normalizing knowledge within 
projects of preservation, security, containment, management, absorption, or abandonment.  
In my dissertation, I work to synthesize these critiques with perspectives from STMS that 
posit classified objects as specifically, contingently, and multiply enacted (e.g., Mol 2002). This 
focuses attention on the classificatory practices and the negotiations integral to these processes of 
classificatory formation and revision. It asks what kinds of classifications one winds up with—
diagnostic, regulatory, identitarian, and so on—when they are expected to do specific kinds of work 
(and especially when various actors want them to do different kinds of work).20 
My analytic focus is on how constellations of regulation and resistance or counter-conduct 
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(Murphy 2012) shape and are shaped by people and practices encountering varying infrastructures. 
Scholars in STMS center the background work of infrastructure, describing this as “something that 
other things ‘run on,’ things that are substrate to events and movements” (Star and Ruhleder 
1996:17). Turning infrastructures on their heads, exposing their embedded workings, and unearthing 
their politics comprises a distinctly STMS project. Bowker (1994) and Bowker and Star (1999) call 
this “infrastructural inversion.” I draw on these theorizations and methodological demands of 
infrastructure studies to attend the particularities of how distinct forms of trans health manifest in 
different places. For example, I look to public infrastructures of care because people are quite 
economically and racially stratified, though they are often regarded as a somewhat monolithic 
“community.”21 Furthermore, forms of care are not evenly distributed across these groups. To train 
attention on public health care infrastructures enables me to ask a set of questions about differential 
valuations of life and resource distribution in two different situations.   
In their discussion of shifting racial classifications during South African apartheid, Bowker 
and Star (1999) discuss the notion of “torque” to illustrate how classificatory systems are politically 
interested, contingent, and unevenly implemented. When biography and classification processes “are 
aligned,” they explain, “there is no sense of torque or stress; when they pull against each other over a 
long period, a nightmare texture emerges” (Bowker and Star 1999:27). Those on borders of 
classification boundaries may be particularly torqued, especially during shifts in classificatory criteria. 
Torque, in some regard, might provide an apt description for trans existence across a multitude of 
domains, including in medicine. However, in my dissertation, I ask how the concept of torque may 
transcend the dynamics of individuals encountering classificatory systems. Might torque also be 
forcefully twisting at broader scales: between different classificatory systems and national 
formations, or across different groups, for example?22 
STMS scholars have long argued that producing and maintaining categories involves a great 
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deal of work to stabilize meanings, contain disagreements, and establish boundaries. This brings 
about relatively fragile ostensible stabilities that are often subject to pushback.23 As Shim (2014), 
Epstein (1996), Dumit (2006), Jutel (2011) and others have shown, the content and legitimacy of 
scientific and medical authority can be contested, modified, and even radically transformed by 
patient experience and “lay expertise.” Alongside work on “embodied health movements,” these 
literatures offer a means of accounting for the co-constitutive production of biomedical knowledges 
by assemblages of actors that far exceed “official groupings” of physicians and researchers (Brown 
et al. 2004; Brown, Morello-Frosch, and Zavestoski 2011; Klawiter 2008). In this dissertation, I ask 
whether “lay expertise” is sufficiently capacious to describe the rapidly institutionalizing dynamics of 
trans health’s emergence and its production of technoscientific and clinical knowledge. Who counts 
as what kind of expert? I also question whether, in concrete practices, such stabilities that are 
achieved, however transient, may not also be highly local—situated in specific space and time. 
 
Politics of Place and Difference in Trans Health  
In addition to drawing on STMS to synthesize classificatory theories and social movements, 
my dissertation also looks to how STMS theorizes the “where” and “how” of shifting knowledge 
formations. While feminist and postcolonial STMS scholars attend deftly to marginality as 
theoretically and empirically important (e.g., Harding 2011; Medina 2014; Star 1991), my dissertation 
also necessitates thinking precisely about how embodied social and political difference are produced 
and deployed, often as identitarian projects (Ferguson 2004; Muñoz 1999; Wiegman 1995). Even the 
limited theoretical work on trans health rarely asks about its conditions of possibility as a practice 
organized by identity, and even more rarely asks how racialization, sexualization, and questions of 
ability may be at play in how this identitarian organization (Warner 2000:167) is imagined.24 Yet it is 
through complex arrangements of various politics of difference that forms of knowledge—
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particularly the privileged knowledge of biomedicine—take shape, circulate, and are reproduced 
(e.g., Berg and Mol 1998; Bowker and Star 1999; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Medina 2014).  
I analyze these dynamics in part by engaging critical studies of race, sexuality, gender, and 
disability. These are distinct but interrelated theoretical fields that emphasize processes of valuation 
with regard to differences (e.g., Crenshaw 1995; Grzanka 2014; Kafer 2013; McRuer 2006; Omi and 
Winant 1994; Reddy 2011; Schulz and Mullings 2006; da Silva 2007; Somerville 2000; Spade 2011; 
Stoler 1995). Without overstating the similarity of these various explorations of race, sexuality, 
gender, and disability, I draw empirically on scholars who analyze these modes of difference and 
subjugation as deeply intertwined (Chen 2012; Cohen 1997; Ferguson 2004; McRuer 2006; Muñoz 
1999; Puar 2012; Schweik 2009). “Trans”—even in the delimiting reach of the very term—enfolds, 
produces, and reproduces hierarchies of race, sexuality, gender, disability, nationality, pathology, and 
criminalization. In this dissertation, I ask how knowledge production, authority, and credibility 
circulate in these shifting but persistent hierarchies.  
A transnational scope is critical to this project, training analytic focus on power dynamics 
between people, and between nations. Among others, I draw on Kaplan and Grewal’s (1994) 
transnational feminist methods and analyses (see also Mani 1990). Contesting ethnocentric so-called 
“global” feminisms, they aim instead to “link diverse feminisms without requiring either equivalence or a 
master theory” and they strive to “make these links without replicating cultural and economic 
hegemony” (Grewal and Kaplan 1994:19). Here, I look to relations within and between geographic sites 
to foreground questions about nationalism, economic power, and knowledge economies.  
A limited number scholars outside of Latin America reflect on how “transgender” amends, 
differs from, and incorporates gender non-normativity in this global region, and even fewer focus 
specifically on health and medicine in so doing.25 But Latin American scholars increasingly engage these 
questions (Berkins and Fernández 2005; Cutuli 2011, 2013b; Fernandez, D’Uva, and Viturro 2004; 
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Hernández-Rosete Martínez 2008; Páez Vacas 2010; Silva and Ornat 2014; Zambrini 2007). 
However, most of these publications do not circulate in the U.S. Exceptions include Argentina-based 
scholars and activists Cabral and Viturro (2006), Litardo (2013), and Cutuli (2013). Several U.S. or 
Australia-based scholars also engage various Latin American formations of gender non-normativity in 
Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile, such as Kulick (1998), Lancaster (1998), Lewis (2010), and Ochoa 
(2014). Economies of knowledge and politics of language shape how the latter literatures travel more 
readily in the U.S. than do the former. Nonetheless, the theorizing of Argentinian (and some broadly 
Latin American) scholars are crucial to generating robust accounts of, for example, travesti political 
organization in Argentina.26 As Lewis (2013) points out, these formations are most robustly theorized 
through relations of state violence, political economy, and situated laws and regulations, against 
culturalist anthropological accounts such as Kulick’s (1998) and Lancaster’s (1998).27 Drawing on these 
critiques, I position my analyses of gender non-normativity and social movements within a broader 
political field in Argentina and in the U.S.  
 
Sites of Knowledge Production: Clinics, Diagnostic Manuals, and Streets 
While the site of the clinic is familiar empirical territory for medical social sciences, classical 
STMS studies tend to focus on the production of biomedical knowledge in the lab (Callon 1986; 
Knorr Cetina 1981, 1995; Latour 1988; Latour and Woolgar 1979; Traweek 1992). Contemporary 
studies have since dispersed from the lab as a gravitational center, exploring clinical trials (e.g., 
Petryna 2009), or technological applications (e.g., Casper and Clarke 1998; Clarke and Casper 1996), 
biotechnological or pharmaceutical development (e.g., Dumit 2012; Sunder Rajan 2006), scientific 
economies (e.g., Cooper and Waldby 2014; Vora 2015), and other sites of inquiry. Even in its 
present forms, though, STMS studies more commonly follow scientists than health care providers.28  
Yet recently, Löwy (2011:116, emphasis added) describes the clinic as a “unique site of the 
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production of knowledge.” My dissertation therefore interrogates how classificatory and diagnostic 
knowledge production are engaged and amended in actual practice, especially within clinical practices. 
Latimer’s (2013) study of clinical genetics vividly demonstrates that the clinic can be a central, rather than 
distal element in biomedical knowledge production, clearly disrupting the presumptive linearity of “lab to 
bedside” of “translational” biomedical discovery and practice.  
Hence I examine how providers (and some activists) occupy an epistemological and ontological 
“front line” of knowledge production. For example, the emergence of “trans science”—brain-based or 
genomic accounts of transness—has largely followed rather than preceded transformations in trans 
health. These burgeoning projects take place largely in the U.S., Australia, and Europe (e.g., Case and 
Ramachandran 2012; Hare et al. 2009; Zubiaurre-Elorza et al. 2013).  
Such projects and have been enabled in part by what Hess (2016) calls “undone science,” the 
gaps, or the “knowable unknowns” and “unknowable unknowns” of more or less interest to certain 
parties to pursue or repress (Hess 2016:30). “Knowable unknowns,” he suggests, can be leveraged as 
sites for developing more extensive scientific knowledge depending on changes in resource allotment, 
increasing attention or priority, act. “Trans science” appears presently to be following the path carved 
out by a biologically essentialist “gay science” from the 1990s (e.g., LeVay 1993), working to establish 
organic bases for transness as an anticipatory rejoinder for the opponents of “trans rights” that center 
rhetorics of “choice.”29  
Also relevant to undone science, an entirely different version of trans science is emerging in 
novel engagements of transness in population health sciences. Epidemiological research concerning 
transness has taken shape in HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention and in methodological work to 
establish estimates of trans “populations.” These, as well as the community-based health disparities-
focused studies that preceded them, involved greater or lesser degrees of trans groups’ collaboration with 
population health and social scientists. Brown (1987, 1992) describes such partnerships as “popular 
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epidemiology.” Here, social movement groups who are concerned with health-based phenomena collect 
data and enroll scientists to transform biographical and anecdotal experience into epidemiological data. 
Extending Latimer’s (2013) argument and building on Hess (2016) and Brown (1987, 1992), I 
also examine how the actions and definitional work of health-based social movements shape and are 
shaped by clinical practice (e.g., Banaszak-Holl, Levitsky, and Zald 2010; Brown et al. 2011; Epstein 
1996; Gould 2009; Klawiter 2008; Nelson 2011). These works posit that science, medicine, and social 
movements exist in mutual and generative, if hierarchical, relation. Health-based social movements 
organize around a variety of projects: to inhabit or change diagnostic criteria (Dumit 2006), to shift 
practices of care or redirect interest in specific research questions (Epstein 1996; Klawiter 2008), to 
organize around specific forms of embodied illness experience (Brown et al. 2004), or to engage 
biomedical projects on different and identitarian terms (Murphy 2012). Most focus on activists’ 
influence on scientific or medical experts to change how they do their work. In trans health, this has 
certainly taken place. In addition, I explore how trans health has also necessarily enrolled providers 
in order to politicize their approaches to knowledge production and care provision. I ask what 
fissures emerge from the uneven enrollment and politicization of providers. In so doing, I ask if the 
camps described in Stone’s (1992) account of the “battleground” scene have shifted alliances, and if 
so, how these reconfigurations have played out. Regarding trans population health science, I ask 
what new statistical conceptions of “trans populations” enable, and possible consequences.  
 
Biopolitics, Citizenship, and Biomedicalization 
Health, recognition, inclusion, and survival are central themes clustering around the topic of 
trans health, even as trans studies has begun to inch away from questions about medicine and its 
enmeshment with law and state governance. Nevertheless, the convergence of embodiment, 
biomedicine, and state governance involved in trans lives and health demand renewed examination 
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of the interconnections among these broad themes. Recent engagements with diverse forms of 
biopolitical citizenship provide rich analytics regarding how these may be linked, and how various 
actors might converge. João Biehl (2007:302–3), for example, discusses “patient citizenship” vis-à-vis 
embodied biomedical and technoscientific interventions in relation to nation-making projects. Adriana 
Petryna’s (2002) “biological citizenship” in post-Soviet Ukraine after Chernobyl centered on how 
people cultivated relationships with the state through disease, leveraging demands on the state from 
this position (Petryna 2002). In Epstein’s (2009) “biopolitical citizenship,” “inclusion” in a 
biomedical paradigm signals recognition and metaphorical enfranchisement in the broader polity. 
Such analyses emphasize the social, cultural, and broadly political dimensions of “belonging” in 
citizenship. 
Nevertheless, these analyses do not always focus centrally on legal and administrative 
categories of citizenship. Trans health raises questions about how providers are implicated in 
decisions about care that relate directly to formal citizenship and the state (Cabral and Viturro 2006; 
Currah and Moore 2009; Spade 2011). In what Cabral and Viturro (2006) position as an exclusion 
from citizenship, and Spade calls “administrative violence” (2011[2015]), the imbrication of medical 
and legal classifications and regulations often produce trans subjects as “impossible people” (Spade 
2011[2015]:19). While I share with other scholars a degree of skepticism about citizenship as a 
central domain of analysis (Brandzel 2016; Ochoa 2014), it remains a key analytic for theorizations 
of national membership, collective fashioning, and stratified exclusion (e.g., Anderson 2006; Nguyen 
2010; Roberts 2012; Shah 2011). Thus, it is necessary to take up questions of formal legal and 
administrative citizenships (and the way these categories are differentially mobilized across groups) 
alongside broader notions of inclusion. 
In so doing, I draw on critical studies of race, sexuality, and citizenship, which position 
citizenship as a symbolic set of racializing relations that engenders conditional inclusions and 
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exclusions in a biopolitical register through formal laws and regulations (e.g., Canaday 2009; 
Kandaswamy 2010, 2012; Luibhéid 2002; Reddy 2011; Shah 2001, 2011). In addition, I interrogate 
how notions of citizenship—both formal and less so—are among the domains included in the broad 
transformations of biomedicine (Clarke et al. 2003, 2010).  
Once again, biomedicalization is relevant. As Clarke and colleagues (2003, 2010) suggest, this 
signals “increasingly complex, multisited, multidirectional processes of medicalization, both 
extended and reconstituted through new social forms of highly technoscientific biomedicine.” 
Biomedicalization thus speaks to how broad social and political shifts suffuse and transform life vis-
à-vis biomedicine (Clarke et al. 2003:161–62). They assert that the “bio” prefix bundles bioscience, 
medical research, and clinical practices, and indicates the extent to which “medicine” and 
“technoscience” have become essentially inseparable. The prefix also evokes biopolitics and the 
administration and governance of life and populations. Mobilizing these reflections with critical 
studies of race, sexuality, and citizenship, I interrogate trans health’s varied investments in 
reconfigurations of regulatory and administrative landscapes. In particular, I examine novel 
engagements with statistical and epidemiological knowledge, new engagements with “risk” and 
“population,” and how biomedicine and states conceptualize transness (or fail to do so). 
 
Politics of Care 
Analyses and explorations of care have in the past several decades been at the center of 
feminist STMS, feminist social sciences, and sociological and anthropological work on medicine, 
health, and illness (e.g., de la Bellacasa 2011, 2012; Held 2007; Hochschild 1997[2012]; Kaufman 
2006; Kleinman, Das, and Lock 1997; Martin, Myers, and Viseu 2015; Murphy 2015; Ruddick 1995). 
Care as a figure and analytic centers questions of relation, reciprocity, and moral or ethical politics 
(Borneman 1997; Cohen 2008; Kaufman 2006; Mol 2008; Taylor 2008). As feminist STMS scholars 
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argue, it also “an affective state, a material vital doing, and an ethico-political obligation” (de la Bellacasa 
2011:90). Whether figured as ethical imperatives, as reflections of economic modes of production, or 
as iterative and contingent processes, modes of clinical care comprise rich ethnographic and 
theoretical sites for reflection. Care inhabits biomedical discourse, inciting questions about fostering 
life, conducting triage, and reducing harm (Kaufman 2006; Nelson 2011; Petryna 2002; Taylor 2008; 
Thompson 2013).  
My dissertation explores not only confrontations the limits of care, but also how care 
indexes relations of power and obligation, in addition to (and sometimes within) dynamics of 
support or nurture (Murphy 2015:732). In trans health, care practices dovetail with notions of 
structural violence (Farmer 1997)—the uneven distribution of illness, harms, and life chances—that 
materialize in what Clarke et al. (2010) call “stratified biomedicalization.”30 I ask how varying politics 
of care produce different notions of trans health, and how these bring about distinct arrangements 
of resource distribution, recognition, and valuation. I engage these questions centrally in my 
discussions of depathologization, and ask how activists (and some providers) make different kinds 
of demands with regard to health care and the state. How has trans health directed its attention in 
prior and contemporary instantiations? How have contemporary constructions of “health 
disparities,” for example, affected how trans individuals and “trans populations” are regarded and 
conceptualized?  How are concepts of structurally-produced harms relevant to emerging forms of 
trans health, and to what effects?  
 
METHODS 
My dissertation is a multi-sited ethnography, combining ethnographic interviews and 
observations with a multitude of other data sources. Between 2012 and 2017, I collected 
ethnographic data as well as regulations, laws, diagnostic manuals, web sites, images, and activist 
publications. My ethnographic research spanned multiple sites and spaces of interest—clinics, 
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organizations, protest sites, news and online media, and conferences. Nearly all of these were 
concentrated in two metropolitan cities: New York City and Buenos Aires.31 Although there were 
many other locales in which I might have grounded the work that would have been just as 
generative, I selected New York and Buenos Aires because: 1) each of these cities is home to self-
identified trans health “leaders,” many of whom are also involved in transnationally-coordinated 
work; 2) each was in the midst of an important set of regulatory and legal transformations regarding 
public provision of trans health care; and 3) these sites spanned the global North and South. 
Between 2013 and 2016, I interviewed 34 health care providers and activists, evenly split between 
each of these locales. Over the course of the study, I spent three non-continuous months 
conducting fieldwork in each city, becoming acquainted with the trans health landscapes in each site. 
In so doing, I traveled to a multitude of clinical spaces in each geographic site: hospitals, 
community clinics, therapists’ offices, and academic departments. I attended clinical trainings, went 
to provider conferences, and tracked changes to diagnostic classifications, care guidelines and 
protocols, and regulatory policies concerning trans health. In addition, I followed trans health 
activists and advocates to work, to political actions, to summits, and to films and artistic 
performances. I collected advocacy materials, activist editorials, blog posts, ad campaigns, and 
videos.  
Given the rapid transformations in the field, I struggled to maintain an up-to-date archive of 
these materials, as debates and material shifts seemed to careen in all directions with lightning speed. 
Over the course of field work, I took detailed fieldnotes during and after observations and 
interactions with informants, and wrote reflective and analytic memos across the full trajectory of 
data collection and analysis. Using ATLAS.ti qualitative analysis software, I thematically organized 
and coded transcripts, field notes, and other key data sources. In addition, I drew from Clarke’s 
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(2005) situational analysis to develop multiple maps to chart and track the shifting “situations” of 
trans health’s emergence.  
It is difficult, particularly in sociological symbolic interactionism, to parse methodology from 
epistemology. This field has historically refused a stark separation between these (Blumer 1959; 
Strauss and Corbin 1998). Feminist interactionist Star (1989) referred to the co-constitutiveness of 
ontology, epistemology, and practice as “theory/methods packages.” Star (1989) and Clarke (2005) 
extended the perspectives of Straussian grounded theory and its methodological rooting in symbolic 
interactionist and philosophical pragmatist epistemologies (e.g., Strauss and Corbin 1998). As Jenks 
(1995:12) observes, “method…is not the servant of theory: method actually grounds theory.”32  
Situational analysis thus mobilizes a post-structuralist account of grounded theory to enable 
iterative theorization of empirical data across a range of interrelated sites (Clarke 2005). This study 
combined situational analysis with ethnographic methods. Drawing also on the nimble methodologies of 
feminist science, technology, and medicine studies (STMS), I examined to human and non-human actors to 
interrogate how biomedical, regulatory, and activist currents converged as trans health care materialized in 
distinct geopolitical sites. While some actors and phenomena I observed are marginal (for example, 
explicitly “trans-supportive” providers are certainly the exception rather than the rule in medical 
practice), I assume that they remain crucial in “defining the situation” of trans health.33 This approach 
thus revealed a complex, multi-layered, and shifting set of landscapes that do not reduce trans health to a 
“thing” or a neatly contained field. Grounded theory methodologies center action and interaction rather 
than “subjects,” and this makes demands on researchers to attend to a broad and often messy field of 
inquiry, which perpetually exceeds the capacity of the project. Indeed, to treat the assemblage of trans 
health as anything but unruly and uncontainable would be a mistake and an unfaithful rendering. While I 
do not presume to represent trans health in its fullness—all research, after all, is partial—I strive to 
answer the question that Strauss and Glaser (1967) framed as a primary provocation of grounded theory: 
What is going on here?  
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OVERVIEW: TRANSMUTABLE CARE 
Several major—and wholly incomplete—transformations currently characterize shifting 
conceptualizations of trans health care: from psychopathology to difference; from diagnostic 
accuracy to health disparity; and from taxpayers’ burden to state-supported benefit. These thematic 
shifts cohere around several major events. Two of them are classificatory: 1) The diagnostic change 
from Gender Identity Disorder to Gender Dysphoria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM); 
and 2) the proposed introduction of Gender Incongruence in the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD). The other two are legal or regulatory: 1) The passage of the 2012 Gender Identity Law in 
Argentina; and 2) the elimination of New York State’s Medicaid exclusion for gender-confirming 
care in 2015. These classificatory and regulatory transformations were both produced by and 
profound had effects on landscapes of trans health, but they had particularly marked significance for 
questions of insurance reimbursement, state subsidies for care, and the public provision of gender 
confirming care. Given the sustained stratifications in the provision of trans health care,34 these 
shifts demanded direct engagement with questions of resource distribution and political economy.  
The classificatory changes I discuss are some of the most palpable forms of evidence of the 
departure from “transsexual medicine” (among other genealogically-linked fields) to “trans health” 
(Singer 2006). Diagnostic classifications have sparked protests, caused tense schisms, and become 
centers of gravity for trans health activism. While questions of representation circulate at the center 
of these debates, questions of practice are never far afield. In fact, providers and activists seem 
decreasingly interested in what diagnostic classifications actually mean in contrast to what practices 
they enable or preclude. Yet the economies of attention devalued by different diagnostic 
classifications, classificatory manuals, codes, and subcodes take shape within familiar power relations 
of geopolitics, race, class, and criminalization. 
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The regulatory changes I analyze are to some degree more peripheral in their public 
notoriety, but no less characteristic of trans health’s field formation. These also become charged 
sites of debate, conflict, and negotiation. These regulatory shifts also set precedence and join a 
growing archive of traveling “policy packages” (e.g., Reid 2005) that providers, activists, advocates, 
and policymakers continue to draw on throughout the world—with varying and sometimes 
unanticipated effects. 
Both classificatory and regulatory transformations have taken shape in large part through 
increasing coordination and negotiation among providers, activists, and advocates. In contrast to 
earlier antagonisms, present formations of trans health seem to indicate an increasing degree of 
cooperation. While such cooperation often takes places without consensus (Star 1993), many tense and 
polarized conflicts are presently playing out in the form of compromise and collaboration. This is 
not to imply that antagonisms do not remain, but to indicate that they have shifted and (at least for 
some people) diminished with the increasing formation of collaborative relationships, accompanied 
by trade-offs achieved through negotiations. 
It might seem as if such coordination would have a stabilizing effect on the field of trans 
health. Instead, I found it opened up a space within which multiple practices and politics are 
convincingly defined and mobilized as trans health. I characterize these dynamics through the 
relations of “transmutable care.” I elaborate on this phenomenon through several domains: 
classification and standardization, racialized citizenship, and depathologization—considering each 
through politics, place, and practice.  
 Transmutable care produces the contestations and partial shifts that characterize present 
forms of trans health. It does so through the conditions of possibility produced through cycles of 
classificatory breakdown and revision; through insistence on the salience of the “external 
environment” and structural violence as serious concerns; and through the ranging politics of 
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depathologizing regimes of trans health. The relations of transmutable care also arise from and 
reshape trans health’s confrontations with its situated parochialisms, demanding a flexibility and 
multiplicity that pull against the entrenchment of trans health as a potentially standardized or 
universalizable field. Yet the appeal of standardization and universality looms large for many 
providers and their desires for credibility and institutionalization when it comes to trans health.  As 
such, it remains an open question how transmutable care will persist in shaping transnational 
landscapes of trans health. It also remains to be seen how these proliferations may settle into 
material and discursive forms that might be undesirable or unrecognizable to trans health activists. 
At this point, though, the field is characterized by its very openness, multiplicity, and increasing 
utility in terms of achieving improvements in trans health care.  
CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1: Containing Unruliness: Classification and Negotiation of the “Trans Diagnosis” 
 
Here, I explore the place of diagnostic forms of classification in trans health. Tracing the 
“trans diagnosis” across its relatively brief life, I show how these terms, definitions, and 
classifications have become central sites of contestation over time and across geographic sites. 
Drawing on diagnostic manuals and activist writings, I interrogate how shifting terms and meanings 
have rarely if ever gained a modicum of stability when it comes to trans health and other related 
fields. As I describe, present revisions have transferred focus from “internal pathologies” of gender 
non-normativity to more social concepts of “distress” or “gender incongruence.” Such shifts, while 
they continue to rely on an anchoring “norm,” pivot away from the pathologizing problematization 
of individuals’ psychic development, and turn instead toward the subjugating social relations that 
suffuse the environments within which they live. This turn away from the “disordered individual” to 
the “dynamic social” is partial, but comprises one important dimension within which present 
iterations of trans health take shape. This shift resonates with turns in the U.S. and more broadly to 
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“health disparities,” “global inequities,” and “social determinants of health.” Yet the fact that trans 
diagnoses remain diagnoses reflects how it remains caught up in the “inertia” of infrastructural change 
(Bowker and Star 1999:14): health care financing bureaucracies cannot code for structural inequity, 
and thus the code remains.     
I empirically show how this perpetual process of breakdown and revision also characterizes 
less formalized identitarian classifications. Further, I suggest that the practices of delivering and 
financing care, legal regulation, and negotiating daily life and health are at the center of classificatory 
debates. Ontology and diagnostic accuracy are, for most actors, in the background if they are even 
of concern. Ongoing revision exemplifies the emergent field of trans health through its iterative, 
multiplicative, and diffractive effects. Negotiations around classification are thus one crucial domain 
through which trans health maintains a lack of closure with regard to trans health’s “proper” 
ontologies, epistemologies, and practices.  
 
Chapter 2: Epidemiological Rage: Population Biography, Biomedical Expertise, and the 
Quantified Politics of Recognition 
  
 This chapter draws on ethnographic and other empirical data to show how trans health-
based social movements strategically redefined notions of “risk” and “reduced life expectancy” to 
bring about major regulatory shifts in the public provision of trans health care. Focusing on 
Argentina’s Gender Identity Law and New York State’s elimination of a Medicaid exclusion 
prohibiting reimbursement for gender confirming care, I show how the shift from “individual 
pathology” to “structural inequity” was further retrenched through a turn to statistical sciences. I 
develop the notion of “population biography” to describe community-based studies that activists 
produced in the absence of epidemiological studies tracking health disparities among trans and 
gender non-normative people. Focusing in particular on a series of studies produced in Buenos 
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Aires by travesti activists, I describe how biographical narratives are combined with statistical data to 
foreground sexualized, gendered, and racialized subjugation and state violence as health risks. These 
studies—particularly in their efforts to estimate an overall trans life expectancy—proved important 
in the passage of the Gender Identity Law. New York activists and advocates similarly mobilized 
biographical narratives alongside descriptive statistics to make a case for the necessity of state 
coverage for gender confirming care. These differed, though, in that they foregrounded a cost-
benefit analysis, arguing not for formal inclusion into citizenship on moral grounds, but rather on 
economic grounds. Nonetheless, I show how epidemiological thinking and the “statistical turn” in 
trans studies have become crucial to present forms of trans activism and trans health. As a 
biopolitical project, I demonstrate how these activist interventions are then enfolded into aspirations 
for inclusion into both biopolitical and formal citizenships.  
 
Chapter 3: Diagnosing Wellness: Relations of Care in Feminist and Trans Health Politics 
and Practices  
 
The third chapter moves back to questions of diagnostics and “wellness” (contra 
psychopathology), but through an analytic of care politics. By mobilizing ethnographic interviews 
and observations, alongside web archives of recent debates, it explores the wildly varying dimensions 
that constitute different forms of trans depathologization. Here, I discuss how trans health in the US 
and Argentina have taken two distinct approaches to depathologization, and also how activists 
within each site differ markedly in their orientations to and objectives around such projects.  
I situate these discussions within a rehistoricization of “depathologization” movements in 
general. For example, although gay and lesbian depathologization projects in the U.S. in the 1970s 
would seem to form the blueprint for trans depathologization efforts, other social movements’ 
engagements with health care formations may align more closely with those of trans health activists. 
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Drawing on feminist health and disability activism, I show how trans depathologization—though 
not gay and lesbian depathologization—works through a dynamic I call “care without illness.” I 
expand on this concept to demonstrate some of the broader stakes of trans health and 
depathologization regimes and their close relations with other forms of care that turn on notions of 
“self-determination.”   
Against previous accounts that treat “depathologization” as a monolithic set of politics, I 
show how distinct commitments to resource distribution, representation, and access to care shape 
trans depathologization’s many forms. Here, I build on work that has begun to parse these differing 
positions (e.g., Burke 2011). I extend these reflections on social movement strategies to describe 
how distributive politics, governance, and nation also matter in depathologzation debates, 
demonstrating how strategies crystallize through health infrastructures. In so doing, I map out the 
varying positions that trans depathologizationists take up, and explore the stakes vis-à-vis questions 
of stigma, infrastructure, geopolitics, stratification, and coalitional solidarity. Lastly, I explore how 
trans health has taken up regimes of depathologization within its formal practices. I discuss the 
terms and stakes of this contingent uptake, and consider how these shifts reconfigure the relations 
of power and dynamics of care in trans health as an emergent field.  
 
Conclusion 
 I conclude the dissertation by discussing the thematic shifts that trans health has brought 
about: a reconceptualization of individual pathology into difference; a shift in attention from 
diagnostic accuracy to health disparity; and a partial change from “individual choice” to “medical 
necessity,” accompanied by demands on state-subsidized medicine. I summarize the theoretical 
contributions enabled by reflections on trans health, particularly in its public provision and its 
transnational forms. I also outline some of the implications of this work as it articulates more 
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broadly with transformations in medicine, debates about classification and citizenship, and the 
entanglements brought about by the various politics of care that shape these discussions. While the 
dynamics of transmutable care render it difficult to say precisely what trans health is, the very 
multiplicity of its enactments, as well as the stratifications it encodes and reproduces, tell us a great 
deal about its practice.  
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CHAPTER 1: CONTAINING UNRULINESS: CLASSIFICATION AND NEGOTIATION OF 
THE “TRANS DIAGNOSIS” 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Classifications have been the lightning rods of trans health for a quarter century or more. 
This chapter explores the most salient classifications and standards shaping the landscape of trans 
health, and examines how both controversy and collaboration have brought about shifts in their 
meanings, arrangements, and effects. I describe how different terms, definitions, and diagnostic 
requirements have become central sites of debate and negotiation in trans health practice over time 
and in different places. Much research in science, technology, and medicine studies (STMS) and 
beyond focuses on how classifications seem common-sense, static, natural, and universal—even 
though they in fact are situated, contingent, unruly, and often hotly debated. By contrast, 
classifications central to trans health appear to be in a state of near constant contestation, and 
change.  
This chapter examines how the character of trans classification controversies have shifted 
over time as pitched struggles between providers and activists have given way to diverse 
collaborations and negotiations. I assert that providers, activists and advocates,35 and other actors 
have focused on diagnostic classifications as primary sites through which to cooperatively hash out 
the terms of trans health practice. The very process of defining “trans” in trans health care practices 
has thus been in an extended period of openness. Within this protracted period, conflicts, 
contingencies, and differing objectives have foregrounded rather than foreclosed the wild 
multiplicity of transness with respect to health. Many studies of classification analyze instances of 
breakdown to articulate the ethics, contingencies, and politics involved in classification and 
standardization processes. But breakdown—or perhaps more appropriately, short cycles of 
breakdown and revision—are trans health’s constant state. This chapter looks empirically to 1) 
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diagnostic revisions, and 2) the competing demands of local practice and transnational relevance to 
reflect on classification issues in trans health. 
 The chapter begins with a discussion of perhaps the foundational classificatory 
problem of trans health: classification practices relevant to gender. I draw from diagnostic manuals 
to examine the classifications most frequently mobilized in trans health. I then define the 
classifications and diagnoses that are central to various forms of trans health, especially those most 
relevant in the U.S. and Argentina.36 Very briefly, I explore histories of these classifications, and 
discusses how activists, health care providers, and others understand classificatory stakes. I then 
outline how various classifications have been at the center of field-defining conflicts in trans health.  
Subsequently, the chapter focuses on three events relevant to classification in trans health: 1) 
the diagnostic change from “Gender Identity Disorder” to “Gender Dysphoria” in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (APA 2000; 2013); 2) the work to develop “Gender Incongruence” in the 
International Classification of Diseases; and 3) the emergence of “trans*” (“trans asterisk”) in the 
global South. In describing the dynamics leading up to and following these changes, the chapter 
demonstrates how activists and providers have increasingly come to collaborate in multiple 
endeavors to reclassify, redefine, and restandardize trans health. In so doing, I show how the 
boundaries differentiating activists, advocates, health care providers, policymakers, and other 
advocates have become increasingly permeable. Within this, I discuss how the knowledge demands 
of “expertification” (Epstein 1996) become strongly multidirectional in the case of trans health. 
Through these examples, I empirically explore how, over recent decades, classifications have 
shifted from sites of antagonistic conflict to sites of negotiation and collaboration. In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, trans activists pushed back on health care professionals (among others) to criticize 
pathologizing classificatory processes associated with accessing gender confirming care (see Chapter 
3). One of their major criticisms, consistent with other health activist agendas, was that trans people 
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were not included in making the decisions that would drastically affect their lives. Through a variety 
of avenues, trans people were gradually enrolled in projects of classificatory revision and 
development. These positions, perhaps unsurprisingly, remained subordinated and/or minoritarian. 
Nonetheless, once activists and advocates became increasingly involved, marked shifts took place in 
diagnostic descriptions of trans people, as well as how trans health care was imagined and arranged.  
While classificatory debates may appear to be definitional, empirical data suggest that these 
may be understood more robustly as debates over actual practices. This chapter explores some of 
the major collaborations between activists and health care providers to examine the dominant 
concerns within and across involved social worlds. Mobilizing a social worlds/arenas analysis and 
positional maps (Clarke 2005), it shows how varying definitional and trans care practice concerns are 
formulated and hashed out through negotiation and "cooperation without consensus" (Star 1993).  
While conflicts over the universality and mobility of “transgender” with respect to health 
care suffuse the field, these are especially palpable in debates at a transnational scale. For example, I 
describe how “Gender Incongruence” in the ICD and the identitarian/communitarian intervention 
of “trans*” in the global South each work to critique the limits of “transgender,” and also to make 
more mobile the enabling apparatuses of trans health and activism. 
The chapter concludes by positing that trans health is characterized by ongoing 
collaborations among multiple actors, generating perpetual cycles of breakdown and revision. Such 
processes open up spaces within which ongoing revisions—even more than specific kinds of 
patients or practices—exemplify the emergent field. As one site of exploring the concept of 
“transmutable care,” negotiations around classification and standardization are central in maintaining 
a potential openness with regard to trans health’s ontologies and practices. I suggest that such 
negotiation processes at least potentially maintain a responsiveness to changes and shifting 
conditions of possibility in the politics and practices of both health care and trans politics. Perpetual 
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revision seems to strike a balance between flexibility and containment vis-à-vis the unruliness of 
classifications.   
 
CLASSIFICATION AND RELATIONS OF POWER 
A growing array of embodiments and enactments of gender non-normativity are articulated 
through the lexicon of “transgender.” “Trans,” and to some degree “trans*” are increasingly 
common descriptions of gender non-normativity. Like nearly all terms describing gender non-
normativity, these remain contested. In the past quarter century, they have been taken up across a 
wide variety of socially, politically, and culturally situated groups and places. “Transgender” also 
organizes an increasingly intelligible “patient population”37 (Aizura 2010; Cohen 1995; Dutta 2013). 
Thus the figure of the transgender patient has also gained transnational salience and visibility over 
recent decades, and comprises the presumptive center of trans health.  
The “transgender population” has also emerged in the past decade as of interest to human 
rights advocates (Open Society Foundations 2013; United Nations Development Programme 2013), 
lawmakers and policy advocates (Boudou et al. 2012; Department of Health, New York State 2015), 
activists (Berkins 2008; Burke 2011), and of course health care providers (Alegria 2011; Coleman et 
al. 2012). Trans individuals (among others) put considerable pressure on extant classifications of sex 
and gender (legal, biomedical, and social, to name a few). Contemporary biomedicine constitutes an 
important arena in which these classifications and their consequences are worked out.  
Various forms of classification are relevant to each different conceptualization of trans 
health, and diagnostic classifications are only one set of these. For the sake of brevity, in this chapter 
I focus mainly on diagnostic classifications though I briefly engage several others. Many studies of 
trans health—most originating in public health, medicine, nursing and social work—focus on the 
problem of classification (e.g. Israel, Tarver & Shaffer 2001; Kenegy 2005; Gorton 2007). However, 
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with a few notable exceptions, there is a dearth of analyses that engage broader theorizing of 
classification.38 Drawing on feminist STMS analyses, this chapter demonstrates how stratification is 
reproduced and contested through the very processes of classificatory revision. 
Classification shapes, encodes, and enacts relations of power. Bowker and Star (1999:10) 
define classification as “a spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world,” and “a 
classification system” as “a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) into which things can be put to then 
do some kind of work.” Significantly, scholars of classification do not take such orderings to be 
“natural” nor “universal,” but see them as constructed, using specific organizing principles that seek 
some degree of mutual exclusivity between categories within a system—whether formal or informal 
(Bowker and Star 1999:10–11). In their discussion of classification and Pap smears, Adele Clarke 
and Monica Casper (1996:601) highlight how “different entities (people, animals, plants, diseases, 
etc.) are organized into classificatory groups,” and how this “reveals something of the social, 
cultural, symbolic, and political contexts within which classifications occur.”  
As Foucault (1994 [1966]) also argues, historically and geographically situated modes of 
distinguishing entities from each other encode specific relations of power. Bowker and Star 
(1999:26, emphasis added) describe how classificatory power dynamics manifest empirically, as “lives 
of individuals are broken, twisted, and torqued by their encounters” with “the cage of classification 
systems.” Spade (2011[2015]:11) further asserts that such a classificatory and regulatory landscape of 
“administrative violence” characterizes states’ stratified management of trans existence. He asserts 
that classifications not only produce meaning, they also differentially distribute vulnerability and 
security. The contingency of classifications is thus most apparent in instances of ill-fit. Depending 
on position, stakes, and material consequences, classifiers and the classified usually experience such 
instances of ill-fit quite differently. Yet in the case of trans health, each actor is expected to 
understand and in a sense bridge these distinct experiences. This chapter shows how such 
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“torqueing” takes place not only between classifications and individual biographies, but also between 
particular classificatory schema and national formations—with people and specific “populations” 
also caught, squeezed, and twisted. 
Many of the central debates in trans health hinge on the “trans diagnosis,” its validity, its 
ability to capture gender non-normativity, and its ability to bring about specific outcomes for both 
providers and patients. The “trans diagnosis” does not exist in the singular, but is rather a gloss on 
the many distinct and shifting diagnoses that appear in varying psychiatric and medical classificatory 
systems throughout the world. The very notion of gender non-normativity as relevant to and 
appropriately managed by medicine springs largely from early- to mid-twentieth century sexology, 
centered primarily in Europe and the U.S. (Meyerowitz 2002). The varying classificatory diagnoses 
that have emerged since this point carry the vestiges of sexualized, gendered and implicitly racialized 
codifications of “deviance” found in their origins.39 The pathologizing impulse of these classificatory 
genealogies—discussed further in Chapter 3—become a central site of tension in some of the 
conflicts defining trans health as an emergent field. These struggles became broadly apparent not 
only through the emergence of trans health, but also in related fields, such as HIV/AIDS treatment 
and prevention and feminist health. 
Two thematic figures haunt the historical imagination vis-à-vis trans diagnosis, and remain 
perpetually present in debates about classification vis-à-vis geopolitics, classification, culture, 
medicine, and difference. Conceptualizations of the “historical trans subject” draw at once from the 
gender non-normative anthropological object and from the medical/psychiatric object.40 These two 
figures are opposed along a variety of axes: pre-modern/modern (APA 1980; Nanda 1999); 
East/West (or global North/global South) (Boellstorff 2004; Kulick 1998); and 
“tradition”/technomedical intervention (Käng 2012; Ocha 2012). Far from being distinct, however, 
Skidmore (2011), Aizura (2011), and Hsu (2013) point out that these historical figures are produced 
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in tandem. As Hsu argues, colonized and “racialized bodies are crucial to the intelligibility” of the 
medically-imagined trans body (Hsu 2013, paragraph 4). Stoler (1995), Somerville (2000), and Terry 
(1999) describe how various national projects of sexual and gendered normalization depend on 
implicitly—and sometimes explicitly—racialized dynamics of power and subjugation. Such relations 
take on a different form in contemporary classificatory debates, but perpetually circulate (even if 
more subtly). 
 Classification also involves processes of formalization and standardization. In this chapter, I 
discuss mainly formalized classifications—specifically, diagnoses. But I also touch on less formalized 
classifications, like “trans*,” which are not similarly standardized. While classification and 
standardization remain “two sides of the same coin” (Bowker and Star 1995:15), I focus here on 
classification.  
At some level, the distinction between classification and standardization is awkward. As 
Bowker and Star (1999:33) suggest, “[s]ystems of classification (and of standardization) form a 
juncture of social organization, moral order, and layers of technical integration.” Bowker’s (1994) 
methodological approach of “infrastructural inversion,” later taken up by Bowker and Star (1999), 
suggests “recognizing the depths of interdependence of technical networks and standards, on the 
one hand, and the real work of politics and knowledge production on the other” (Bowker and Star 
1999:34). To examine classification on its own sidesteps its inextricability from modes of 
standardization. Even simply to follow the process of a male-to-female trans person deciding to 
change the gender classification marker on her legal identification documentation is revealing of the 
inseparability of diagnostic classifications, medical and legal standardization, and other 
infrastructures including insurance, judicial, administrative, and medical.  
Spade (2011[2015]) and other scholars and activists describe the tangle of apparatuses and 
regulations that such a process involves in the U.S. Prior to the passage of the Gender Identity Law 
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in Argentina, Cabral and Viturro (2006) describe a distinct but similarly entangled web of challenges 
to obtain a similar administrative change. Gender reclassification in Argentina is presently more 
streamlined, but the infrastructures through which people attempt to accomplish such work remain 
entangled. While these and other entanglements of standardized practices and infrastructures are 
highly relevant to classificatory analyses, for the sake of clarity and focus, I presently leave to one 
side a more thorough discussion of standards.  
While it would seem that classification defines entities ontologically, Mol (2002) suggests 
otherwise. Ethnographically examining a Dutch hospital, she focuses on atherosclerosis. She argues 
that multiple actors—patients, pathologists, surgeons, radiologists, and others— interact with the 
disease in different ways as to produce a multiplicity of objects that would seem deceptively to 
condense as a singular thing: “atherosclerosis.” Mol (2002:33) writes, “in practices, objects are 
enacted,” reflecting not on what atherosclerosis is, but rather on how it is done. Different kinds of 
actors also enact “transgender” in ways that reveal its multiplicities. Yet unlike atherosclerosis, the 
multiplicities of transgender are far more evident and explicit: there is less consensus in defining or 
describing the state of being transgender. These multiplicities circulate through naming practices, 
scientific studies, diagnostic classifications, social service programs, care standards, legal categories, 
and activist formations. Furthermore, while atherosclerosis involves what can fairly unequivocally be 
called a disease, there is less consensus about what “transgender” describes with regard to illness, 
biological and psychic phenomena, cause, and biography. Thus, even as the sites within which 
atherosclerosis is enacted spill over from the hospital into homes and multiple publics, at some level 
it remains a phenomenon that happens in and to certain bodies and that affects veins. Transgender 
is more loosely constructed, arguably less biomedically anchored, and with less agreement even 
among those who would describe themselves as “transgender” as to what it is or how it is done. 
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 The politics of classification comprise a central matter over which activists and providers 
have historically clashed (see Chapter 3). Cromwell, Green, and Denny (2001)—all trans activists or 
advocates and professionals41—discuss some of the struggles over the proliferation of language to 
describe “gender variance.” Presenting findings from a survey about trans people’s use of language, 
they included a schema of certain terms and their origins (reproduced below):  
 
Transgender Community Terms  Medical Community Terms 
Crossdresser Transvestite 
Transgender Transsexual 
Transition Sex Reassignment 
Gender Variance Gender Dysphoria, G.I.D. 
Transsexual Woman Male Transsexual 
Transman, FTM Female Transsexual 
 
Table 1: Adapted from “Terms and their Origins,” from Cromwell, Green, and Denny (2001). 
 
They introduce their survey results with a brief discussion of language usage: “[W]e are seeing the 
emergence of terms originating within the transgender community[,] which seem to be replacing 
terms which originated from the psychological and medical communities” (Cromwell, Green, and 
Denny 2001:Paragraph 4). These authors echo the conventional wisdom that transgender’s origins 
are bottom-up and “community-based.” “Transgender,” in this sense, is cast as a collective 
community rejoinder that confronts the “medical community’s” diagnostically-focused taxonomies, 
which are expressed largely through “transsexuality.” Classificatory language thus becomes a site of 
community-based resistance against the diagnostic and often pathologizing impetus of medical 
practice.  Indeed, “transgender” is presently treated as an “umbrella term” (Currah 2006) that 
generally incorporates multiple forms of gender non-normativity, and that foregrounds collective 
identity over diagnostic likeness.  
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 Since this presentation (2001),42 many of the terms these authors characterize as originating 
in “transgender community”—and indeed, many more—have been taken up by medical providers 
and within various classifications and standards relevant to trans health. This is one of the 
transformations that Singer (2006:615) locates in describing a shift from a “pathological” to a 
“community-based” model of care provision for trans people. As Singer (2006) and Meyerowitz 
(2002) both indicate, transsexual medicine exercised a near-complete refusal to collaborate with 
activists. Entering the 2000s, though, Singer (2006) describes how “community members” worked 
with providers in the shift to trans health, largely in the ambit of “competence trainings,” which 
focused on linguistic and other pragmatic suggestions to providers from community trainers. As I 
will show, this has to do in large part with the increasingly collaborative relations and permeable 
boundaries between providers and activists. The results of these cooperative interactions are often 
figured by medical providers as enlisting community advisory members, community input, or other 
expressions of community partnership.  
 Yet as Valentine (2007) argues in Imagining Transgender, to presume that a “trans community” 
(let al.one “medical community”) is a discernible, self-evident formation would be an error. He 
writes, “I realized that a transgender community does not exist outside the contexts of those very 
entities which are concerned to find a transgender community: social service organizations, social 
science accounts, and activist discourses” (Valentine 2007:68). His “ethnography of a category” thus 
explores the “imagined unity” of “transgender,” focusing on the racialized, classed, and gendered 
fissures and hierarchies that are obscured in its ostensible unity and identifiability. This account 
invokes different modes of torqueing than medical or diagnostic modes, but these remain important 
to questions of trans health—especially given the increasingly “expertified” position of the “trans 
community member.”  
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However, as Valentine (2007) notes, “transgender” has conferred markedly uneven material 
changes and benefits among the “community” it claims. Spade (2011[2015]) concurs, asserting that 
legal equality approaches to trans politics, for example, violently reinforce such hierarchies rather 
than dismantling the classificatory and regulatory systems that produce the differential valuation of 
life. At stake are questions of how well “transgender” fits for different people, how it is 
institutionalized, and who it organizes, as well as familiar questions of representation and claims to 
“speak for” a community. 
While Valentine shares one of my ethnographic sites of New York City, his reflections focus 
squarely on U.S.-based classificatory struggles. To examine classificatory struggles at a transnational 
level is to introduce another scale through which ontological and political debates are waged. The 
extent to which “torqueing” is at play at this level is evident in early appearances of the term 
“trans*” in the global South in the early 2000s. These claimed that U.S. and European accounts of 
gender non-normativity dominated the ostensibly “international” field of trans health and other 
fields of trans politics. Funding streams, they asserted, also followed what Chakrabarty (2000:6) and 
other postcolonial scholars (e.g., Hall 1992) characterize as the historicist logic of “first in the West, 
and then elsewhere.”43 Global South activists, cognizant of the potential ill fit of “transgender” to 
describe the breadth of their political allies and constituents, thus appended an asterisk to funders’ 
language of “trans” and “transgender.” The asterisk worked to modify “trans,” and therefore to 
cheekily and implicitly reject its universal reach. Activists maintained the terminology of “trans” to 
enable the possibility of accessing funding streams, but their addition of the asterisk troubled the 
presumptive relevance of “trans” to travestis and other groups that do not use the language of 
“transgender.” Political economy and frames of “development” thus also shape classificatory 
debates, and inform how torqueing takes place at varying scales.  
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At times, activist responses to problems of ill fit and torque appear as the diverse actions of 
an “unruly public,” as de Saille (2014) describes in analyzing public participation in the development 
of technoscientific research agendas. These paired forms of “unruliness”—classificatory and 
political—might be theorized together in the case of trans health. Such multi-dimensional unruliness 
also gestures to what Khanna and colleagues (2013) call “unruly politics.” While they use this term 
to describe recent mass social movement uprisings, I suggest that “unruliness” also comprises some 
of the conditions to which trans health is perpetually responding—in terms of classificatory torque 
as well as certain activist demands. Unruly politics, for Khanna and colleagues (2013:14), “draws its 
power from transgressing…the rules of the political game” while coordinating actions based on a 
sense of “what is right and just.” In practice, negotiation between providers and activists is far less 
unruly than the politics that Khanna and colleagues (2013) describe, given that proponents of 
classificatory changes who gain a place at the table are willing to negotiate within the terms of 
biomedicine. But the underlying unruliness that persistently destabilizes classificatory efforts remains 
at play, at times pressing against the very foundations of diagnostic classification and hierarchical 
provider-patient relations. Furthermore, stratified forms of ill fit become a central issue for social 
movements that are more inclined to reject the rules of the game (discussed in Chapter 3). 
 
GENDERING THE PROBLEM LIST 
Clarissa, a newly practicing nurse practitioner, describes the conundrum of charting when it 
comes to caring for transgender patients: “There's no template for a trans person…There's not even 
a question, it's just male/female. And all the providers, they're like, just write it in the notes. Or in 
the problem list, is where it would go” (Clarissa Interview, July 25, 2013). This literal and figurative 
space of the “problem list” frames one of the foundational problems for trans health: how to 
classify patients’ sex or gender?  
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Analyzing classification—particularly in the realm of medical nosology and clinical 
practice—forms one of the theoretical and empirical cornerstones of transgender studies (e.g., Stone 
1992; Hines 2007; Burke 2011). But these tend to focus squarely on how gender non-normativity is 
clinically defined and described—centering largely on questions of diagnosis. These interests remain 
centrally relevant to my reflections. But I suggest that other elements of classification also matter: 
the systems within which they are embedded; how people work around them; and how they 
coordinate action.  
  The problem list was developed in the last 1960s as an area in the medical chart that “helps 
[physicians] to define and follow clinical problems one by one and then systematically to relate and 
resolve them” (Weed 1971:3) Intended as a less-standardized space for clinical reflection and 
synthesis, its uses are multiple, and it does not always work as intended. For Clarissa (Interview, July 
25, 2013), the problem list was simply a space in an electronic record that she knew providers would 
look at. As a provider who was personally and politically committed to caring well for her trans 
patients, she thought that letting other providers know right away that a patient was trans was of the 
utmost importance. She thought this might prevent some of the frequent awkward moments that 
trans people experience in health care settings.44 
Even with a plethora of diagnostic options on the chart to describe the medical or 
psychiatric condition of gender non-normativity, providers face a peculiar and remarkably mundane 
problem when it comes to charting basic patient demographics: Is the “male” or “female” box most 
appropriate? Clarissa (Interview, July 25, 2013) notes the absurdity of this situation as she describes 
her efforts to more effectively chart patients’ gender by pushing for changes in electronic charting 
capabilities with Epic, an electronic medical charting vendor in the U.S.: “I have been inquiring…‘do 
you just have to ask this company to give you another button? …Has this company not invented 
this button?...What is the story on this?’” 
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 “Residual categories” and the persistently defiant category of “Other” vex classificatory 
systems that aspire to stability and closure. Residual categories serve multiple functions: they 
distribute uncertainty; they do the “good enough” job of partially categorizing that which would 
otherwise resist categorization; and they signal ambiguity while eluding uncertainty on the part of the 
classifier (Bowker and Star 1999:149). In some cases, they serve a “bootstrapping” function by 
locating where more explicit categories should exist. Ad hoc categories often emerge from these 
(Bowker and Star 1999:276). In fact, “transgender,” “other,” or a blank space in which to write one’s 
sex/gender45 increasingly appear on intake forms and in medical charts. This is likely partly 
attributable to the collaborative work of providers, activists, and advocates, and several groups have 
published recommendations about how to best chart for trans patients (e.g., Deutch, Green, Keatly 
et al. 2013; Tate, Ledbetter, & Youssef 2012; Cahill & Makadon 2013).  
Clarissa (Interview July 25, 2013) struggled to find a way to identify trans patients’ self-
identified gender to her colleagues. Beyond wanting patients to be able to access gender-confirming 
care, she was worried about how other providers would treat her patients for health issues irrelevant 
to gendered enactment or embodiment. In this concern, Clarissa identifies how the imperative for 
sexed/gendered legibility spans the whole of health care practice. The proliferation of new boxes, 
two-question methods for assessing gender categories, and ad hoc practices like Clarissa’s use of the 
problem list are just some of the strategies that people use to intervene in the conundrums produced 
by this imperative. But the elusiveness of sexed/gendered legibility is far from a new problem in 
medicine—in fact, many argue that it is medicine’s techniques of power that in large part produce this 
problem. As Foucault (1990), Stoler (1995), and others argue, medicine is a key (though certainly not 
sole) site through which processes of normalization are articulated and hierarchies of existence are 
instantiated.  
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The following sections draw on ethnographic, textual, and web-based data to outline and 
analyze the classifications and standards most relevant—both presently and in recent history—to 
trans health. I highlight several struggles that show how classification and standardization have 
become central sites of meaning-making with regard to both ontology and practice. In contrast to 
Stone’s (1992) characterization of trans health as a “face off’ between providers and trans people, I 
suggest that conflicts have shifted from professional to political lines of division.46 Some providers 
hold fast to diagnostic descriptions of transness that define it as pathological or problematic, and are 
most concerned with diagnostic accuracy when it comes to classificatory debates (e.g., McHugh 
1992; 2012). In contrast, an increasing number of providers—many politically aligned with trans 
people if not trans-identified themselves—are more interested in providing what they see as “good 
care” to trans patients (Lev 2004; Deutsch 2012; Karasic and Drescher 2005; Coleman et al. 2012). 
In this regard, classificatory debates can become a site through which to work with “trans 
communities” to identify what comprises “good care” in practice—even as they may inadvertently 
hold certain professional, racialized, classed, and gendered hierarchies stable. 
 
SHIFTING CLASSIFICATIONS 
A variety of classification systems and standards converge in the landscape of trans health. 
Specific diagnoses mean and do different things for medical billers, physicians, patients, 
epidemiologists, support group members, and activists (to name a few), and vary from place to place 
as well. Due in part to these ranging stakes, categories emerge and shift iteratively, and different 
actors resist when classifications are not sufficient for the work that they do. Several providers I 
interviewed in New York, for example, referred to the “creative” practice of diagnosing trans 
patients with endocrine disorder to facilitate insurance coverage. Ultimately, formal classificatory 
changes depend on the ability to leverage authority, expertise, cooperation and some degree of 
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cooperation (Bowker and Star 1999; Clarke and Casper 1996; Latour 1990). Informal classificatory 
changes may require far less cooperation, but may later influence institutionalized shifts. In all such 
iterations the cooperation may or may not bring about genuine consensus (Star 1993). A new 
classificatory formation may be acceptable or possible through negotiation without being viewed as 
ideal or even close to it. 
 This section provides an overview of the classifications most relevant to trans health 
practice, both historically and presently. Table 1 below charts the shifts in two of the major 
classificatory systems within which the “trans diagnosis” has been administered in the U.S. and 
Argentina (as well as many other geographic sites): The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) and 
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD). Having entered the ICD in 1975 and the DSM in 1980, 
the “trans diagnosis” has moved between these classificatory systems itinerantly.  
The DSM is published by the U.S.-based American Psychiatric Association, but its 
circulation and consequences are much broader. In fact, its diagnoses comprise most of the mental 
health chapter of the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (the 
ICD), the diagnostic system used in most of the world. Yet the appearance of “Trans-sexualism” in 
the ICD-9 predated the entry of “Transsexualism” in the DSM-III. Subsequently, the ICD took up 
the language of “Gender Identity Disorder.” Recently, the DSM has reconceptualized the “trans 
diagnosis” as “Gender Dysphoria,” and the upcoming ICD-11 revision is slated to adopt “Gender 
Incongruence,” as of 2018. The extent of continuities and distinctions between classifications in 
each “bible” of classification is matched by shifts within each source.  
In addition, the trans diagnosis migrates between chapters, and there are other shifts in 
description, emphasis, essential features, and differential diagnoses (APA 1980; 1987; 1994; 2000; 
2013; ICD 1975; 1990; 2000). Through structuralist analysis, it might be possible to read the 
meaning of the trans diagnosis through its diagnostic neighbors, which range from exhibitionism to 
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tic disorders. Yet the distinctively and rapidly iterative character of its placement seems to elude 
rather than stabilize its definability.     
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Table 1.  
Medical Classifications and “Trans Diagnoses” 
Source Classifications and 
Subtypes 
Chapter Neighbor 
Classifications 
DSM III (1980) Gender Identity 
Disorders 
Psychosexual 
Disorders 
Paraphilias (e.g., 
Fetishism, 
Transvestism, 
Zoophilia, Pedophilia); 
psychosexual 
dysfunctions 
(Inhibited sexual 
desire, Inhibited sexual 
excitement, Premature 
ejaculation); Other 
psychosexual disorders 
(e.g., Ego-dystonic 
homosexuality) 
302.5 Transsexualism 
302.60 Gender ID 
Disorder of Childhood 
302.85 Atypical 
Gender ID Disorder 
DSM-III-R 
(1987) 
Gender Identity 
Disorders 
Disorders Usually 
First Evident in 
Infancy, Childhood, 
or Adolescence 
Disruptive behavior 
disorders; Anxiety 
disorders of childhood 
or adolescence; Eating 
disorders; Tic 
disorders; Elimination 
disorders; Speech 
disorders  
302.60 Gender ID 
Disorder of Childhood 
302.5 Transsexualism 
302.85 Gender ID 
Disorder of 
Adolescence or 
Adulthood, 
nontreanssexual type 
(GIDAANT) 
302.85 Gender ID 
Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified 
DSM-IV (1994) Gender Identity 
Disorders 
Sexual and Gender 
Identity Disorders 
Sexual dysfunctions 
(e.g., Sexual Desire 
Disorders, Sexual 
Arousal Disorders, 
Orgasmic Disorders), 
paraphilias (e.g., 
Exhibitionism, 
Fetishism, Pedophilia, 
Transvestic Fetishism) 
302.6 Gender Identity 
Disorder in Children 
302.85 Gender Identity 
Disorder in 
Adolescents and 
Adults 
302.6 Gender Identity 
Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified 
DSM-IV TR 
(2000) 
Gender Identity 
Disorders 
Sexual and Gender 
Identity Disorders 
Sexual dysfunctions 
(e.g., Sexual Desire 
Disorders, Sexual 
Arousal Disorders, 
302.6 Gender Identity 
Disorder in Children 
 57 
302.85 Gender Identity 
Disorder in 
Adolescents or Adults 
Orgasmic Disorders), 
paraphilias (e.g., 
Exhibitionism, 
Fetishism, Pedophilia, 
Transvestic Fetishism) 
302.6 Gender Identity 
Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified 
DSM-V (2013) 302.85 (F64.9) Gender 
Dysphoria 
Gender Dysphoria No others, only 
diagnosis in chapter 
ICD-9 (1979) 302.5 Trans-sexualism 
(Excludes 302.3 
Transvestism) 
Mental disorders, 
(under heading “302 
Sexual Deviations 
and Disorders”) 
Homosexuality; 
Zoophilia; Pedophilia; 
Transvestism; 
Disorders of 
psychosexual identity; 
Psychosexual 
dysfunction 
302.50 With 
unspecified sexual 
history 
302.51 With asexual 
history 
302.52 With 
homosexual history 
302.53 With 
heterosexual history 
ICD-10 (1992) F64 Gender Identity 
Disorders 
Mental and 
Behavioral Disorders 
Habit and impulse 
disorders; Enduring 
personality changes; 
Specific personality 
disorders; Disorders of 
sexual preference; 
Psychological and 
behavioural disorders 
associated with sexual 
development and 
orientation 
F64.0 Transsexualism 
F64.1 Dual-role 
transvestism 
F64.2 Gender identity 
disorder of childhood 
F64.8 Other gender 
identity disorder 
F64.9 Gender identity 
disorder, unspecified 
ICD-11 
(Forthcoming) 
Gender Incongruence Conditions Related 
to Sexual Health 
Sexual dysfunctions; 
Sexual pain disorders; 
Changes in male 
genital anatomy; 
Changes in female 
genital anatomy; 
Paraphilic disorders; 
Adrenogenital 
disorders; 
Predominantly 
sexually transmitted 
infections 
Gender Incongruence 
in Childhood (?) 
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 Much controversy has marked each of these shifts. Moreover, in the 1990s, trans activists 
loudly rejected the need to be diagnosed as having Gender Identity Disorder to be eligible for gender 
confirming care. Accordingly, Stone (1992) described the relations between trans people and 
providers around this time as a “battleground.” For many trans people, “the letter”—or the 
diagnostic confirmation that psychiatrists and psychologists drafted for surgeons, endocrinologists, 
and primary care doctors to confirm a person’s “medical need” to seek biomedical care—came to 
signify a site of coercion and normalization. Standardized treatment regimes, such as those issues by 
the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association (HBIGDA) (now the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH)) recommended that people undergo 
extended mental health treatment prior to such a letter being issued.47 Such often polarized struggles 
persisted through the 1990s and early 2000s. Many trans people and those who considered 
themselves their allies began organizing online to respond to invitations for public comment and 
joining professional associations and advisory groups. Providers—many emerging from HIV/AIDS 
health care practice and feminist women’s health care settings—joined these efforts as “trans-
supportive” or “trans-affirming” providers.  
Presently, trans health is a field that focuses on relieving “distress” and is conversant in what 
might be described as “structurally stratified” aspects of health care. For the most part, trans health 
providers seem to place far less stake in diagnostic accuracy, and are more concerned with trans 
people being able to access care. They advocate describing the negative effects of “transphobia” 
(Bockting & Ehrbar 2006) and “institutionalized social control” (Lev 2005:38). Many of these 
providers describe themselves as trans, or align themselves politically or personally with trans or 
LGBT people. 
This period of relative calm should not however be interpreted to imply that trans health 
practice has achieved consensus in its views on classification and its uses. Kenneth Zucker, for 
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example, is a psychiatrist who advocates so-called “reparative” therapy for young people for whom 
their gendered enactment or embodiment does not align with normative expectations. For Zucker 
and others, the ostensible accuracy of the DSM diagnosis enables providers to work to 
therapeutically alter “disordered” expressions of gender prior to recommending what they see as the 
last resort: the biomedical techniques of gender confirming care. Zucker remains an important figure 
in psychiatry, and he served as the chair of the Sexual and Gender Identity Disorder Work Group 
for the DSM-5 revision—an appointment that was met with much alarm and criticism from both 
activists and trans-supportive providers. 
While many of these debates have centered in the U.S., diagnostic classifications remain 
relevant in Argentina, despite the Gender Identity Law having obviated the need for diagnoses to 
access gender-confirming care. Classifications still matter in two main ways. First, many activists and 
some providers engage in transnational collaborative work. Argentina’s law has become a model for 
a spate of new “Gender Identity Laws” throughout Latin American and beyond, and people who 
worked as part of the coalition have been asked to consult with groups working on such projects 
elsewhere. Given that many nations use ICD or DSM codes for diagnosing trans people, 
transnationally-oriented Argentinian activists remain affected by and interested in transformations in 
both diagnostic systems. Second, even though the Gender Identity Law eliminates the requirement 
for diagnosis, some Argentinian providers continue to use it and to insist on its validity and 
importance. For example, one Buenos Aires provider who positioned himself as an expert in caring 
for trans*48 patients insisted on the relevance of psychiatric diagnoses, and continues to use them 
several years after the law’s passage (Jaime Interview, July 28, 2015). In contrast, Argentinian 
activists, like Antonio (Interview, July 25, 2015), describe feeling frustrated by the “U.S. psychiatric 
imperialism” that dominates transnational conversations about trans health and questions of access. 
He and others view DSM debates with some measure of exasperation. This in part influenced 
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Antonio’s decision to work with the World Health Organization in the revision of the ICD 
(discussed below). 
The positions of advocates and activists range even more broadly vis-à-vis their desired 
objectives for trans diagnosis. On the one hand, they agree with each other and with trans-
supportive providers that questions of access should drive how the trans diagnosis is defined and 
situated. Yet on the other, they differ markedly about how to achieve broad access to gender-
confirming care for trans people. “Depathologizing” projects figure centrally in activists’ and 
advocates’ collaborative work with trans-supportive health care providers (Chapter 3 discusses their 
range of positions in more detail). Objectives range along multiple lines and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
differ by geopolitical location. Activists in Argentina developed the Gender Identity Law—which 
had a profound effect on how gender-confirming care is organized in the nation—with minimal 
participation from health care providers. The only participating providers were themselves already 
members of the activist organizations working with the coalition that drafted the law (Nico 
Interview, August 3, 2015). Activists in the U.S. expressed various concerns about potential effects 
and consequences of the shifting diagnoses. Some worried about stigma while others were 
concerned that less “pathologizing” diagnoses would disproportionately benefit those who were 
already likely to have greater access to care (see Chapter 3).  
Roberto (Interview, July 29, 2013), a nurse practitioner in New York, described how the 
clinic where he worked—a large LGBT health clinic in the city—had developed a workaround to 
insulate patients from the “stigma” of a mental health diagnosis while helping them obtain coverage 
for hormones.49 The clinic had adopted the policy of using “Endocrine Disorder, Not Otherwise 
Specified”—an ICD code, but not a DSM one—as a diagnosis for trans patients needing coverage 
for hormones. He was concerned, though, that insurance companies were beginning to catch on: 
Author: Are there any problems with that, with people’s insurance and gender markers? 
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Roberto: There hasn’t been any yet but there’s a concern there will be. I guess they’re changing the ICD-9 
codes soon and they’re worried that is going to be a problem. I think [with] Endocrine Disorder, Not 
Otherwise Specified, you don’t have to attach a sex to it like [with] Gender Identity Disorder. I have started 
getting more denials. Some insurance companies are asking for prior authorization for hormones and they ask 
flat out if it’s for hormone therapy or cross-gender hormone therapy or something along those lines, which 
treat gender-identity disorder, and if you say “yeah,” they deny it. (Roberto Interview, July 29, 2013) 
Tina (Interview, August 8, 2013), a nurse at the same clinic, was a bit more concerned with the 
ethics of this workaround (Knorr Cetina 1999; Bowker and Star 1999), though she felt it was 
ultimately justified: 
Tina: [M]y understanding is that we use endocrine disorder because it’s very vague and does not “out” 
somebody as being trans, and there’s more likelihood that insurance will cover the labs, visit and medication. 
Author: What are your thoughts on [using] Endocrine Disorder? 
Tina: It’s slightly dishonest… But I get why it’s done because again, it’s pragmatic, but duplicitous, yes. But you 
sometimes have to be duplicitous, and it’s better than gender dysphoria which is so “mental health-y” and 
gross.  
Another New York provider (Fieldnotes, July 25, 2013) mentioned to me during an 
ethnographic observation that the classification did not seem dishonest to her at all. In fact, she said 
that it is simply a fact that trans people have Endocrine Disorder: their bodies produce the “wrong 
hormone,” she reasoned, and the diagnostic criteria formally included for Endocrine Disorder 
diagnosis simply had not caught up yet. She joins an increasing number of “trans-supportive” 
providers, advocates, and activists who strive to redefine gender non-normativity as a biological 
phenomenon. These reterritorializations of diagnosis are, in fact, supported by a growing body of 
research that investigates trans brains, genes, and other anatomical, hormonal, or molecular systems 
(e.g., Case and Ramachandran 2012; Hare et al. 2009; Zubiaurre-Elorza et al. 2013). 
As such, medical diagnoses beyond the parameters of what might be regarded as “trans 
diagnoses” are also significant for trans health. Such diagnoses that arise among New York 
providers I interviewed and observed were restricted to endocrine-related diagnoses. It is likely, 
though, that providers elsewhere have found other means to establish workarounds congruent with 
health and insurance infrastructures within which they work. Alternatively, some providers may use 
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diagnoses more convergent with emergent conceptions that transness is best understood as a 
partially biological (rather than a solely psychological) phenomenon.50 Thus, Table 2 shows what is 
likely an incomplete list of non-psychiatric diagnostic classifications currently relevant to trans health 
practice. 
Table 2.  
Medical Classifications as Workarounds for “Trans Diagnoses” 
ICD-9 (1975) 259.9 Endocrine 
Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified 
Endocrine, 
Nutritional, and/or 
Metabolic Disorders 
Disorders of the 
thyroid; Disorders of 
the pancreas; 
Disorders of the 
pituitary gland; 
Disorders of the 
adrenal gland; 
Disorders of the 
gonads 
ICD-10 (1990) E34.9 
Endocrine Disorder, 
unspecified 
 
Below, Table 3 broadly maps some of the work that different social worlds in the U.S. seek 
to accomplish through trans diagnosis (this mapping was also relevant to Argentina prior to the 
passage of the Gender Identity Law, but has become less relevant since its passage in 2012). This 
table draws from Clarke’s (2005) methodological approach of mapping positions as separable from 
actors.  
In Table 3, I combined early versions of my positional maps with a social worlds/arenas 
analysis, which Clarke cartographically extends from Strauss (e.g., 1987). These demonstrated how 
social worlds agreed and differed about the objectives of trans health, and how each moved between 
positions between diagnostic revisions. Given the dominance of DSM classifications in the U.S., the 
positions articulated generally center around mental health diagnoses. Positions change somewhat 
with the emergence of “Gender Dysphoria” in 2013 for reasons I explore below.  
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Table 3. Positions on the Utility of the “Trans Diagnosis” 
 
OBJECTIVE    SOCIAL WORLD 
 
FOR DIAGNOSES BEFORE 2013 
 
Providing access to care  Activists, advocates, “trans-supportive” providers 
Diagnosing patients accurately Providers (excluding “trans-supportive” providers) 
Informing etiological analyses Providers 
Social control/subjugation Activists, advocates, “trans-supportive” providers 
 
FOR DIAGNOSES AFTER 2013 
 
Providing access to care  Activists, advocates, “trans-supportive” providers 
Diagnosing patients accurately Providers (including “trans-supportive” providers) 
Informing etiological analyses Providers, some advocates, some activists 
Social control/subjugation Activists, some advocates 
 
 
Regardless of the geographic differences between my sites, diagnostic classification in trans 
health—whether its use in the U.S. and elsewhere, or its declassification in Argentina—is squarely 
focused not on ontology, but on action and practice. 
 
Non-Diagnostic Classifications 
Non-diagnostic modes of medical classification have also shaped the landscape of trans 
health and influenced it as a formation. For example, HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention became 
concerned with the high prevalence and incidence rates increasingly found among trans people in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s (Baral, Poteat, Strömdahl et al. 2013). Epidemiologists initially 
classified trans women as “men who have sex with men,” or MSM—a classificatory decision that 
raised much ire for trans advocates and activists (Parker, Aggleton, & Perez-Brumer 2016). In 
addition to the identitarian erasure of defining women as men, activists and advocates argued that 
the prevention needs of both groups were distinct. Epidemiologists had been more focused on what 
body parts were involved in fluid transmission, but they eventually responded to the pushback, and 
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began to focus on trans women specifically as a “high-risk population” (e.g., Poteat, Reisner, & 
Radix 2014). 
This set of debates, alongside other non-diagnostic classificatory debates, such as women’s 
health clinics including trans men and women (Boston Women’s Health Book Collective and 
Norsigian 2011, Chapter 4), contributed to the emergence of a common-sense presumption that 
‘trans health needs are unique.’ This “uniqueness” was, however, accompanied by an implication of 
the sameness of “trans health needs.” A growing number of scholars now argue that this has tended 
to collapse and erase some of the marked racialized, classed, sexualized, gendered, national, and 
other differences among gender non-normative people worldwide (Dutta 2012; 2013; Spade 2011 
[2015]; Hanssmann 2012; Aizura 2011; Thompson 2015).  
  At some level, identitarian classifications at some level resist this collapse, and some actors 
have worked to integrate distinctions into the structuring of trans health formations. Some theorize 
that the very intervention of “trans health” as a terrain distinct from “transsexual medicine” 
significantly expands its reach across distinct forms of gender non-normativity by centering 
“transgender” (Singer 2006). Yet, as Valentine (2007) notes, transgender’s provenance is not so 
uncomplicated as to be a strictly “community-based” term—and it indeed performs some of the 
same erasures of difference as does trans health. The shift is nonetheless indicative of the growing 
partnership between activists, advocates, and certain providers in developing “trans-supportive” 
trans health. Another identitarian classification—trans*—has also worked to intervene in the 
collapse and erasure of difference, particularly in Argentina. It does so by troubling certain 
ontological presumptions and suggesting a lack of universally mobile meaning in expressions of 
gender non-normativity. In so doing, it links up to trans health practice, implicitly claiming that trans 
health—much like distinct modes of being trans*—cannot be based in notions of sameness, but 
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rather must be articulated within frameworks that explicitly acknowledge, center, and support 
difference.  
 
From Disorder to Distress  
The DSM’s most recent revision (APA 2013), finalized and published in 2013, eliminated 
“Gender Identity Disorder” from the Manual, and introduced in its place “Gender Dysphoria.” 
Several key distinctions subsequently emerged between these diagnostic classifications. Most 
notably, its authors touted the new classification as a tool to diagnose distress springing from gender 
non-normativity, rather than diagnosing an inherent psychological or developmental problem. 
Publicizing highlights of notable changes, the APA (2013b:14) wrote, “Gender dysphoria is a new 
diagnostic class in DSM-5 and reflects a change in conceptualization of the disorder’s defining 
features by emphasizing the phenomenon of ‘gender incongruence’ rather than cross-gender 
identification per se, as was the case in DSM-IV gender identity disorder” (APA 2013b:14). 
Proponents of this shift to a distress-based diagnosis suggest that it turns attention from individual 
pathology to the dynamic social environment within which transphobia and other forms of 
systematic subjugation bring about distress (APA 2013).  
In addition to this change, Gender Dysphoria is now included in a chapter of its own, rather 
than in the chapter on sexual dysfunctions and paraphilias as was Gender Identity Disorder. Lastly, 
the language describing the diagnosis shifts from “sex” (as in “cross-sex identification”) to “gender,” 
following the lead of activists and advocates who proclaim distinctions in meaning among between 
gender, sex, and sexuality.  
The lead-up to DSM-5 began in 2006 through the appointments of a DSM-5 Task Force, 
which in 2008 grew to encompass 13 Work Groups. These corresponded with each of the DSM-IV 
groupings (Zucker 2010). Kenneth Zucker chaired the Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders Work 
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Group, and members of the Gender Identity Disorder subgroup included Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, 
Jack Drescher, Heino Meyer-Bahlburg, and Friedemann Pfäfflin.51 Drescher in particular positions 
himself as a trans-supportive provider, and works closely with mental health providers, advocates, 
and activists to foreground questions of access in the provision of care for trans people.  
Subgroup members also solicited certain advisors for the process, and eventually in 2011 
presented preliminary diagnostic descriptions to the public. Activists and advocates were thus 
included, albeit in subordinated ways, as advisors in the process. Activists and advocates also broadly 
circulated the call for public comment in the summer of 2011. Kelly Winters (2011), who heads 
GID Reform Advocates, published a lengthy blog post in the weeks leading up to the comment 
submission deadline, proclaiming that the draft diagnostic criteria “fall short.” After detailing what 
she regarded as shortcomings, she encouraged people to register a user account with the APA and 
submit commentary. She also encouraged readers to ask LGBTQ organizations to “clarify that 
nonconformity to birth-assigned roles and being victims of societal prejudice are not, in themselves, 
mental pathology,” and urged them to ask trans-supportive professionals to “voice their concerns to 
the APA” (Winters 2011). The Work Group indeed made several changes to the final version of the 
diagnosis, including incorporating an “exit clause” that Winters (alongside others) had proposed: 
“Gender Dysphoria” as a diagnosis would not remain with an individual in perpetuity as GID had, 
but would no longer apply after patients sought care that would presumably resolve dysphoria. 
The new diagnosis was broadly regarded as a compromise between “old guard” defenders of 
GID and activists, advocates, and providers who sought to “depathologize” trans health care 
(discussed in Chapter 3). Trans-supportive mental health providers were largely content with the 
compromise (Fiona Interview, January 11, 2016). But the shift was met with mixed response by 
activists and advocates, as well as some trans-supportive medical providers. Overall, most of the 
providers with whom I spoke felt that it offered some degree of improvement and that it at least 
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potentially improved non-stigmatizing access to care. Some were enthusiastic about the 
“depathologizing” tone of the diagnosis, while others were frustrated that it remained in the DSM as 
a mental health diagnosis. Miranda (Interview, August 10, 2013), a nurse practitioner, commented: 
“[I]t’s still in the DSM, as far as a mental health… [T]he good news about that is it allows medical 
intervention, but I think that most proponents that I’m aware of would like it to be a medical diagnosis so we 
can get away from the stigmatization of mental illness, and pathology. I mean, I think it’s good, it’s better. But I 
just hate the DSM really. I hate all of it. I don’t think it’s useful.  And yeah, maybe I’m like throwing out the 
baby with the bath water but it doesn’t have to be the only way that we do things.  
 
Some activists and advocates were displeased about the change for other reasons. Some 
concurred with Strangio’s (2012) concern that for certain people, access to treatment depended on 
GID as a pathology. In a blog post following the DSM revision, he argued that among incarcerated 
people—with whom he was working as an attorney at the time—gender confirming care was often 
only accessible though 8th Amendment lawsuits against prisons and other carceral institutions for 
failing to provide adequate health care. These, he asserted, hinged on medicalized diagnoses, not on 
less clearly defined assessments of “distress.” Similarly, certain advocates and trans-supportive 
providers who worked closely with low-income and trans people of color described how diagnostic 
classifications were of less immediate concern to many of their clients and patients. Advocates were 
less interested in diagnostic classifications and more interested in the regulations and classifications 
relevant to accessing state benefits plans, such as Medicaid. As a New York advocate named Gia 
described (Interview, January 12, 2016), their clients and patients were most interested in the 
classificatory systems that affected their public lives: namely, how they were likely to be targeted by 
police based on criminal classifications.52 Issues of racialized, classed, gendered, and geopolitical 
stratification manifest most markedly in debates about depathologization regimes and activism 
(discussed in Chapter 3).  
While DSM-5 contributors frame “dysphoria”—which originates from the Greek term for 
“distress”—as a novel intervention, it is in fact far from a new concept. In 1973, following the 
growth of university-based gender biomedical centers offering surgeries, Stanford psychiatrist 
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Normal Fisk suggested “gender dysphoria syndrome” as an improved means to assess patients’ degree 
of non-normativity. “As originally intended,” he writes, “the term transsexual was to specifically 
identify a person who was not to be confused with a homosexual or a transvestite” (Fisk 1974:387). 
He recounts his work with Stanford University Medical Center’s clinical research on the efficacy of 
“surgical sex conversion” (Fisk 1974: 387) in an editorial published in the Western Journal of Medicine. 
Based on these reflections, he asserts,  
 
there was indeed a great deal of diversity and deviance from what had been defined as the symptoms of 
“classical transsexualism.” Moreover, the overtly present common denominator was the high level of dysphoria 
concerning the individual’s gender of assignment or rearing. It became readily apparent that people presenting 
with gender problems actually made up a spectrum of gender disorders ranging from the mildest to the most 
severe forms of this affliction. (Fisk 1974:388) 
 
Fisk (1974) describes how the existence of this broad “spectrum” should guide providers to broaden 
indications for surgeries. “We are far more interested in the patient’s status here and now and in the 
recent past, than we are in establishing a differential diagnosis” (Fisk 1974:389). However, he and his 
contemporaries were not interested in reconceptualizing transsexuality “as benign variation rather 
than as illness or disorder,” as some activists in gay liberation and feminist movements desired 
(Meyerowitz 2002:254).  
The repackaging of “gender dysphoria” in the contemporary moment aims to bridge Fisk’s 
“spectrum” model with activists’ notions of non-pathological plurality—the former as an index of a 
range of pathology, and the latter describing the non-pathological stress of social subjugation. This 
seems to hinge on dysphoria’s reclamation and recirculation as a novel intervention. 
  
From Distress to Incongruence 
 Miranda was not the only provider who wistfully expressed a desire for a solely “medical” 
and non-psychiatric diagnosis. Beth (Interview, July 25, 2013), another New York provider, wanted a 
way diagnose patients without the “stigma” that accompanies mental debility, and wished for a 
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“neutral,” which she then corrected to say, “I mean a medical” diagnosis. These expressions have in 
part to do with the diagnostic awkwardness that providers experience given the strange positioning 
of trans health care: unlike other conditions, the diagnosis is psychiatric but the “treatments” are 
hormonal, surgical, or other medical interventions on the physical body (Plemons 2010).  
As New York-based nurse practitioner, Talia (Interview, August 3, 2013) said, “I still don’t 
really think that as a nurse practitioner—[a] medical provider—I should really be diagnosing people 
with things out of the DSM…” This concern, however, undergirds a broader assumption: that 
psychiatry is a moral and moralizing domain, while the rest of medicine, in sharp contrast, remains at 
least potentially value-free: “neutral.” Critiques of this supposed conventional wisdom are familiar in 
the medical social sciences (e.g. Metzl & Kirkland 2010). This ostensible schism also animates 
certain debates in psychiatry, promoting its “biologization” and compelling its alliance with 
neuroscience and other biologically-based endeavors of research and practice instead of the less 
“scientific” realms of psychoanalysis (e.g., Pickersgill 2011).   
While several providers mentioned a “medical” or “neutral” trans diagnosis, few were 
anything but vaguely aware of the ongoing efforts in the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
update the ICD-based designation for the trans diagnosis. This process is part of the overall revision 
of ICD codes, which the WHO’s World Health Assembly oversees. Within this, an ICD-11 expert 
working group was convened by WHO staff, comprised of medical providers, psychiatrists, and 
some non-medically trained advocates from across the globe. This was called the Working Group on 
the Classification of Sexual Disorders and Sexual Health (WGSDSH) Several members of this group 
asserted that it was:  
now appropriate to abandon the psychopathological model of transgender people based on 1940s 
conceptualizations of sexual deviance and to move towards a model that is (1) more reflective of current 
scientific evidence and best practices; (2) more responsive to the needs, experience, and human rights of this 
vulnerable population; and (3) more supportive of the provision of accessible and high-quality healthcare 
services. (Drescher, Cohen-Kettenis, Winter 2012: 575)  
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The WGSDSH also incorporated experts from the WHO Department of Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse as well as the WHO Department of Reproductive Health and Research. It was 
tasked with reviewing evidence and revising classifications, descriptions, and guidelines for 
conditions in the ICD-10 chapter on Mental and Behavioral Disorders relavant to sexual behavior, 
dysfunction, and orientation, as well as gender identity (Krueger, Reed, First et al. 2017). Strikingly, 
the group was also asked to review the APA’s proposals for the DSM-5 revision.  
The WGSDSH’s working process progressed through several stages: First, members 
conducted literature reviews and compiled evidence. After developing a draft diagnosis, they entered 
a “Beta phase,” during which they gathered public comments.53 Subsequently, they initiated field-
testing in several international sites, including in Mexico, Brazil, France, India, Lebanon and South 
Africa. Presently, the group has finalized the proposed diagnosis—Gender Incongruence. The 
WGSDSH recommends that it be placed in a chapter apart from the Mental Health and Illnesses 
chapter (within which “Gender Identity Disorder” appears in the ICD-10). These proposals will be 
voted on by the World Health Assembly in 2018. 
In 2016, Geoffrey Reed, a member of the WHO Secretariat in the Department of Mental 
Health and Substance Abuse led the field testing in Mexico and co-authored results in the Lancet 
Psychiatry in 2016. His team used statistical modeling to analyze whether psychological distress or 
dysfunction was the result of “gender incongruence” or “social rejection and violence” (Robles, 
Vega-Ramírez & Cruz-Islas 2016). They found that social rejection and violence overwhelmingly 
predicted distress, while gender incongruence in and of itself did not. In a press release issued about 
the article, lead investigator Rebeca Robles (2016) commented: “Our findings support the idea that 
distress and dysfunction may be the result of stigmatization and maltreatment, rather than integral 
aspects of transgender identity.”  
 71 
Some U.S.-based providers discussed having heard about a group working to develop a 
“solely medical” diagnosis, but none with whom I spoke were directly involved. Nor did they 
mention having contributed to the public comments, though several had submitted feedback during 
the DSM’s revision. Only two advocates with whom I spoke in New York were aware of the 
proposed changes to the ICD. In Argentina, by contrast, activists were broadly familiar with the 
process—even though the resulting diagnosis would not apply to trans health practice in that nation 
given the provisions of the new Gender Identity Law.  
Antonio, a Buenos Aires-based activist and advocate with longstanding connections with 
providers and policymakers, was an adviser to the WHO working group, as were a number of other 
activists and advocates from a variety of locales. While diagnoses were no longer relevant in 
Argentina, he felt that establishing a non-mental health trans diagnosis would be possible outside of 
the confines of U.S. health infrastructures, and that this would benefit emergent transnational trans 
health networks. Jack Drescher (U.S.) and Peggy Cohen-Kettenis (Netherlands)—two of the four 
members of the DSM-5’s Gender Identity Disorder subgroup—were also members of the ICD 
working group. Sam Winter (Singapore, now in Australia), another member of the WGSDSH, 
describes his classificatory positions as being shaped in part by trans activists with whom he is in 
contact (Winter 2014). 
  Activists and advocates also worked more indirectly on the ICD revision. Anticipating its 
arrival and hoping for a less pathologizing and more useful diagnosis for its constituents, one global 
activist organization held an international gathering in The Hague in 2011. Convening a group of 
multidisciplinary experts—most of them trans—they strove to provide early recommendations to 
the WHO as they anticipated the ICD revision. Intricately detailing codes, groupings, and chapters, 
they outlined a highly technical proposal of decentralized codes that could be tailored to localized 
 72 
needs—termed a “starfish model,” for its decentralized nervous system and capacity to exist in 
separation. In the report, authors wrote: 
At the Experts’ Meeting the starfish was used as a metaphoric model that could give answer[s] to differentiated 
possibilities in terms [of] access to health care, including its coverage. In this sense, combining different 
chapters, blocks and codes (the starfish’s legs) could exponentially increase trans* people[’s] opportunities of 
accessing health care under very different circumstances without recurring to a single and potentially 
repathologizing diagnosis (a Spider Model). (GATE 2011:10) 
 
Ultimately, the Deleuzian “starfish model” was not adopted, but a number of the provisions and 
suggestions set forth in the report were considered and in many cases integrated into the currently 
proposed diagnosis of “Gender Incongruence.”  
While the Working Group seems to have come to a consensus that this new iteration of the 
trans diagnosis is not a mental illness, new fissures have formed around the question of whether or 
not “Gender Incongruence in Childhood” is a necessary diagnosis. Members and former members 
of the Working Group who say it should not further assert that such a diagnosis only prompts 
stigmatization of early gender variance, and it does not bridge to access (since hormone treatments 
are not used until just prior to adolescence). These members align with activists and advocates who 
soundly reject the classification. Other Working Group members, however, thought the diagnosis 
could be useful to bring about research funding and to justify specialty clinics. In a rather scathing 
guest post on Kelley Winters’ blog, Sam Winter dismissed these arguments, and characterized the 
WHO’s development of GIC as “transphobic hypocrisy” (2014). 
 
ACTIVIST-PROVIDERS AND EXPERT-ACTIVISTS 
The dynamics that emerge in the DSM revision and to an even greater extent in the ICD 
revision demonstrate how the boundaries among activists, advocates, and providers are increasingly 
permeable—often to the extent that it may be difficult to differentiate among work, position, and 
role based on what I previously framed as distinctive “social worlds.” Instead, schisms now tend to 
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take place along political lines—seen, for example, in Winter’s adoption of activist critiques of 
transphobia not only as a phenomenon in the world, but as shaping current diagnostic 
classifications. Further, as Epstein (1996) has discussed, activists and advocates became highly 
conversant in technical aspects of diagnostic classification and practice. Yet most analyses of such 
“lay-expertise” center on how non-professionals become integrated in the production of knowledge. 
While this may include activist appeals to professionals to consider the quotidian needs and 
experiences of laypeople, studying trans health shows that in this instance, “expertification” (Epstein 
1996) also involves certain providers building language, integrating knowledge, and orienting politics 
based on activist guidance. In this regard, activist inculcate providers with a concept of health care 
based on both experiences of trans existence and certain orientations to trans politics. Yet certain 
providers take this “activist inculcation” more seriously or incorporate it more deeply than others, 
bringing about varying levels of engagement with what might be called “provider-activism.” 
The WGSHSD drew from activist’s accounts to define “social rejection and violence,” rather 
than “gender incongruence” as those tightly linked to distress. This manifests a turn outward toward 
the social, rather than inward toward the individual (discussed in Chapter 2). While the WGSHSD 
attended carefully to questions of mobility and transnationality, however, more outward questions of 
racialization rarely arose in discussions about diagnostic revision (at least those documents to which 
I had access). Based on my ethnographic work, it was clear that diagnostic practices in the U.S. are 
(and in Argentina had been) markedly stratified and racialized. Several activists and advocates also 
discussed how apparent this was in their work.54 As such, it remains curious that discussions about 
race and racialization were apparently given such short shrift in the DSM and ICD revision 
processes. This absence is the more notable because racialized (as well as sexualized, classed, and 
gendered) violence against gender non-normative people was increasingly reported in the media 
across the globe during the very years that the Working Group was assembled (BBC News 2015; 
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TGEU 2015). In fact, the whiteness of both of the working groups and the activists and advocates 
involved in diagnostic revision is rather striking. Chapter 3 discusses some of the racialized and 
classed power dynamics at play in trans depathologization activism. 
In Epstein's (1996) description of AIDS treatment activists, the contributions of trans 
“community experts” are also highly stratified by race, class, gender expression, nation, and political 
objective. “Community expertise” in trans health advocacy and activism has involved imparting 
wisdom to providers about what trans life is like and how providers can help rather than hinder the 
possibilities of a good life. But in these collaborative interactions, both “trans life” and “a good life” 
are conceptualized in racialized, classed, ethnocentric, and otherwise specifically situated ways. Thus, 
even as the resulting changes in both classification systems and standardized practice guidelines 
“democratize” the scaffolding of trans health, they also encode and materially circulate marked 
stratifications.  
 
 TRANS-ASTERISK (TRANS*) 
The ethnocentric terms of trans health’s field of formation are increasingly contested as it 
emerges as a transnational field, and the ICD’s revision process reflects some of these debates. 
Outside of a diagnostic framework, “trans*” (with an asterisk appended) has surfaced as one of 
many interventions on what some view as the US- and European-centered notion of “transgender.” 
This classificatory innovation works to both critique the limits of “transgender” and to make the 
enabling apparatuses of trans health and activism more mobile. Such linguistic interventions contest 
domination of trans health’s institutionalization by the global North.   
Several years after its appearance in Latin American and Caribbean activism, trans* was also 
taken up in the U.S. However, it developed along a wholly different trajectory, not at all in 
conversation with its emergence in Latin America and the Caribbean. This diminutive typographical 
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symbol, the asterisk, has come to stand in for an intense set of debates in both geographic sites. 
However, the debates differ markedly in each locale, revealing a great deal about the politics of 
transnationality, identity, mobility, and temporality at stake in trans health. 
In the inaugural keywords issue of Transgender Studies Quarterly, Avery Tompkins (2014), 
describes the multiple registers of the asterisk in “trans-star.” Working as either a “wild card” 
Boolean search term or a typographical footnote indicator, the asterisk amends “trans,” expanding the 
groups of people to whom it applies. He wrote, “Proponents of adding the asterisk to trans argue 
that it signals greater inclusivity of new gender identities and expressions and better represents a 
broader community of individuals.” Such expansion work has also been a theme of early as well as 
contemporary trans health activists wishing to contest the medical gatekeeping of health care 
providers vis-à-vis eligibility requirements for gender-confirming surgeries or hormones. A concern 
for such corporeal and identitarian pluralism similarly drives work to reform broader health care 
infrastructures to “include diverse trans identities, bodies and experiences” (as one set of guidelines 
describes) (Planned Parenthood Toronto 2016). 
But in the US, the asterisk is a symbol now somewhat past its zenith. Tompkins places its 
online emergence around 2010. However, after a pitched and somewhat confusing battle on Tumblr, 
online communities—based largely, though not exclusively in the US—came to a consensus that the 
asterisk was either unnecessary, exclusionary, or delegitimizing (e.g., Trans Student Educational 
Resources n.d.; Gabriel 2014). Following these debates, some organizations removed the recently-
added asterisk from their websites and materials, resulting in its rather abbreviated institutional life in 
the US.  
While these exchanges included many discussions of the asterisk’s origin, none that I could 
find mentioned a group of travestis, trans, and intersex activists that met under the auspices of an 
international LGBT NGO in Córdoba, Argentina in 2005. The training—in which various activists 
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from Latin America and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean participated—employed the asterisk as 
what they called a “textual strategy.” In the institutional report following the training, conveners 
wrote the following about the asterisk:  
How to avoid, while at the same time undermining, the generic determination that language places not just 
upon the subjects and their possibilities to find themselves in language but also on the way we conceive and 
name the world? One strategy that might be used is the one we have set at work while writing this Memoir, 
through using the asterisk (*) (IGLHRC 2005:2). 
 
They described choosing the asterisk for several different reasons. For example, it enables a means 
of speaking about identities—both in the plural and individually—that do not necessarily condense 
as “transgender.” There is also an implicit critique of “transgender” as an importation of the global 
North. Given the epidemiological revelation of high HIV transmission rates among what general 
global North-based NGOs define as “transgender women,” some funding streams for targeted 
prevention were awarded to NGOs working on “transgender issues” in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. However, as a distinctly classed and racialized term, “transgender”—or in Spanish, 
transgénero, carries a set of connotations that was somewhat removed from the social position of 
travesti. Trans* thus became somewhat of a cheeky rejoinder to the ethnocentric presumption of 
equivalency. As the institutional report continued,  
We prefer the asterisk because of how it looks, almost suspended over the sentence, as a star in the horizon or 
a point through which it might be possible to fly away. Of course, the asterisk cannot be pronounced, and we 
also like that because, when our tongue comes there, and staggers, it becomes quite an accurate expression of 
the status enjoyed by those whose existence gender ignores (IGLHRC 2005:2). 
 
The historical and regional erasure of the asterisk and its history in the context of U.S. trans politics 
does not come as a surprise given geopolitical power dynamics and the flows along which 
knowledge as well as capital flow. Nevertheless, it illuminates how identity categories, population 
health classifications, funding streams, linguistic debates, and geopolitics shape the landscape of 
trans activism across the global North and South.  
   
 77 
CONCLUSION 
Diagnostic classification is a primary site through which trans health is conceptualized, 
defined, practiced, and rendered mobile. The process of diagnostically defining “trans” is not so 
much punctuated by periods of breakdown as much as it is in a process of perpetual breakdown and 
revision per se. Within this process, closure becomes a challenge not only due to the ranging and 
changing objectives of involved actors, but also because of the geographic mobility that is either 
emphasized or ignored in classificatory debates. Unruliness is at work in the uncontainable and 
always-proliferating character of the trans diagnosis (as well as other trans classifications and their 
hybridizing forms). In addition, unruliness—albeit a rather tame version of it—it at play in activist 
practices to mobilize health providers and the field of biomedicine to adopt a politicized 
reorientation to the outward environment. Political unruliness—though still somewhat “disciplined” 
in its manifestation—also condenses in community-based population health projects I discuss in the 
next chapter. 
Practices figure centrally in each of these debates—indeed, it seems as if questions of 
diagnostic accuracy fade nearly into oblivion though ongoing iterations of diagnostic revision. Not 
only advocates and activists but also providers seem to “work backwards” from their practice 
objectives to the classifications that will enable their desired actions. This perhaps decreasing regard 
for diagnostic accuracy also contributes to a sense of openness and play within the classificatory 
brackets of diagnostic systems and manuals. Lastly, the degree to which the APA’s DSM revision 
almost exclusively centered on U.S.-based providers and advocates stands in contrast with the 
WHO’s focus on transnational relevance. Nonetheless, both projects, nonetheless, reproduced as 
well as countered various forms of stratification and subjugation. 
These processes signal a lack of foreclosure about the purposes and content of the trans 
diagnosis in health care. Similarly, they signal a lack of foreclosure in how people understand what 
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trans health does—or at least should do—in practice. As such, classification is one domain through 
which transmutable care takes shape: perpetual revision yields a protracted period of openness within 
which many things can be diagnostically encoded, or diagnoses can be made to do very different 
things. The wild multiplicity of formations of transness, trans health, and trans politics proliferates in 
diagnostic debates. One can trace the changing politics of trans health not only through the 
published versions of revised diagnostic manuals, but through the minutiae of blog posts, 
acknowledgement sections, position statements, and by-lines in working group publications.   
In the company of trans advocates and activists, providers have to a varying degree been 
enrolled in provider-activism via “activist inculcation.”  For many providers, that has meant turning 
away from debates about diagnostic accuracy. Instead, they turn towards the concerns articulated by 
activists and advocates about the environments within which trans people live. Within these, 
providers have come to believe, many trans people encounter varying degrees of harm, subjugation, 
immiseration, and/or violence. Such concerns are embedded in classificatory debates. They also set 
the stage for what I discuss in the next chapter: a continuing shift of focus from individuals to 
external environment in the form of community-based epidemiology. 
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CHAPTER 2: EPIDEMIOLOGICAL RAGE: POPULATION BIOGRAPHY, BIOMEDICAL 
EXPERTISE, AND THE QUANTIFIED POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 
 
In 2014 in Argentina, a trans and travesti55 organization called ATTTA56 and an HIV 
prevention organization called Fundación Huésped launched a campaign for the International Day 
Against Homophobia and Transphobia. Called “Expectativas,” which translates to “expectations,” the 
campaign foregrounded the shortness of trans and travesti lives. Thus its name also connoted 
“expectativas de vida,” one translation of “life expectancy.” The publicity campaign generated and aired 
a TV spot and posted large ads in the style of the image in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Poster from Expectativas campaign, sponsored by Fundación Huésped and 
ATTTA. 
 
The campaign’s visual images play on the sensationalism of “before and after” photos of gender 
transition, presumably from male to female. The typically masculine name on the left shows a date 
of birth. On the right is a feminine name, and under it a set of dates indicating that for the trans-
feminine subject of the photo, death arrived at age 35—the life expectancy for trans people and 
travestis estimated by several community-based studies of life expectancy.57 
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In this chapter, I show how trans and travesti activists in Buenos Aires and New York City 
leveraged arguments that braided statistical and economic rationalities with affectively charged 
narratives to argue for political change. Activists in each locale defined early trans and/or travesti58 
death as directly linked to state or interpersonal violence, exclusion from health care, and/or 
marginalization from formal labor economies. These explanations stand in marked contrast with 
dominant epidemiological studies—though few in number—that define trans populations through 
behavioral risk, focusing largely on HIV transmission. I discuss how trans and travesti activists 
effectively redefined “risk” as a descriptive critique of sexualized, gendered, and racialized 
subjugation. Specifically, I show how these groups mobilized hybrid modes of epidemiological 
thinking, sometimes by adopting concrete epidemiological methods.  
This chapter has three related aims. First, it describes the importance of epidemiological 
thinking to trans health advocacy and activism. Second, it proposes and explains “population 
biography” as a specific form of political and health-based knowledge production. Third, it discusses 
how these activist interventions are marshaled into contingently effective citizenship claims. I begin 
by outlining two legal and regulatory shifts: one in each of my ethnographic sites. While distinct at 
many levels, these transformations specifically addressed gender-confirming care as a public 
entitlement, and linked this to political recognition. I trace how trans health activists in part brought 
about these changes by drawing on quantitative methods, epidemiological thinking and what Biehl 
(2010:182) calls the “pharmaceutical discourse of life-saving.”  
The first regulatory shift took place in Argentina, with the passage of the Gender Identity 
Law. The second took place in New York State, with the elimination of the Medicaid exclusion for 
reimbursement of gender confirming care. In both sites, I describe how activists leveraged these 
regulatory changes through a strategy that I call population biography. By developing and circulating 
population biographies, activists in Buenos Aires and New York called for new regulations, 
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expanded legal provisions, and economic redistribution to address the profound and distinctly 
racialized and classed foreshortening of travesti and trans people’s lives. For these health activists, 
biomedical, epidemiological, and political recognition are closely intertwined. Dynamics of 
citizenship—formal, biopolitical, and so on—suffuse the field of political claims-making in the 
realm of trans health. The imperative for trans activists to engage notions of citizenship, to the 
degree that these comprise a lingua franca of distributive governance, thus enables certain demands 
while constricting others.  
Relevant to these legal and regulatory changes, I demonstrate how trans health activists 
mobilize the political discourse of citizenship to expose either systematic neglect or targeted state 
violence towards gender non-normative people. In addition to potentially revealing contradictions in 
regimes of liberal equality, these strategies also open up debates about “proper” citizenship and 
which subjects may be considered deserving by state care apparatuses. The chapter thus engages 
several examples of political claims-making on the part of trans health activists to interrogate the 
stakes of varying approaches to political action and social movement mobilization. In so doing, it 
examines how “trans health”—mobilized metonymically as gender-confirming care—has in part 
been reimagined and refashioned by social movement activists’ interactions with each other, with 
health care providers, and with policymakers. 
Within the distinct political dynamics that circulate in each of my ethnographic sites, the 
language and logics of epidemiology and population health both thematically and materially 
assemble risk, health, violent death, recognition, devaluation, and citizenship claims. These converge 
in a strategic political deployment of what I name “population biography.” “Population biography” 
methodologically merges narratives of embodiment, collective politics and praxis, and encounters 
with state and other forms of violence (among others) with quantitative methods informed by 
population health. In addition to engaging Brown’s (1987, 1992) notion of “popular epidemiology,” 
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this concept also draws on Traweek’s (1999:189, 199) insights about the centrality of “intimate 
knowledges” in how people ‘embody theories’ and ‘theorize bodies’ in research on biomedicine and 
technoscience. This chapter explores how citizenship and other political claims for recognition, 
remuneration, and reparation are leveraged through a lexicon of health—and specifically through 
quantitative population health methods. In examining such reversals of expertise and the diffusion 
of knowledge, the chapter shows how trans activists and travestis not only made the statistical 
personal, but also produced a population that compelled recognition and political action in ways that 
individual-level claims could not—a phenomenon that resonates with Chatterjee’s (2004) “politics of 
the governed”. In conclusion, I describe how such political claims confound, remake, and reiterate 
gendered, sexualized, racialized, and abled hierarchies of human valuation. 
 
STATISTICAL TURNS AND THE RELEVANCE OF VIOLENCE 
 Argentina’s and New York’s legal and regulatory changes mark shifts in how gender 
confirming care is conceptualized with respect to public forms of health care financing.59 First, 
Argentina’s unusually expansive Gender Identity Law passed in 2012, was buoyed in part by claims 
that the nation’s ongoing subjugation of gender non-normative people comprised a “debt to 
democracy” (deuda de la democracia).60 One of the more persuasive arguments for legislators on this 
point was the potential for the law to mitigate the enduring threat of violence and proximity of death 
for trans people and travestis. The activists involved in drafting the initiative sought to eliminate or 
limit administrative barriers to health care access and legal gender reclassification by identifying these 
as primary obstacles to social and political recognition and extended life chances.61 The law’s 
relatively easy passage turned in large part on the effective politicization of a drastically reduced life 
expectancy for trans people in the nation, pointing in particular to state and other forms of violence 
contributing to lives being cut short.62    
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Several years later, New York State eliminated a sixteen-year blanket exclusion for gender 
confirming care for trans people who are recipients of Medicaid.63 New York State’s Department of 
Health became the target of a series of direct action protests and a 2015 class action lawsuit that 
eventually overturned the provision. Activists who protested to the Insurance Commission and 
Offices of Medicaid and Medicare, as well as the attorneys and advocates involved in the lawsuit, 
framed their demands baldly as a question of survival. Appealing to empirical studies, they asserted 
that lack of access to health care results in “increased suicidality, higher rates of drug and alcohol 
abuse, and higher rates of unemployment.” (Kinkead 2015:Paragraph 6).64 Prior to this, a series of 
lawsuits and proposals had been unsuccessful in overturning the exclusion, begun in 1998. 
One of the major effects of trans activists’ involvement in shaping trans health alongside 
health care providers has been that violence, murder, and suicide have been defined as issues central 
to trans health and well-being. This is true in both the U.S. and Argentina, and has been advanced 
through a series of community-based studies (e.g., Xavier, Hitchcock, Hollinshead et al. 2004; 
Bockting and Avery 2005; Berkins and Fernández 2005; Berkins 2008). In these studies, violence is 
described not only as a public health problem to be publicized and addressed, but also as a central 
reason for leveraging changes to insurance plans and legal regulations that prevent trans people or 
travestis from changing legal identification or accessing hormones or surgeries.  
Activists and advocates also argue that having a physical appearance that does not align with 
gender normative self-presentation of increases one’s likelihood to be targeted for violence. 
Therefore, they assert, affordable gender-confirming health care must be available as a preventive 
measure. Activists also argue that having a legal ID with a gender marker that does not seem to 
comport with their gendered embodiment increases the possibility of being targeted, harassed, or 
detained by police. To mitigate these outcomes, activists assert that gender reclassification must be 
made easier to achieve through policy simplification and innovation. By defining what is at stake for 
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trans health in these expansive ways, activists thus rendered violence legible through the 
epidemiological lexicon of health disparities. At least theoretically, violence and death became the 
discernible health outcomes that demonstrated excess death among trans people—which could be 
mitigated through robust trans health care provision and shifts in legal and regulatory policies and 
practices. 
 Producing statistical evidence of health disparities and negative health outcomes has proven 
to be an important advocacy instrument for trans and travesti activists. Adams (2016: 16-17) calls this 
“metrical forms of accountability” and Porter (1995) calls it “trust in numbers.” Both are distinctive 
signs of neoliberal assessment and audit strategies in which what counts must be both quantifiable 
and quantified. Many of these trans and travesti activists had long described anecdotal accounts of 
violence and exclusion, and they had worked to leverage these narratives into provisions that would 
support trans and travesti survival. However, the activists I observed describe encountering pushback 
from law- and policymakers, funders, and some health care providers about whether or not they 
could credibly demonstrate the patterns of violence and exclusion that they described narratively. As 
such, some activists and organizations prioritized the production of quantitative data to support the 
claims they had already been making (e.g., National Center for Transgender Equality and National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force. 2010; Berkins and Fernández 2005; Berkins 2008).  
However, statistical analyses to demonstrate excess mortality have been elusive. As the 
handful of health researchers working on what they define as “transgender populations” have 
asserted, several factors make it difficult to produce quantitative analyses. For one, they assert that it 
is a “very small” population compared with the general population of the U.S. Many of the central 
tools for public health researchers, such as the national Census or national longitudinal studies, do 
not track gender identity or sexuality. As such, researchers have tended to use non-probability 
samples to draw conclusions.65 They nonetheless draw from data to speculate that trans people 
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experience disproportionate exposure to violence (Bockting, Miner, Swinburne et al. 2013; Nemoto, 
Bödeker, Iwamoto 2011; Berkins and Fernández 2006; Berkins 2007).  
Regardless of statistical analyses, the frequency of violent death among trans and other 
gender non-normative people is regarded as common knowledge among activists and others, and 
narrative memorialization has played an important part in trans politics in the U.S., Argentina, and 
elsewhere. Internationally, November 20th is the Transgender Day of Remembrance (TDOR), during 
which trans people and supporters gather in vigil and read names of trans people who have died 
violently over the past year. In Argentina, a group of trans and travesti activists and supporters have 
developed a campaign calling for an end to travesticidios—“travesticides,” or murders of travestis. This 
campaign parallels and at some level joins feminist anti-violence movements in Argentina and 
beyond (for example, Ni Una Menos, or “not one [woman] less”) in their call to stop the gendered 
violence of femicides (Fregoso and Bejarano 2009). Both TDOR and Ni Una Menos focus on 
foregrounding specific names and sometimes brief narratives about people who died from gendered 
and/or anti-trans violence.  
 Significantly, both population health and narrative memorialization define transgender 
identity as the primary condition of exposure to violence. And yet some have contested these 
narrative practices, pointing to their failure (or at least TDOR’s failure) to account for racialized and 
classed trans death. For example, Lamble (2008) argues that “by focusing on transphobia as the 
definitive cause of violence, this [TDOR] ritual potentially obscures the ways in which hierarchies of 
race, class, and sexuality constitute such acts.” Lamble (2008) further explains that through these 
dynamics, victims “emerge… as the product of an individual hatred or fear rather than the result of 
the accumulative effect of social institutions… that are founded on, and perpetuate, complex 
hierarchies of power and violence.”  
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Others have contested the production of knowledge about trans death more broadly, 
including statistical iterations. In their work on trans necropolitics, Snorton and Haritaworn (2013) 
assert that feminized gender non-normative subjects who are racialized as non-white, and who are 
generally marginalized from formal labor markets and administrative citizenship, are uniquely 
marked for death. They suggest that while the deaths that are memorialized and statistically 
mobilized to bring about state protections, rights, and resources are primarily those of trans women 
of color, such provisions primarily benefit white, economically-mobile gender non-normative 
citizen-subjects. Snorton and Haritaworn (2013) name this as an insidious form of “value 
extraction” from trans of color death. It is precisely this extraction of surplus value, they assert, that 
enables a “newly professionalizing class of experts” to produce population health and other studies 
about (deracialized and declassed) excess trans death (Snorton and Haritaworn 2013, 67). I draw on 
Snorton and Haritaworn’s (2013) mobilization of necropolitics to discuss how racialized, classed, 
and other stratifications take shape along lines of life chances, exposure to violence, knowledge 
production, and resource distribution. However, I also engage empirical evidence to demonstrate 
how the multiple dimensions of value and the persistent but non-deterministic dynamics of 
knowledge economies can both stabilize and occasionally destabilize such hierarchies. 
While there is increasing statistical focus on patterns of violence, the statistical life of trans 
death is probably more visibly represented by larger-scale HIV prevalence and incidence studies and 
review articles66 that define transgender populations as “high risk” for HIV transmission through 
sexual “behavior” (e.g., Baral, Poteat, Strömdahl et al. 2013; Herbst, Jacobs, Finlayson et al. 2008). 
Varying degrees of explanation accompany these forms of knowledge production. Some researchers 
caution that that these results must take into account the conditions within which sexual “decision-
making” unfolds. Others claim that statistical methods misrepresent the actual disease burden of 
HIV in trans populations. Some assert that economic conditions and the survival imperative of 
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working in informal economies (including sex work) constitutes an important consideration, and 
should be a domain for future research. Significantly, in all of these studies, “risk” is generally 
constructed as an individual-level analysis of decision-making, constrained or not.   
This stands in stark contrast with certain community-based studies, which redefine “risk” not 
through individual behavior, but through group-differentiated exposure to violence, marginalization, 
and exclusion from social spheres, employment, and health care access. This difference in 
perspective and orientation is at the center of the “epidemiology wars” (Poole & Rothman 1998). As 
Shim (2014:71) asserts, introducing “group-level data” into epidemiology has been nothing short of 
controversial. Looking beyond individual-level data “challenges many of the discipline’s standard 
operating procedures and assumptions about the scientific validity and legitimacy of different types 
of research and data” (Shim 2014:72). While the subfield of social epidemiology strives to achieve 
scientific validity while integrating group-level data, this remains somewhat marginal to hegemonic 
epidemiology practice.67 
Community-based studies of trans subjects have implicitly argued against individual 
“behavioral” models of health, illness, and by translation marginalization. In the U.S., community-
based studies centered on trans subjects have tended to be published by non-profit organizations or 
by health researchers in collaboration with trans advocates or “community members” (e.g., 
Clements-Nolle and Bachrach 2002; National Center for Transgender Equality and National Gay 
and Lesbian Task Force 2012).68  Some are peer-reviewed (and thus at least admissible, if contested, 
in population health research), but some are not. In Argentina, community-based studies have 
largely been conducted by travesti and trans organizations, sometimes in collaboration with scholars, 
and other times not (Berkins 2007; Berkins and Fernández 2006; Borgogno with REDLACTRANS 
2009). While there are a number of Argentinian manuscripts that publish health-based data on trans 
and travesti people, I have not to date located epidemiological articles on this topic in Argentina.  
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While community-based studies in both locales focus on distinct questions and forms of 
data presentation, they tend to define what might be called “structural problems” as primary in 
producing situations of risk or imperilment to trans people. Such studies vary in the extent to which 
they present racial and class difference as central to these dynamics, but they uniformly reject—
usually implicitly, and sometimes explicitly—the “individual responsibility” implications of standard 
epidemiological behavior-based risk paradigms.  
Next, I combine ethnographic data with legal and regulatory document research to describe 
statistical claims about trans health that, combined with narratives, brought about significant and 
somewhat surprising transformations in Buenos Aires and New York. 
 
LEGAL CHANGES IN THE PUBLIC PROVISION OF TRANS HEALTH CARE 
 Policy and infrastructural landscapes of trans health care have shifted significantly in the past 
20 years, especially vis-à-vis the availability and coverage of gender-confirming health care. As I 
discussed in Chapter 1, both biomedical and psychiatric understandings of gender non-normativity 
have shifted. Alongside them, dominant paradigms for treatment and reimbursement have shifted as 
well. This section focuses on two legal and regulatory transformations—one at the level of the 
nation and one at the level of the state—within which key controversies about trans health have 
recently condensed.    
 
Argentina’s “Groundbreaking” Gender Identity Law 
In 2012, Argentina passed the federal Gender Identity and Health Comprehensive Care 
for Trans People Act. The resulting Gender Identity Law has received remarkably and curiously little 
attention in the US, although it has inspired legislative actions in several other nations.69 The Gender 
Identity Law greatly reduced bureaucratic barriers and surgical requirements for legal gender 
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reclassification in the nation. Previously, people who wished to change the gender marker on their 
national ID cards had to get a psychiatric diagnosis, surgical treatment, and medical approval, and 
had to plead their case before a judge--a lengthy, expensive, and often very arduous experience.70 
Policies were inconsistent, and the process often took several years. The Gender Identity Law 
converted this to a two- to three-week streamlined administrative process requiring only expressed 
desire on the part of those requesting this change.71 Furthermore, the law required gender-
confirming health care to be covered or reimbursable across the three-tier medical system, including 
in public hospitals (which subsidize the care of people without employer-based or private health 
insurance).72 In addition to this, the law did away with the necessity of establishing a Gender 
Dysphoria diagnosis (described in Chapter 1). Again, only an expression of desire on the part of 
those seeking hormone or surgical treatment is necessary. 
While various forms of the law had been introduced to the Argentinian legislature since 
2007, the Gender Identity Law passed in 2012 is notable in several regards. First, it was conceived 
and drafted by a coalition of activists, and was provided to legislators in its final form only after 
protracted internal debate among coalition members. Second, it combined administrative gender 
reclassification with access to gender-confirming health care within the same law. Third, it 
eliminated the use of the psychiatric diagnosis that had previously been requisite to initiate gender-
confirming care and legal gender reclassification (and that generally remains so in most other nation-
states). Fourth, the act passed by a very wide margin.73 Fifth, it was the first national law based on 
the Yogyakarta Principles (2007), which reconceptualized sexual orientation and gender identity 
through international human rights law. Finally, the law applied health care coverage for gender-
confirming care in a less economically-stratified manner than is typically the case.74  
The activists who conceptualized the Argentinian law prioritized the gender reclassification 
provision in part because legal gender markers on ID documents have been a pretext for police 
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harassment, violence, and arrest among gender non-normative people, alongside other forms of 
systematic exclusion. They also stressed the importance of access to diagnosis-free gender-
confirming care in public as well private hospitals, at once rejecting medical gatekeeping and 
reducing economic stratification of care. Nico, one of the attorneys and activists with whom I spoke, 
explained that CHA (Homosexual Community of Argentina, or Comunidad Homosexuál de Argentina)75 
struggled with coalition members from other organizations who wanted to separate these two legal 
provisions (gender reclassification on one hand and depathologized medical access on the other). In 
our interview, he said, “[i]t was another aspect of our bill that…we included the right to health 
and…the ID amendment stuff all together. The other organizations did it separately” (Nico 
Interview, August 3, 2015). Nico (Interview, August 3, 2015) further described how he thought 
some of the coalition members who opposed combining the provisions had arrived at their position: 
Well, during the discussion of the law, I think that the other organization that had this decision of dividing the 
two bills, I think…they got in advance some sort of advice from someone that knew about laws and about 
lobbying from healthcare companies, because I remember the day the law was approved [that I heard] from 
some Senators, saying, “This law is stupid because I told them many times that the health part should be in 
another bill. The implementation of the law is going to be very difficult. Blah blah blah.”   
Thus, certain activists argued that the combined law was unfeasible and unlikely to pass, largely due 
to anticipated organized resistance from health care providers and insurers. Nonetheless, it passed 
Argentina’s Congress by a landslide.  
Indeed, the law seems to diminish medical authority in a manner that many anticipated 
would be problematic for health care providers. Significantly, Nico (Interview August 3, 2015) noted 
that providers (save for those already involved in LGB or trans*/travesti activism) were not part of 
the coalition developing the law: 
I don’t remember having doctors in the discussion. It was organizations and [was] very politicized, it was a very 
active political campaign of “we want this law.” “We want it now!” was part of the slogan.  “Gender identity 
law now.”  The organizations were very hurried.  They pushed the discussion a lot.   
 After its passage, the health care provisions of the law have been challenging to implement 
at several levels. For example, Nico (Interview, August 3, 2015) and others mentioned certain 
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providers who resisted the law’s imperative not to use psychiatric diagnoses in the delivery of 
gender-confirming care. In fact, one provider who considered himself a trailblazer in trans health 
care continued insisting that patients come to him for regular psychiatric treatment. Other providers 
were less recalcitrant, but nonetheless found themselves unprepared to meet the needs of patients. 
Some surgeons sought guidance from practitioners outside of the country, while others anxiously 
awaited guidance from the Ministry of Health about how to conceptualize trans health care 
provision. 
Yet despite its easy passage, the law remained unregulated by the Ministry of Health for 
three years following its passage. Nico and others explained that this delay caused providers and 
insurers to express confusion about what treatments and procedures would be included and 
standardized. In the absence of governmental guidance, a trans advocacy community-based 
organization called Capicüa (2014) published a trans health guide. This guide acquainted providers 
with terms, medical facts, and narrative experiences of transition, as well as including a social and 
political history of medical power in regulating and normalizing gender. In 2015, the Ministry of 
Health finally issued explicit regulations to implement the law, which up to that point had been 
enacted in an ad hoc manner by varying hospitals and insurance systems based on their own 
interpretations of the law. But even the formally issued regulations issued few concrete guidelines 
about reimbursement rates and qualified treatments. Its vagueness caused Nico to describe the 
regulations as “a legal joke,” and to compare it to other symbolically important but ill-regulated 
health care laws. Following the law’s regulation, the National Program for Sexual Health and 
Responsible Reproduction (Programa Nacional de Salud Sexual y Procreación Responsable et al 
2015) published a health guide to educate providers about implementing the law’s provisions. While 
this guide served as the official expert resource, it drew extensively from Capicüa’s (2014) document, 
basing its first two chapters almost entirely on that community-based organization’s resource.76 In a 
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reversal of the conventional wisdom of expert knowledge production, activists thus provided the 
expertise that produced both the Gender Identity Law and the guidelines for its biomedical 
implementation.77  
The law—whether or not it delivers on all of its promises—aims to address conditions of 
life and survival, and to facilitate the reduction of state violence and biomedical coercion. At this 
level, it can be distinguished from some of the legal anti-discrimination advocacy in the U.S. and 
elsewhere that aims to enroll state actors (including police) to supposedly to protect gender non-
normative people as an identitarian class from bad transphobic actors. Notably, Argentina’s federal 
anti-discrimination laws do not explicitly include gender identity or sexuality, although a 1988 anti-
discrimination law could be broadly interpreted to apply to anyone who “prevents, obstructs, 
restricts or in any way undermines the full exercise on an equal basis of the fundamental rights” 
(Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Presidencia de la Nación 1988).78 However, while 
“race, religion, nationality, ideology, political or trade union opinion, sex, economic status, social 
status [and] physical characteristics” are specifically protected, gender identity and sexuality are not. 
Presently, activists are working to pass anti-discrimination laws in Argentina (Buenos Aires passed 
one in 2015), but they describe prioritizing laws that pertained specifically to access concrete 
entitlements and administrative rights.79 Meanwhile, activists elsewhere in the world strive to attain a 
law “like Argentina’s” (e.g., International HIV/AIDS Alliance 2014: 53). As mentioned, the 
“coattail” effects of this law are already becoming manifest in Latin America, Europe, and beyond. 
Even in the reporting on these shifts, the “West and the rest” (Hall 1996) dynamics that postcolonial 
scholars describe are notable. For example, a recent article (Russo 2017: Paragraph 1) erroneously 
described Denmark—which in 2017 passed a law replicating some of Argentina’s Gender Identity 
Law’s provisions—as “the first country to declassify [transgender] as a mental illness.” 
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New York State’s “Medicaid Victory”   
 In 1998, New York State’s Department of Health added a specific exclusion for state 
Medicaid payments for any treatments—surgical, hormonal, or psychological/psychiatric—related 
to what they called “gender reassignment.” It appeared in the state’s social services regulations 
without a hearing (Spade 2010), around the time when trans health activism had begun to gain some 
degree of visibility in the US.80 Many state Medicaid programs had no explicit policies governing 
gender confirming care for trans people, although some had (and continue to have) limitations or 
exclusions on such care (Spade 2010: 500). Such policies have often been justified by defining 
gender confirming care for trans people as “experimental” (or sometimes “cosmetic”)—which was 
the case in New York. Professional organizations have begun to contest these claims, and trans-
supportive researchers have aimed to address any perceived gaps in evidence-based research. 
Despite New York’s exclusion, many trans Medicaid beneficiaries were able to access 
coverage for hormones in the first few years after its implementation. This changed in the early 
2000s, when advocates at Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP)—a collective grassroots organizing 
project and legal agency that provides legal representation for low-income trans people and trans 
people of color—began to hear from clients that their hormone coverage was being cut off. The 
Department of Health had evidently begun flagging those records where gender markers and 
hormone prescriptions were ostensibly “mismatched.”  
 Meanwhile, grassroots and direct action strategies81 for health care access were gaining 
momentum in New York and throughout the US. Some of these advocated depathologizing care—
discussed in Chapter 3. Others protested discrimination in health care settings, while still others 
engaged organized labor to address insurance coverage (e.g., Wilson 2013). In New York City in 
particular, direct action strategies embraced broad demands for justice, and folded health activism 
into a larger political program. TransJustice, “a political group formed by and for trans and gender-
 94 
nonconforming [TGNC] people of color,” (TransJustice 2006: 227) organized the first “Trans Day 
of Action for Social and Economic Justice” in 2005. Lack of basic health care for trans people of 
color was defined as part of a bevy of marginalizing forces confronted routinely. A 2005 statement 
asserted: 
The specific issues that TGNC people of color face mirror those faced by broader communities of color in 
NYC: police brutality and harassment; racist and xenophobic immigration policies; lack of access to living wage 
employment, adequate affordable housing, quality education, and basic healthcare; and; the impacts of US 
imperialism and the so-called US “war on terrorism” being waged against people at home and abroad. These 
issues are compounded for TGNC people of color by the fact that homophobia and transphobia is so 
pervasive in society. As a result, our community is disproportionately represented in homeless shelters, in foster 
care agencies, in jails and prisons. (TransJustice 2006:228) 
 
TransJustice’s Trans Day of Action responded directly to the city’s 2002 vote to prohibit 
transgender discrimination—a commitment that the group pointedly noted was slow to be regulated, 
as the law lacked guidelines for implementation for two and a half years. In their 2005 statement, 
Day of Action organizers explicitly connected trans discrimination with broader racialized economic 
marginalization, including the lack of health benefits. The city’s action to pass the anti-discrimination 
law and the state’s decision to restrict hormone benefits for trans people were ostensibly unrelated. 
Nonetheless, it reveals how formal legal protections—specifically in the realm of employment and 
housing—do not necessarily extend to health care access and benefits.  
In 2007, a team of attorneys (including those at SRLP) brought a federal lawsuit to challenge 
the statute that excluded gender-confirming care for trans people. The team argued that the statute 
discriminated on the basis of diagnosis, since hormone treatments and gender-confirming surgeries 
were reimbursable for other diagnoses. A judge dismissed the suit without granting a hearing, and 
the claimant and representing attorneys decided not to appeal to avoid a setting what they 
considered a negative precedent if they lost. In 2011, attorneys—again, led in part by SRLP—tried a 
different course of action. Governor Cuomo had just come into office and assembled a “Medicaid 
Redesign Team” (MRT) to save money and improve health outcomes. Several advocates looked to 
this process as an opportunity to reverse New York State’s blanket exclusion. Several advocates 
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submitted a proposal for consideration to one of the MRT’s subgroups, the Health Disparities 
Working Group. While advocates retained a position that the regulation was unfair and unethical, 
this time advocates also focused on the savings in mental health crisis costs, as well as the health-
supportive benefits of lifting the exclusion. The Working Group thus decided to issue the proposal 
to the Governor’s team. 
In the course of this process, however, reporter Carl Campanile from the New York Post 
learned that lifting the exclusion was on the MRT’s agenda. He wrote an article entitled, “Let 
Taxpayers Foot Sex-Op Bill: Panel,” reporting that the Working Group advising Cuomo wanted 
“taxpayers to foot the bill for transgender residents to get ‘sexual-reassignment surgery[.]’” 
(Campanile 2011a). He continued, “New York’s costliest-in-the-nation Medicaid program would 
cover the tab.” (Campanile 2011a). Greta (Interview, January 9, 2016), an attorney and advocate in 
New York City, explained that this caused an uproar within the MRT and Governor’s office. While 
the process was supposed to be “transparent and public,” the MRT and Cuomo’s team was 
concerned with the negative press. Greta (Interview, January 9, 2016) explained that the state 
insurance commissioner, Nirav Shah, met privately with some of the people involved in submitting 
the proposal. When the Health Disparities Working Group compiled their final list of proposals for 
Cuomo, the proposal to lift the exclusion was pulled from consideration. Two days after the initial 
Post story ran, Campanile ran a second story, salaciously titled, “Cuomo Chops Off Sex-Change 
Funds” (Campanile 2011b).  
Sara (Interview January 14, 2016), a New York City activist and media advocate, described 
how a SRLP members and attorneys, as well as other local activists and advocates, regrouped 
following this. She explained: 
I think what they were taking away from that is that this work behind the scenes or even this work out in public 
like a lawsuit which becomes public knowledge when the media gets a hold of it, it’s kind of a disaster… [T]he 
New York Post scooped [the 2011 proposal] so that had a really big impact, and SRLP…didn’t want to go 
through this work and have it happen again. So what was the other option? Was it to just continue to try to 
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keep things under the radar as much as possible and be careful about who you talk to and that kind of thing, 
which is very hard? Or was there another way of actually using the media this time, particularly as trans stuff 
was finding its way into the mainstream a little bit more here and there which…could have been useful.  
 
Sara said that despite concerns about public reception, a team of activists, advocates, and media 
specialists—from SRLP, GLAAD and TransJustice—came together to develop a public campaign 
about trans health in support of lifting the Medicaid exclusion. SRLP, Legal Aid, and a group of 
other attorneys were already gearing up to try litigation once again. They planned to file a class 
action lawsuit on behalf of two Medicaid beneficiaries (Cruz v. Zucker 2015) Prior to this, the group 
decided to “lay the groundwork” for this, as Sara described, by producing PSAs with trans people, 
health care providers, and family members discussing the importance of trans health.  
 The resulting education and media campaign embedded several arguments in its materials: 
first, trans people lack access to care in part based on economic marginalization; second, health care 
for trans people is not exceptional or “special”; third, non-medically supervised care is unsafe, and 
that it leads to emergency room costs (Sara Interview January 14, 2016); fourth, despite public 
rhetoric, health care for trans people is affordable; and last, health care access leads to improved 
outcomes, reduced mortality and morbidity, and hence cost-savings. Sara said that one of the 
objectives was to cultivate support through finding points that non-trans people could relate to: 
The messaging… was that this isn’t special healthcare, that it’s the same healthcare that many people access 
every day. [T]hat came out of this idea again from the report of drawing other people in, so it didn’t seem [like] 
some care that they couldn’t relate [to]…  The hormone therapy that I receive is the same that some cis woman 
in menopause receive or at other points in their life for whatever reason and same goes for testosterone. There 
are cis men that access that as well. [S]urgeries often can be similar to things that cis people receive as well. So 
we wanted to get that point across so people didn’t feel so… Because trans healthcare has been sensationalized 
for everyone in the media so we wanted to just challenge that and question that. 
Each of the campaign points is represented below in one of the infographics circulated by the 
campaign (see Figure 2). The graphic below was circulated both as a composite and in various 
component parts. Throughout the campaign, figures and statistics about the improvement of mental 
health outcomes and the reduction in suicidality were repeated frequently.  
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Figure 2: 
Infographic by GLAAD and SRLP circulated in 2014  
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 In addition to the infographic and PSAs, the coalition also engaged in direction actions 
against the State Insurance Commissioner Shah and his successor, Howard Zucker. On Valentine’s 
Day in February 2014, a group of activists protested the Medicaid exclusion in from of the New 
York State Department of Health office. Members of SRLP and TransJustice, as well as other 
organizations such as Make the Road, Trans Women of Color Coalition, and Trans Latinas, 
organized and attended the march. They held banners and signs with images of hearts on them that 
read, “Hey, Shah: Where’s the Love? Trans People Need Safe + Affordable Healthcare Now!” 
Protestors also carried a bunch of red mylar balloons in the shape of hearts. In May, activists 
targeted Zucker, who had recently replaced Shah. Zucker was delivering a keynote speech at a health 
care technology and design conference in New York City. SRLP members took the stage and 
unfurled a large banner that read, “NY Needs #TransHealthcareNow: End Medicaid Exclusions.” 
Two activists held the banner while Reina Gossett, SRLP’s membership director, spoke from the 
stage. Reflecting in a media interview on the five minutes she spent speaking from the stage, Gossett 
(2014:Paragraph 4) said: 
I talked about why this regulation is so harmful – it’s not just a policy issue, it’s about who can go to the doctor, 
who can access medically necessary care, and who can live. And right now the message that the Department of 
Health is sending to transgender New Yorkers is that they don’t care if we live, they don’t care about our 
health.  
 Attendees at the conference—which had nothing specifically to do with trans health—used the 
Twitter hashtag prompted by the banner to tweet and post photos of the protest using the 
conference’s name and the #TransHealthNow tag.  
 Attorneys filed the class action lawsuit a few months later. The defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss, which they were granted for several provisions of the lawsuit. However, the motion was 
denied for a number of the articles outlined by the team representing the plaintiff. As a result of this, 
New York State agreed to repeal the exclusion, though they maintained exclusions for covering 
hormones for people under 18, as well as surgeries for people under 21. They also excluded 
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surgeries and procedures that they defined as “cosmetic,” including breast augmentation, 
electrolysis, facial feminization surgeries, tracheal shaves, and (oddly) voice therapy.82,83 The case was 
thus heralded as a victory for trans health, but an unfinished one. As such, the legal team filed 
another lawsuit, and in 2016, New York’s Medicaid program further relaxed its restrictions on 
coverage, including by extending covered care for surgeries to people under the age of 21.  
 
LIFE EXPECTANCY 
The Expectativas campaign arrived at 35 as an estimate of average trans/travesti lifespan 
through data presented by community-based studies conducted in Argentina over the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. The original statistics and methods of data gathering that produced this estimate are 
difficult to locate, but the number travels widely and is often repeated in these studies. Several 
community-based reports cite the statistic, citing other reports, sometimes elliptically. One study 
asserts that “The average life expectancy, according to data that some possess, yield an estimated 
minimum of 35.5 and a maximum of 41.25 years” (Los promedios de esperanza de vida esperanza de vida 
según los datos que poseen algunas referentes arrojan un mí nimo de 35,5 y un máximo de 41,25 años) (Borgogno 
with REDLACTRANS 2009: 54). The same study decries the lack of epidemiological data that 
would enable more robust conclusions, noting the absence of data as one of its primary limitations 
(Borgogno with REDLACTRANS 2009: 8). In noting this broader gap in data, study authors thus 
indict government and international surveillance agencies for perpetuating trans “invisibility.” They 
further assert that the absence of these data—the “undone science” (Hess 2015) of large-scale 
epidemiological research on trans and travesti people—forces community-based researchers to use 
methods and make estimates that might be limited in their scientific validity. These authors thus 
implicitly defend the findings of community-based studies, even if their methods may be distinct 
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and/or less “rigorous” than hegemonic epidemiology might require. 
A variety of community-based health studies have been conducted in Buenos Aires and 
beyond since 1999 (e.g., (Adjuntía en Derechos Humanos de la Defensoría del Pueblo de la Ciudad 
de Buenos Aires and Asociación de Lucha por la Identidad Travesti y Transexual (ALITT) 1999; 
Berkins and Fernández 2005; Berkins 2008; Borgogno with REDLACTRANS 2009; ATTTA and 
Fundación Huésped 2014). Most tracked rates of employment, education, and violence—including 
police violence. Some studies also discuss average life expectancy, sometimes with quantitative 
estimates (e.g., Borgogno with REDLACTRANS 2009). These assert that the average life 
expectancy for trans “populations” is about half that of the nation’s aggregated life expectancy.  
These statistics—as well as the particular framing of what might be called “structural violence” 
(Galtung 1969; Farmer 2004)—proved particularly important to the legislative debates that preceded 
the landslide passage of Argentina’s Gender Identity Law.   
Claims about reduced life expectancy and structural violence played a major role in legislative 
debates leading up to the law’s passage. Vilma Ibarra, a former senator and National Deputy of 
Argentina, argued for the passage of the Gender Identity Law in a special legislative session late in 
2011.  
Trans community members are generally people with the lowest life expectancies, and with the most difficulty 
completing schooling, and they are expelled, in general, from the labor sectors. They suffer enormous 
discrimination and social violence.  
 
Los integrantes de la comunidad trans son en general personas con las más bajas expectativas de vida y con mayor dificultad para 
la escolarización, y son expulsados, en general, de los sectores laborales. Sufren una enorme discriminación y violencia social. 
 
Discussions of violence and marginalization have long been part of the analysis of trans and travesti 
people, advocates, and organizations (e.g., Global Action for Trans Equality n.d.; Asociación 
Travestis Transexuales Transgéneros de Argentina n.d.; Berkins n.d.; Fernández 2005). These 
assertions have been advanced through both narrative testimonials and statistical representations. 
 101 
However, arguments gained serious traction in a legislative and policy sense when linked to an 
epidemiologic vernacular of “reduced life expectancy.”  
 While the problem of foreshortened lives was also central to New York’s Medicaid 
campaign, there was not so strong a focus on the quantification of life expectancy. The strongest 
claim that activists and advocates made in circulating data from community-based and other studies 
were about cost-savings. Interesting, cost-savings were rarely quantified, but rather they were 
convincingly projected by linking the failure to cover gender confirming care to a host of expensive 
problems about which states are already concerned: substance abuse, mental health treatment, and 
employment. In this campaign, then, trans people were positioned not as a “taxpayers’ burden,” but 
rather as potentially productive citizens (see Irving 2008). U.S. discourse about public provision of 
care included claims about mortality and reduced life chances (though it was suicide rather than 
murder that figured as the primary site of bodily violence). However, this was merged with 
discourses of economic efficiency and cost-benefit analysis. 
 While it appeared particularly significant to have a numerical estimate of foreshortened life 
expectancy in Argentina’s work to pass the Gender Identity Law, New York activists seemed to be 
able to leverage just the promise of cost-savings alongside reduced mortality. Differences in the scale, 
scope, and objective of each campaign and legal or regulatory shift is also significant here, so a direct 
comparison between each site may not be merited. Nonetheless, the foci of these community-based 
studies—whether emphasizing mortality or economic efficiency—are each indicative of a set of 
shifts that redirects attention away from individuals and towards the relevance of collective or 
structural formations. 
 
 102 
EPIDEMIOLOGICAL FURY: DEFINING DEATH’S PROXIMITY 
My field work in Buenos Aires occurred both before and after the launch of the Expectativas 
campaign. In 2015, a year after it circulated, I attended the opening of a photography exhibition 
called Furia Travesti, or “Travesti Fury.” A bustling crowd of more than one-hundred people filled the 
Tierra Violeta community center in Buenos Aires where the show was held. On the weathered brick 
walls hung photographs taken or collected by travesti photographer Agustina García, documenting 
several decades of marches, events, and mundane moments in the lives of Buenos Aires travestis. At 
one point, a voice spoke loudly over the din of the crowd. “I am death!” A figure dressed in black 
had taken the microphone. “I am death!” she repeated, as the crowd fell silent and gathered around 
her.84 It was Agustina, and she spoke with a palpable urgency. “I follow you wherever you go,” she 
continued. “I follow you as you walk and work on the streets. I follow you everywhere. “Enough!” 
she began to shout from behind her black lace mourning veil. “Enough with the murders, enough 
with the travesticides!85 Enough with lives cut short too soon, like Laura Moyano’s! Enough!”86 
Indeed, the pace of violence and death I observed was unbearably relentless. Moyano, a 35-
year-old travesti from the city of Córdoba had been murdered two weeks before. This was followed 
by protests in Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and elsewhere that demanded “Ni una menos” and “Basta de 
travestidios” (“No More Travesticides”).87 At the event, I chatted with Diana Amancay Sacayán. A 
high-profile travesti activist, she had been the first Argentine citizen to receive a new national identity 
card from President Cristina Kirchner de Fernández after the passage of Argentina’s Gender 
Identity Law. Diana had worked with the coalition that drafted the initial law, and at that point was 
working as an activist on several other legislative projects. Three months later, at age 40, she was 
also murdered. By all accounts, neither of these deaths had an explicitly political motivation, but 
were caught up in the classed, gendered, racialized, and sexualized violence that condenses into 
death’s perpetual haunting of travesti life in Argentina.88  
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As mentioned previously, death—whether by violence or suicide, by state or interpersonal 
violence, by sudden death or infirmity—is regularly invoked as a condition of trans existence. The 
extent to which these dynamics are analyzed as racialized, classed, and sexualized violence varies 
greatly. Nonetheless, the particular racialized, classed, and sexualized locations stand as qualitative 
data in the narrative representation of trans and travesti deaths.  
Some of these stratified differences, however, are subsumed in data investigating the health 
conditions of “transgender” populations. While certain community-based studies increasingly point 
out these marked stratifications, they also maintain some slippage. Snorton and Haritaworn’s (2013) 
reflections on trans necropolitics may be instructive here, as they analyze policy changes as largely 
beneficial to white, upwardly-mobile trans and gender non-normative people. However, as in the 
case of Argentina, in some cases racialization and class specificity are underemphasized in data to 
bring about legal changes that might be argued to focus benefit on those most exposed to state 
violence (as I would argue the Gender Identity Law, at least in theory, accomplishes to some 
degree).  
When it comes to gender non-normativity, it may be the case that “population” can 
comprise a more urgently deserving set of subjects than “individuals.” However, it may be the very 
interplay of these that builds the case for establishing trans people and travestis as legitimate national 
subjects, and indeed as human. This conditional admittance to “humanness” is starkly racialized, 
sexualized, abled, and classed (e.g., da Silva 2007; Hua 2011; Spillers 2003; Weheliye 2014). Thus, the 
very collapse of travestis into “trans population” writ large may have an effect of statistically 
“rendering human” (and therefore rendering worthy of life) those gender non-normative people 
who—through racialized necropolitics—have otherwise been marked for premature death (Snorton 
& Haritaworn 2013). It is the material evidence of the survival-enhancing possibilities of this 
slippage, alongside the ethical and political repugnance of its necessity, that leads to the 
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“epidemiological rage” that names this chapter and that echoes the affectively charged intensity of 
furia travesti.89 
  
POPULATION BIOGRAPHY: FROM INDIVIDUALS TO POPULATIONS AND BACK  
The Statistical Turn  
In Fundación Huésped’s (2014) article about the Expectativas campaign, Juan Frontini, the 
creative director of the project, said the following (my translation): “The data on life expectancy for 
trans people were quite astonishing to me. For this reason, I looked for a campaign that would have 
the same impact.” Such excess death, Frontini is asserting, is exceptional in its sensationally-inflected 
political persuasiveness. That such death is highly concentrated among trans-feminine subjects 
seems scarcely to require specific mention.  
Trans population health studies increasingly turn to statistical methods to frame and make 
claims about trans health and medicine in what might be called “the statistical turn” in transgender 
studies. In the introduction to the special TSQ (Transgender Studies Quarterly) issue, “Making 
Transgender Count” (2005: 4), the editors explain some of the tensions related to quantification and 
trans people: 
On one hand, one makes trans count (in the sense of having its importance recognized) by counting it (making 
it visible through quantification). On the other hand, one makes (i.e., compels) trans count by forcing atypical 
configurations of identity into categories into which they do not quite fit—the proverbial square peg in a round 
hole. In this way, the imperative to be counted becomes another kind of normativizing violence that trans subjects 
can encounter and hence another problematic to be critically interrogated by the field of transgender studies.  
 
The form, method, and focus of precisely what is counted or measured about trans people (and of 
course where) may range greatly—as may the credibility of those who do the counting, and the 
dispersed effects—anticipated or not—of quantification. For instance, well-funded and typically 
global North HIV prevention networks and research agencies have established trans women as a 
global priority and a “very high risk” population, aiming to intervene on “health behaviors.” 
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University-based professional researchers in the U.S.—many driven in part by questions about 
resource allocation—recently published a national trans population estimate. Smaller-scale 
community-based studies focus on data-collection about the structural features of health and 
survival: for example, medical access, education, and employment, and violence.  
 This economy of knowledge production is certainly shaped by hierarchies of “scientific” 
expertise. It is also shaped by academic economies—including the dominance of English-language 
journals and peer-review systems—that geopolitically structure what counts as valid, mobile, and 
“universal” knowledge and expertise. It remains quite notable, however, that the evidentiary 
arguments that held significant sway in the 2011-2012 debates in the Argentine legislature, as well as 
those that comprised the education campaign preceding Cruz v. Zucker, were not produced by 
biostatisticians or epidemiologists, but rather by small-scale community-based research studies.  
As Epstein (1996: 257, 314) and others demonstrate, it remains possible to effectively 
contest the authority of statistical analysis as the apotheosis of accurate representation. This does not 
necessarily require discrediting statistics as such. Rather, it involves reframing scientific assertions by 
pointing out what they exclude or elide, often in scientific terms and on methodological grounds 
through an epistemological bridging (Epstein 1996). Shim (2014: 14-17) describes an instance in 
which this bridging work did not occur. On one side of what she describes as an epistemological 
“lay-science divide,” epidemiologists mobilized reductionist ideas about the stability and separability 
of race, class, and gender. On the other side, laypeople brought a systemic, intersectional, and 
relational view of these factors as relevant to the health inequities they experience.  
The community-based studies I describe in this chapter seek to span this divide. Activists 
engaged some “epistemological bridging” at some level by bringing a population health-oriented 
view to their work. However, they also managed to retain a conceptualization of marginalization that 
did not comport with epidemiology’s reductiveness. Further, activists did not demand that 
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epidemiologists worked differently, but rather identified and defined as a problem the lack of statistical 
data on trans mortality, and worked to address this “undone science” (Hess 2016) through their own 
epidemiological efforts. Adams (2016) locates a similar challenge to statistical knowledge in the 
broader domain of disease research within which some patients have pointed out the lacunae in 
knowledge related to their “orphan diseases.” She writes (2016: 228), “these patients have begun to 
make arguments for quantification strategies using an “n of 1,” such that their own bodies become 
the site for the production of metrics.”  
When it comes to life expectancy studies, trans activists have both embraced and deflected 
the statistical turn, at least vis-à-vis standard epidemiological methods. Instead, through community-
based studies, they focus outward on structural factors they implicitly argue are causative of 
abbreviated lives. This work converges in some ways with certain forms of population health 
inquiry, such as social epidemiology. Further, they draw from fairly small-sized samples, but make 
claims about generalizability that are aided by the addition of narratives that emphasize 
representationally the widespread phenomena of violence, marginalization, and exclusion.  
 
The Emergence of Population Biographies 
These community-based epidemiological studies coming out of Argentina (and to some 
extent the U.S., though they are not precisely parallel) both reflect and at some level push against 
some of the familiar stratifications of knowledge production. For example, these studies are often 
mobilized and at least co-authored by travestis and travesti-led organizations. As I mentioned, the 
racial and class positions of most travesti-identified people would not align with the white, upwardly 
mobile “professionalizing class” that Snorton and Haritaworn (2013) (generally rightly) describe as 
taking up trans-related population health research. In addition, the content of the community-based 
studies that I have mentioned is presented in a form that foregrounds narratives alongside 
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population-based data. La gesta del nombre propio, or The Struggle for One’s Own Name (2005), for 
example, contains graphs, bar charts, and tables that track a range of variables. Also included are 
photos of protests and meetings, as well as a long list of names of some of the travestis who died 
during the course of the study. See samples of these in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
             Figure 3                        Figure 4 
 
Figure 3: Sample image of data display about experiences of police violence 
Figure 4: Sample image of names and a protest photo 
 
From La Gesta del Nombre Propio (Berkins and Fernández 2006:29-30;129) 
 
 Once again, like many community-based studies, these figures do not frame problems in terms 
of individual risk factors (such as so-called “risk behaviors” for HIV transmission). Instead they 
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imply what might be described as structural risk, such as being subject to police violence or 
educational exclusion. In so doing, they embed arguments about some of the specific causes of 
foreshortened life, prominently featuring state violence, rarely a focus of standard public health 
research. Through this mode of empirical presentation, they insist on the collective and not just the 
aggregate, and promote specific kinds of social and political change.  
 I describe these community-based studies as “population biographies.” This notion extends 
Phil Brown’s (1987, 1992) work on “popular epidemiology” from the realm of environmental health. 
Brown (1992: 269) describes popular epidemiology as “the process by which lay persons gather data 
and direct and marshal the knowledge and resources of experts.” He advanced this concept to 
examine how non-scientist political actors (he call them “citizens”) use scientific authority to identify 
and solve health-related problems. Such lay or community actors thus transform “biography” into 
“population health.”   
       Population biography also mobilizes scientific population surveillance and life expectancy data. 
While data collection is a central part, the process of directing and marshaling expert research and 
knowledge is partially supplanted by claiming a sort of bridging expertise to bring data into 
conversation with collective trans and travesti life. In so doing, population biographies explicitly 
tether collective narratives and political life to figures of population, rendering them inextricable. 
Population biographies thus engage the thought styles (Fleck 1976) associated with epidemiology 
without capitulating to the reductiveness of aggregate data, and insist on a simultaneity of scale.90 In 
short, they project epidemiological affect where they lack robust methods, and where they lack 
robust methods, they explicitly point out that gaps in data are produced by the very exclusions that 
they seek to represent. 
 Population biographies, at some level, contest certain hierarchies of knowledge production. 
Snorton and Haritaworn (2013) incisively identify the conventional hierarchies of knowledge 
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production as a necropolitical site through which racialized, classed, gendered, and sexualized 
subordination is reproduced. They assert that these dynamics take shape in part through expert 
professionalization. However, in the case of population biographies (particularly those based in 
Buenos Aires), travestis are not only the privileged subjects of such research, they also at least in part 
drive, shape, and author it to some degree. In both Buenos Aires and New York City, population 
biographies addressed issues like gender reclassification and health rather than formal discrimination 
protections or anti-“hate crime” legislation. The latter are examples of the types of provisions that 
Snorton and Haritaworn (2013), Spade (2011), and others describe as primarily benefiting white and 
upwardly mobile trans subjects. Many travesti-led organizations in Buenos Aires and some activist 
and advocacy groups in New York have articulated these “survival-oriented” strategies as more 
pressing than “state protections-oriented” strategies. Partly in response to this prioritization, 
Argentina’s Gender Identity Law focused more strongly on provisions that would best be described 
as “survival-oriented.” Here, stratifying necropolitical dynamics still shape notions of 
“deservingness,” but at some level diverge from the notions of expertise that Snorton and 
Haritaworn (2013) discuss. This seems to complicate their theorizations of the value extraction 
involved in trans necropolitical production of expertise and rights regimes.91  
 The extent to which population biography disrupts the hegemonic relations of power that 
shape Snorton and Haritaworn’s (2013) account of trans necropolitics, however, is limited. The 
activism leading up to Argentina’s Gender Identity Law is scarcely regarded in the U.S. The fact of 
the passage of the law itself—of which even experienced trans health advocates in the U.S. are often 
unaware—is often condescendingly viewed as both remarkable and aberrant. Thus, even though 
community-based studies from Argentina were cited in national government-produced documents 
and on the congressional floor, they did not or have not yet penetrated the geopolitical hierarchies 
of knowledge production.  
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 Further, in Argentina, the notion of “expertise”—even experiential expertise—remains tightly 
linked to a proximity to death by state actors. For example, a trans man and activist I interviewed 
told me that state actors only give credence to the expertise of travestis who can claim to be 
authentically near death, or to the non-trans professionals who claim to represent them. He 
explained that his expertise as a trans activist and professional, whose classed and racialized 
exposure to early death was far more distal, was regarded as being “too political” to offer credible 
expertise. As such, a persistent hegemonic politics of knowledge—while provisionally mutable—still 
suffuses what forms of (necropolitical) expertise can count.  
 Activists and advocates in New York, in contrast, had to mobilize their economic value in the 
form of efficiency, productivity, and cost-savings. Life expectancy (in the form of suicide risk rather 
than state or interpersonal violence) was important, but not the primary object of attention. 
Nonetheless, the PSA-style videos and campaign materials produced leading up to Cruz v. Zucker still 
framed the necessity of trans health as a public benefit by bridging narrative and statistics. While still 
engaged in “upstreaming” work, population biographies in New York were different from those in 
Buenos Aires at several levels. They were largely produced by activist/advocate partnerships, and 
often took a less confrontational approach, leaving out critiques of state violence and using rhetorics 
of cost-saving and preventive health. 
 The effects of population biographies have been notable, particularly in the Buenos Aires and 
Argentinian contexts. As noted, the low life expectancy estimate was frequently and powerfully 
mobilized to promote passage of the Gender Identity Law. Yet the legitimacy of professional 
expertise remains somewhat stable. For example, Argentina’s trans health guide, Atención de la Salud 
Integral de Personas Trans (or “Comprehensive Health Care for Trans People) (Programa Nacional de 
Salud Sexual y Procreación Responsable 2015) contains varying references to peer-reviewed 
research, as well as drawing directly from population biographies. It notes: “The importance of these 
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[legal] changes [are] central, since at this point the estimated life expectancy of trans people is 35 
years” (Programa Nacional de Salud Sexual y Procreación Responsable 2015:41). A footnote reads, 
“For lack of official statistics, these data were estimated in organization-based studies, such as those 
by ALITT, ATTTA, and others” (Programa Nacional de Salud Sexual y Procreación Responsable 
2015:41). In the absence of “official” data, the use of population biographies seemed justified 
regardless of potentially diminished scientific rigor.  
 
FASHIONING STATISTICAL CITIZENSHIP  
 Rigor, however, is the name of the epidemiological game. “Official data” are gradually being 
produced within a global economy of knowledge, and are being taken up to mobilize a wide variety 
of objectives. Interestingly, my research revealed that despite the recurrent geopolitical hierarchies of 
knowledge production, the numerical estimate of trans life expectancy—specifically 35—traveled, 
although the studies from which it emerged did not. As such, this figure has appeared in a number 
of U.S.-based blog articles, sometimes without citation, other times with citation to another page 
that did not provide an original citation (e.g., Vincent 2015). I note this not to criticize citational 
practices. Rather the obligation to utilize to statistics, however challenging and elusive they might be 
to generate, is characteristic of the field of debate within which these bloggers find themselves. 
“Trust in numbers” permeates widely, and the statistical imperative generates a peculiar rhetorical 
form. Activists too must think epidemiologically to make persuasive political claims. These numbers 
then take on a mobile life of their own. 
While local debates about trans health are distinctive, the emergence of trans health is very 
much a transnational phenomenon. Local debates thus travel, albeit unevenly. One of the longest-
standing debates in trans medicine concerns the “appropriateness” of surgeries or sex hormone 
provision for gender non-normative people. Paul McHugh is an important figure in these debates, as 
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the former psychiatrist-in-chief at Johns Hopkins Hospital who led the closure of the University’s 
gender identity clinic in 1979. In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal entitled “Transgender Surgery 
Isn't the Solution,” McHugh (2014:Paragraph 10) cites a 2011 Swedish study from the Karolinska 
Institute (Dhejne et al. 2011) to assert the ineffectiveness of gender confirming care:92  
The study revealed that beginning about 10 years after having the surgery, the transgendered began to 
experience increasing mental difficulties. Most shockingly, their suicide mortality rose almost 20-fold above the 
comparable nontransgender population. This disturbing result has as yet no explanation but probably reflects 
the growing sense of isolation reported by the aging transgendered after surgery. The high suicide rate certainly 
challenges the surgery prescription. 
 
His representation is methodologically unfaithful, since the study set out to compare how trans 
people’s mortality outcomes compared with those of non-trans people, not the effectiveness of 
gender-confirming surgeries. Indeed, the study’s authors publicly disputed what they characterize as 
a “misuse” of their results. Lead author Dr. Cecelia Dhejne with Cristan Williams (2015:Lines 104-
7), said in an interview: “What we’ve found is that treatment models which ignore the effect of 
cultural oppression and outright hate aren’t enough. We need to understand that our treatment 
models must be responsive to not only gender dysphoria, but the effects of anti-trans hate as well. 
That’s what improved care means.”93  
But despite Dhejne’s objections, the study focuses on what public health practitioners would 
call “downstream” individual measures of health effects—specifically, direct causes of death. While 
the article’s conclusions gesture explicitly towards what public health researchers call “social 
determinants of health,” its mortality measures cannot quite statistically extend to the realm of 
“proof” regarding these speculations. 
This is precisely where population biographies differ from “official” studies. They effectively 
bring together the “downstream” measure of mortality with “upstream” concerns regarding social 
subjugation—in part by merging quantitative and narrative data. Moreover, population biographies 
also present statistical analyses of housing, education, income, and state violence (rarely engaged in 
public health) to make claims about what social epidemiologists Link and Phelan (1995) would call 
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the “fundamental causes” of travesti and trans mortality. Population biographies thus take up what 
Alondra Nelson (2011) calls “social health” in her work on the Black Panther Party’s health and 
research programs. This signals practices that are “oriented by an outlook on well-being that scale[s] 
from the individual, corporeal body to the body politic in such a way that therapeutic matters were 
inextricably articulated to social justice ones” (Nelson 2011:10).  
I propose that one means through which population biographies are translated into political 
action is through linking social health to a notion of investment in travesti and trans lives. But the fact 
that such demands have gained political traction when the investment is in the aggregate population is 
not incidental. In his analysis of squatters excluded from formal citizenship, Chatterjee (2004:57) 
describes how a “politics of the governed,” necessitates “investing their collective identity with a 
moral content” to leverage means of survival from states. For Chatterjee (2004:34), this involved an 
active collective fashioning into a “population,” but not simply as a descriptive of empirical concept, 
but as a moral one. Building on Chatterjee’s reflections, I argue that it is possible to understand the 
work that population biographies perform as a means of fashioning “statistical citizenship” that 
simultaneously produces a population and invests it with a moral or ethical imperative. Here I am 
extending Hannah’s (2000: 515) initial mobilization of “statistical citizenship,” defined as the 
“strategic active participation in the construction of the statistical representations by which 
individuals are constituted as political actors, objects of social policy, and/or consumers.”  
Certainly, population biographies and political investments in their findings may be analyzed 
through Hannah’s lens of “active participation.” However, I am also drawing attention to a means of 
rendering statistical the forces that hegemonic epidemiology cannot readily define as causally valid.94 As 
these forces—violent policing, exclusion from labor, racialized and sexualized violence—are made 
plain through both stories and numbers, the political and ethical imperative to act is (at least 
potentially) heightened. I argue that it was this bridging, along with Argentina’s distinctive political 
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history, that made it possible for the Argentina legislature to concur with the claim that the nation 
had a “debt to democracy” when it came to trans and travesti subjects. 
   Statistical citizenship thus involves what might be called “upstreaming mortality” by 
focusing on structural cause, which clarify the necessity of intervention at this level rather than at the 
usual individual “behavioral” level so favored by public health. For example, in 2015, the province 
of Buenos Aires passed the Employment Quota law. This stipulates that 1% of all public-sector job 
hires must include travesti and trans people. This provincial law came about in the wake of publicity 
about the national Gender Identity Law, and also took up arguments about life expectancy and 
mortality.95  
Here, we can observe how trans claims on the state and demands for social justice are 
intertwined with questions of economy. Michelle Murphy (2013; 2017) calls this the “economization 
of life,” which she posits as a post-eugenic set of entanglements that increasingly examine aggregate 
life through the joining together of population and macroeconomies. The “calculative 
infrastructures” of the economization of life “offer… a way to calibrate human worth, but also 
forms of human waste, human surplus, unproductive life, and life in excess of economic value.” 
(Murphy 2013:144).   
In this regard, population biographies produce valuable individuals and populations in terms 
of life chances. But such strategies are also inevitably tied to questions about value to and for the 
nation state. That such interventions are beneficial is difficult to contest. However, such shifts also, 
and perhaps inevitably, produce scenarios in which non-incorporation into state economic 
infrastructures—such as participation in informal economies—becomes equated with “unproductive 
life.” This raises questions about what trans and travesti life is to the state as a site of investment, and 
about what kinds of governance (and governabilities) are implied in and through the production of 
“vulnerable” populations. As Aren Aizura (2014) writes, “we cannot theorize a trans necropolitics 
 115 
without exploring the mobility of gender variant bodies and the circuits of capital they/we exploit 
and are exploited by.” Given the novel ways that statistical citizenship and the economization of life 
are taking shape, it remains to be seen how these questions of value and exploitation will materialize 
in the future. Assuredly, this will remain a generative area for analysis moving forward, in both sites 
I studied and beyond. 
This imbrication of population, economy, and investment vis-à-vis trans lives raises many 
questions. To think about how relations of economy also animate necropolitical questions of 
population is to think differently with population health. What kinds of productive lives are state 
actors and institutions interested in cultivating by recognizing and knowing these “populations” ? 
What are the anticipated returns on investment, as Murphy asks of the other “risky subjects” of state 
investment? Might we view these interests as being about assimilation or compliance? About 
containing unruly actors by, for example, containing practices of sex work and political unrest? To 
the extent that costliness is uniquely mobilized when it comes to trans people, how do these concerns 
enter the universe of concerns about citizenship, protection, health care access, and human value? 
What other dynamics do economized trans lives animate when comes to the ostensible knowability 
of gender non-normative populations?  
While these are merely starting points, I am arguing that to thoroughly grapple with the 
stakes of trans health and politics, it is critical also to center such questions of financialization and 
capital. My provocations must remain preliminary, but can be productively engaged in the future 
through reflections on neoliberal subject-making (e.g., Irving 2008), with a thorough empirical 
grounding in the emergent phenomena of increasingly robust trans care infrastructures. 
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CONCLUSION 
It matters that population biography has provided some of the most persuasive work leading 
to administrative and bureaucratic transformations in both Argentina and New York. This may be 
due to its novel form. It could also be attributed to its scientific commensurability, or to the sheer 
shock value of the mortality estimates. Regardless, it seems that such studies defined problems in 
ways that led to openings rather than closures in terms of centering trans survival. One of the ways 
that this has taken shape in the emergence of trans health is through activists’ development of 
methodological innovations, for example through efforts to “upstream mortality.” Brown (1987, 
1992) describes how “citizens” produce new forms of knowledge when there is a gap in expertise, 
and how relations of power are negotiated within these processes. Population biography extends this 
to discuss how trans and travesti activists created new knowledge not only through methodological 
innovation, but also through the absolute refusal to parse narrative biography from population 
health data. Epidemiological methods routinely fail to capture both nuance and the dynamism of the 
social field, which accounts for some its major limitations in engaging the stratified and stratifying 
currents in health research and provision (Shim 2002; 2014). Population biographies turn 
epidemiology and its methodological constraints against itself, as did the HIV/AIDS treatment 
activists that Epstein (1996) described.  
But in the case of population biographies, interwoven biographical narratives provided an 
alibi for any potential methodological inadequacies in quantification of trans death and violence. 
This move rejected the very objectivizing thought styles of epidemiological practice and state 
governance in which it simultaneously also engaged. Through this hybrid methodology, activists 
foregrounded the relevance of structural violence and its extended history as a primary, rather than 
secondary or background means through which to understand health and health care. This resonates 
with Nelson’s (2011:3, 19) reflections about “social health,” and how Black Panther Party health 
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activism was inextricably linked up with notions of how “bondage, racism, and segregation affected 
the well- being of black communities.” It also resonates with Chatterjee’s (2004) reflections on how 
“population-making” is involved in fashioning demands on the state, even in the ambit of persistent 
exclusion or marginalization. 
Of course, it also matters that “population” is inescapable in the production of knowledge 
mobilized by population biography—and that the active formation (or perhaps invention) of a specific 
population of need is one of its many effects. Such modes of quantification are inevitably caught up 
in forms of governance that operate in and through the figure of the “population”. Population 
health is, after all, profoundly and inextricably linked to racialized population control and the 
political economic investment in certain forms of life over and above others (Murphy 2013; 2017). 
Further, with the ascendance of “official” or hegemonic epidemiological data about trans 
populations, the figures as well as the meanings of mortality measures may shift. This may affect the 
allocation of resources and the possibilities of political demands on the state and beyond. 
Resource distribution is a central theme in the provision of trans health, especially in its 
public forms. Public health logics generally take two forms when it comes to intervention: 1) what is 
the largest group that will be affected, and 2) what intervention will have the most profound effect 
on a group regardless of its size. Trans communities are in part characterized by their exceptional 
status, and this “population” is perpetually described as being very small. Thus, trans activists and 
advocates have recognized that they must demonstrate the necessity of the profound effect size 
when it comes to justifying coverage for gender-confirming care. In the next chapter, I discuss how 
activists and providers have partnered to leverage state (as well as private insurance) coverage while 
simultaneously “depathologizing” the diagnostic practices associated with transness vis-à-vis 
biomedical treatment.  
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In conclusion, I suggest that population biography is a deftly inventive strategy that at once 
enlists epidemiological thinking even as it rejects its reductiveness, and exposes hegemonic 
epidemiology’s inherent non-neutrality. In refusing to capitulate wholly to population-level 
abstraction, these community-based studies framed problems distinctly and produced highly 
convincing evidence to bring about unusual administrative and bureaucratic shifts in Argentina. Yet 
this tactic remains intractably tethered to problems of “population.” Here, life cannot count as life 
except in and through the data. And death—however profoundly apparent in daily existence—
cannot count as death without the calculative infrastructures of mortality measures.  
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CHAPTER 3: DIAGNOSING WELLNESS: RELATIONS OF CARE IN FEMINIST AND 
TRANS HEALTH POLITICS AND PRACTICES  
 
Talia, a nurse practitioner in a New York City hospital, talked with me about diagnostic 
classification of her trans patients. Her raised eyebrows registered disapproval of the injunction to 
use a psychiatric code to facilitate her patients’ ability to procure hormone treatments and surgeries. 
“I still don’t think that as a nurse practitioner, I should really be diagnosing people with things out 
of the DSM” (Talia, Interview August 3, 2013). She shrugged, leaning back in her chair. Our 
conversation took place while New York State’s Medicaid program still prohibited Medicaid from 
covering gender-affirming care. After a brief pause, she conceded that if this provision were lifted, 
she might use that psychiatric diagnosis to “help billing.” She explained that currently, she regularly 
risked her license by using a work-around common among health care providers treating 
transgender Medicaid patients: “For billing purposes, I just use Endocrine Disorder-NOS [Not 
Otherwise Specified] 259.9”96 (Talia Interview August 3, 2013). However, this was not her vision of 
ideal care. “We actually view people as being generally healthy. Diagnosis means there’s something 
wrong with you. [Why do] we still have to assign a code to health? Why can’t we just use V70.0—the 
code you use for a well visit—for all of our trans health and have that cover everything?” (Talia 
Interview August 3, 2013).  
Talia’s comments contest the requirement for a diagnosis that pathologizes transgender 
patients. Aligning with trans depathologizationists broadly speaking, this position is enabled by a 
mode of organizing care politics that I call “care without illness.” This chapter explores 
depathologization as a multifaceted set of practices and principles organizing trans health care across 
multiple sites. Studies of trans health activism are still a developing area of research. Some of these 
have focused specifically on trans depathologization, but it remains an understudied domain,97 and 
many recent engagements with it treat depathologization as an undifferentiated phenomenon. 
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Instead, I show in this chapter that it indexes a range of practices, targets, and objectives. I thus 
advance “care without illness” as an analytic that joins together some—but not all—forms of 
depathologization activism.  
Depathologization movements in general (including trans depathologization, anti-psychiatry, 
gay and lesbian depathologization, and some forms of feminist health and disability activism) work 
to refigure expertise and contest medicalizing and normalizing power.98 Some projects aim to 
refashion rather than entirely disengage from clinical relations of care. Instead of contesting medical 
power via demedicalization, proponents of care without illness work to level the relationship 
between provider and patient by foregrounding self-determination. The concept of care without 
illness affords a nuanced examination of depathologization by attending to the embedded politics of 
care that shape its distinctive forms. It enables theorizing how trans health activism resonates with 
other depathologizing projects working to transform care relations while retaining access to 
biomedical care.  
In this chapter, I show how activists and some providers are working to refigure what they 
view as pathologizing diagnostic models comprising hegemonic health infrastructures. Trans 
depathologizationists99 comprise a large, vocal, and loosely assembled group asserting that access to 
medically-based gender confirming health care is critical for many trans people to support health 
rather than to “correct” a problematic corporeal or psychic state. Accordingly, this means that trans 
people are not “ill” but ought to be able to access care based on self-expressed need to facilitate and 
support wellness. Most trans depathologizationists maintain that sex hormones and/or surgeries 
should be available if people feel they need them, but that clinicians’ main role is to provide 
information and facilitate access, not to authorize care or obstruct access to it.100 Activists and 
scholars who argue for trans depathologization thus do not view biomedicine as problematic per se. 
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Rather, they condemn the hubris of its presumptive authoritative expertise and the manifold 
infrastructural obstacles — legal, regulatory, billing, bureaucratic — it presents for trans people. 
 
DEPATHOLOGIZATION AND POLITICAL DIAGNOSTICS 
Social scientists and other scholars have long critiqued medicalization101 and 
pathologization,102 particularly in the new subfield of the sociology of diagnosis (Jutel 2009; McGann 
and Hutson 2011). However, as sociologist Mary Burke (2011:203) points out, these are not 
identical, and “the former does not always lead to the latter.” Burke asserts that medicalization—the 
process of defining a bodily state, social position, or set of practices as jurisdictionally within the 
domain of medicine and health care—carries a range of possible consequences. She argues as others 
do that certain outcomes might be highly desired by medicalized subjects, such as enhanced 
allocation of resources and access to care (Burke 2011:188). However, such forms of medicalization 
differ from pathologization—the process of defining practices, social positions, or bodily states as 
being at once anti-normative and ill. Burke notes, “activists can simultaneously embrace 
medicalization while rejecting pathologization,” characteristic of trans depathologization movements 
(Burke 2011:204).  
This assumption that care need not be faithfully tied to pathologization is shared in large 
part by many feminist health and disability rights activists, and forms the basis of care without illness 
as a distinct mode of organizing care relations. In developing this analytic, I draw especially on 
feminist theorizing about care, particularly its insistence that care indexes relations of power and 
obligation, in addition to (and sometimes within) dynamics of support or nurture (Murphy 
2015:732). Feminist technoscience scholars thus define “care” as “an affective state, a material vital 
doing, and an ethico-political obligation” (Puig de la Bellacasa 2011:90).  
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I extend reflections on care by asking how care politics, as modes of attention and 
attachment, produce distinct visions of trans health that generate different possibilities for 
recognition, valuation, and resource distribution. In so doing, I show how social stratification shapes 
not only relations of care, but the ways that depathologizationists recognize and define problems in 
assembling trans health. In elaborating how some depathologizationists care differently from others, I 
demonstrate how the concerns of some gender non-normative subjects are favored while those 
concerns of others may be sidelined.   
In what follows, I invite consideration of “depathologization” not solely as a set of processes 
that contest diagnostically-based treatment practices, but also as a political diagnostic in and of itself. 
Empirically examining trans depathologization therefore enables an analysis of how politics of care 
organize and are in turn shaped by infrastructures, power dynamics, racial and economic conditions, 
and other facets of care relations. Alongside feminist health and disability activists, trans 
depathologizationists advance diffractive concepts of wellness and access that decoupled “health” 
from gendered, racialized, sexualized, and abled “norms.” Nonetheless, I found that even while 
many activists attended fastidiously to questions of differential access, certain depathologizationists’ 
emphasis on stigma and destigmatization at times displaced attention to deeply stratified practices of 
care.103 Other activists instead foregrounded questions of distributive health politics, at times leaving 
definitional struggles to one side. These reflections on the ranging care politics of depathologization 
highlight new questions about how to define, address, and transform the distributive problems of 
health access, inequitable power relations, and politics of subjugation that suffuse health care 
provision transnationally.  
Empirically, I draw on interviews and observations among providers and activists in New 
York City and Buenos Aires to discuss how clinical relations and broader politics of care converge in 
practice vis-à-vis trans depathologization. Some analysts have taken for granted depathologization as 
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a mode of pulling away from the structures of medicine. In contrast, these empirical observations 
make clear that depathologization strategies in fact incorporate many concrete clinical practices and 
enroll many health care providers, and are therefore not synonymous with demedicalization projects. 
In addition, few studies engage depathologization’s contestation of power relations beyond the 
domain of biomedicine.  This chapter addresses each of these lacunae by detailing how 
depathologization movements view the broad stakes of their work, how depathologization projects 
unfold both within and beyond clinical spaces, and how activists and providers work collaboratively 
on such projects. I show how, for some, depathologization comprises a political imperative within 
which the pathologizing dynamics of health care and medicine are only a single point of departure 
among many.  
Depathologization is often advanced as a putatively singular political strategy. I argue instead 
that it incorporates wildly diffracted and sometimes dissonant orientations, projects, and politics that 
are observable in the multiplicity of objectives that its proponents articulate. Dimensionalizing these 
nuances—both as they inhere in depathologization projects more generally, and in trans 
depathologization specifically—enables analyses of how care infrastructures and broader care 
politics are rarely in stable relation. Through asking what care without illness actually does across 
differing sites and for different actors, I offer a more robust account of what is at stake for varying 
actors. In this regard, I build on the work of other ethnographic scholars who engage the multiplicity 
of trans activism’s approaches to depathologization (e.g., Burke 2011). I extend these conceptually 
and geographically by considering trans depathologization through the lens of care politics and 
stratification, and by methodologically undertaking a transnational ethnography.  
 I begin by using Clarke’s (2005) analytic strategy of positional, social worlds/arenas and 
project mapping to analyze these several distinct positions and genres of depathologization in 
relation to each other. These broadly outline the distinctive positions, collective actors, and genres I 
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encountered in my fieldwork vis-à-vis trans depathologization. The distinct genres I identified 
include declassificatory, medicalized, revisionist psychiatric, depscyhopathologization, consent-based, and coalitional. 
After broadly situating these, I loop back to ground trans depathologization in broader social 
movements, and define the central terms of depathologization and care relations. Next, I situate 
trans depathologization within the theoretical frameworks of medicalization, pathologization, and 
normalization, focusing on feminist and disability activism’s concerns with the subjugating figure of 
the “norm.”104 In this regard, I argue, trans care without illness arises in large part from feminist 
health infrastructures and epistemologies in both the US and Argentina (e.g. Brown 2013; Clarke 
and Olesen 1999; Murphy 2012) and modes of care developed by disability activists and scholars 
(Garland-Thomson 1997; Krieg 2013; Shakespeare 2006) in their multivalent notions of autonomy. 
Subsequently, I draw on ethnographic data to illustrate how actors asserted these varying 
positions—often articulating multiple and sometimes conflicting positions. I argue that a more 
nuanced and capacious accounting for trans health care is possible, in sharp contrast with accounts 
that focus solely on medicalization and stigma.  
This chapter thus contributes to ongoing engagements with care in transgender and feminist 
studies, social sciences, and disability studies by drawing connections between clinical practices of 
care and the range of political commitments and positions from which they emanate. In exploring 
care infrastructures and the “truth” of diagnostic classification as intimately linked to politics of care, 
the chapter further brings feminist technoscience studies’ reflections to bear on these provocative 
debates.  
This chapter also extends discussions in medical sociology, especially the sociology of 
diagnosis, in detailing how diagnostic practices, depathologization, notions of autonomy, and 
relations of care are distinctly mobilized in trans health. Moreover, I argue that these reflections are 
highly germane to other modes of health care that foreground questions of “self-determination,” 
 125 
including sterilization, surgeries for intersex infants and children, euthanasia, abortion, varying forms 
of plastic surgeries or elective surgeries, genomic diagnostic practices, HIV treatment-as-prevention, 
and so on.   
 
MAPPING TRANS DEPATHOLOGIZATION 
Clarke (2005) advocates positional maps as a cartographic analytic approach to “understand, 
make known, and represent the heterogeneity of positions taken in the situation under study and/or 
within given…discourses in that situation” (p. 25). Trans health activism has not yet been robustly 
studied, and in all but the most attentive accounts, “trans depathologization” is treated as an 
undifferentiated phenomenon, rather than a ranging set of practices, targets, and objectives. The 
positional map in Figure 5 below displays the relationships and variations among these differing 
positions in trans depathologization.  
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Figure 5. Positional Map: Extent of infrastructural change and importance of eliminating 
stigma in depathologization activism   
 
 
Clarke also proposes using social worlds/arenas maps to “lay out the collective actors, key 
nonhuman elements, and the arena(s) of commitment and discourse within which” negotiations take 
place (Clarke 2005:xxii). Figure 6 is a social worlds/arenas map that represents the collective actors 
that are invested in different ways in trans depathologization.105  
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Figure 6: Social World Map of Trans Depathologization 
 
 
Project maps synthesize analytic findings and “big picture” relationships (Clarke 2005:136-9). 
Figure 7 is a project map showing how different genres of depathologization differ from each other.  
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Figure 7: Project Map of Trans Depathologization Projects 
 
Figure 5 tracks differences in the positions that study participants took vis-à-vis trans 
diagnoses in the realm of trans depathologization. These positions generally ranged along two major 
axes: the extent to which positions sought to change systems or infrastructures, and the degree to 
which they focused primarily on the problem of “stigma” (often over and above issues of access, 
which I expand on below). The positions outlined in Figure 5 are not linked to specific persons. 
Rather, these represent the permeable positions taken (or not taken) in interaction and negotiation 
that emerge in my data (Clarke 2005:25). Any particular individual may assert multiple and even 
conflicting positions—and this positional mobility arose frequently as activists and providers 
negotiated trans depathologization. 
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The social worlds/arenas map in Figure 6 shows some of the major groups, organizations, 
and systems involved in trans depathologization. This is non-exhaustive, but represents the social 
worlds (e.g., activists and providers), non-human elements (e.g., classifications and financing 
structures, and care guidelines), and discourses (e.g., psychiatry and other movements) that are 
implicated and involved in trans depathologization. It shows the broad range of actors and elements 
that are part of negotiating trans depathologization. As I discuss my ethnographic findings below, 
these actors and elements are varyingly present as activists (and others) work to navigate the 
landscape of work to change how the trans diagnosis is conceptualized in biomedical practice, law, 
and beyond. 
Although individual actors were highly mobile in the positions they took on within the arena 
of trans depathologization, several “types” of depathologization took analytical shape. These, too, 
were not static and individuals moved between them. The project map in Figure 7 shows these 
distinctive genres of depathologization, and represents how they varied along two primary axes. The 
x-axis maps strategic commitments, and tracks whether depathologizationists take revisionist 
strategies (seeking to shift existing standards) or transformational strategies (re-envisioning or 
eliminating standards). The y-axis maps primary concern, and evaluates whether the focus is 
primarily on issues of stigma or infrastructure, which form the two primary depathologizationist 
concerns.  
While most people are interested in addressing both of these, tensions arise between and 
among depathologizationists who focus primarily on stigma versus infrastructure and access. These 
debates play out vis-à-vis questions about economic privilege, how to best facilitate access to care, 
how stratification matters to depathologization, and how biomedically-defined diagnoses matter to 
broader forms of representation. Of course, the positions and genres of depathologization I discuss 
are far more contingent, mobile, and mutually imbricated than a static map can adequately capture.   
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CARE WITHOUT ILLNESS BEYOND TRANS HEALTH 
Care without illness both underpins and draws together many forms of depathologization. 
While it is possible to bring a broad set of health social movements under this banner, my focus here 
is on feminist health and disability social movements and scholarship. Neither field readily deploys 
the term “depathologization.” Nonetheless, critiques of normalization and pathologization advanced 
by both fields—barring a wholesale rejection of biomedical care—resonate clearly with trans 
depathologization imperatives. Next, I draw briefly on feminist and disability scholarship in 
sketching how care without illness organizes some of the major theoretical interventions of these 
two fields. Most discussions of trans depathologization persistently and insufficiently compare it to 
gay and lesbian psychiatric depathologization. Precisely because of this analogical reflex, it is 
important to examine these seemingly more elusive connections.  
 
Feminist Health: Politicizing Pathologization 
Feminist scholarship and activism is central to trans depathologization regimes in both New 
York and Buenos Aires.106 Feminist analysts and activists have long pointed out that sites of medical 
practice can be elaborated as sites of social control and therefore as targets for politicization. 
Decades ago, Ehrenreich and English (1973) discussed how the US medical establishment 
historically regarded women as inferior on the basis of their corporeal and mental constitutions. 
They further pointed out distinct stratifications within this dynamic: the pathologization of wealthy 
women’s bodies and minds involved a different set of illnesses and maladies than those of poor 
women.  
Such stratified pathologization produced different modes of inclusion and exclusion vis-à-vis 
medical management.107 Other scholars have shown how medical power produces and reproduces 
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social norms and hierarchies of so-called “natural” orders—at once gendered, racialized, and 
abled—by exercising both coercive and violent power (Cutuli 2012; Rapp 1999; Roberts 1997; 
Ruzek 1978; Samuels 2014; and Stoler 1995). Writing about the US feminist health movement in the 
1970s, Murphy (2012:29) recently argued that the politicization of health and indeed specific forms 
of life (what she calls “sexed living-being”) took shape through a “feminist reassembly of the terms 
of health care”—focused on “seizing the means” of medical practice rather than demedicalization. 
One manifestation of this “self-help” approach to care was a refiguring of the concept of the 
“norm.” Murphy (2012:97) discusses how feminists disputed the notion of the “normal” menstrual 
cycle relative to a population standard, and instead conceptualized a highly individualized “norm” 
based on specific women tracking their cycles over time.108 These analyses bridge with assertions 
from trans health activists that embodied knowledge forms the basis for health and wellness rather 
than statistical or ideologically coercive norms. 
 
Disability Activism: Displacing the “Norm” 
Trans depathologization also stems from efforts of disability scholars and activists. Some 
trans health advocates, activists, and providers have explicitly engaged disability studies and activist 
rubrics in their framing of trans health, but most did not. Nevertheless, even when not specifically 
engaged, contributions of disability scholars and activists were palpable.109 Like feminist 
interventions, these foreground the notion that the disciplinary and biomedical norm is ineluctably 
produced against the figure of the disabled subject. As Schweik (2009) and Garland-Thomson (1997) 
point out, gendered, racialized, and health norms converge in both regulatory governance and 
medical care for people with disabilities. Dolmage and Lewiecki-Wilson (2010:24) further link 
disability and feminist analysis, insisting that each field must “investigate the history of bodily norms 
in order to unmask the powers and processes of ‘norming’ and the construction of ‘normality.’” As 
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Mel Chen (2012:43) argues, disability and feminist studies each take up such investigatory projects by 
“rais[ing] biopolitical questions about certain living states of being that have been marked as 
equivalent to death” or as otherwise dehumanized, subordinated, or objectified. 
Disability scholars do not generally aim to abrogate the availability of biomedical care. 
Nonetheless, they insist that conceptualizing disability must not take place solely in the realm of 
biomedicine. To this end, Dolmage and Lewiecki-Wilson (2010:30) further argue that “disability is a 
complex political and cultural effect of one’s interaction with an environment, not simply a medical 
condition to be eliminated” or managed. This relates to disability activists’ and scholars’ discussions 
of the “social model” of disability, which contrasts with both “individual” and “medical” models. 
The social model proposes that disability springs not from embodied, neural, emotional, or psychic 
atypicalities, but rather from the failures of society to accommodate different capacities (Hall 2011; 
Oliver 1990; Shakespeare 2006). Taken together with feminist reassemblies of medicine, this notion 
forms one of the major blueprints for care without illness. As in feminist health care formations, the 
social model of disability presumes the possibility of accommodation or capacitation (not limited to 
but likely inclusive of biomedical technologies and interventions) without the attribution pathology or 
deficiency to states of atypicality.  
In the next section, I draw on my ethnographic data to show how these intertwined political 
analyses and commitments take shape in practice with respect to trans health. I demonstrate how the 
broad implications of care without illness shape the objectives of trans depathologization, even as its 
politics and foci vary, revealing how trans depathologization draws from feminist health and 
disability activism and scholarship. 
  
PROLIFERATING DEPATHOLOGIZATIONS  
Care without illness unites trans depathologizationists in their rejection of pathologization 
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coupled with their desire to maintain access to biomedical interventions. However, despite this 
common link, empirical data show that stark differences remain among trans depathologization’s 
distinctive forms. Burke (2011:192) also observed strategic distinctions among trans 
depathologization activists in the San Francisco Bay Area, and differentiated between those 
promoting “reform” and those proposing “demedicalization.”  
In this section, I extend Burke’s (2011) insights to develop a more expansive positional 
typology that that also incorporates depathologization movements in the US and beyond. This both 
draws from and relationally positions some of the central debates among advocates and activists. 
The general genres of depathologization I present include: declassificatory, medicalized, revisionist 
psychiatric, depscyhopathologization, consent-based, and coalitional (Figure 7). Each of these might take on the 
varying positions outlined in Figure 5. Again, these genres and positions are by no means exhaustive, 
nor are their elements mutually exclusive. In fact, multiple genres of trans depathologization and 
multiple positions within it may be practiced by the same actors. For example, some activists slid 
between depsychopathologization and consent-based genres. Moreover, some may take on some 
positions as legal advocates or providers, for example, but might embed these within broader forms 
of depathologization (such as those who formally worked within medicalized depathologization, but 
who situated this work within coalitional forms of depathologization). Such complexities 
notwithstanding, these mappings provide useful schemas to examine what is at stake for different 
depathologizationists working in distinctive sites and for different objectives. Below, I explain the 
genres of depathologization I describe in the project map in Figure 7, and show how different 
positions (represented in Figure 5) were varyingly asserted. Throughout these ethnographic 
descriptions, the different actors, non-human elements, and discourses shown in Figure 6 arise as 
part of negotiating positions, claims, and compromises. 
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Genres of Trans Depathologization 
Declassificatory depathologization 
  
In a 2011 address to the Harvard University School of Public Health, trans activist Pauline 
Park argued for the declassification of what was then Gender Identity Disorder (GID) (discussed in 
Chapter 1). She said, “I personally find it outrageous that transgendered people in the United States 
and elsewhere have to have themselves declared mentally ill in order to access health care or to get 
or to keep a job” (Park, 2011). Arguing against what she called the “GID regime,” she asserted, “We 
must commit to finding means by which transgendered people can access forms of medical 
intervention…without having to subject themselves to the degradation of being declared mentally ill 
simply by virtue of their gender identity” (Park 2011).  
Park’s (2007, 2011) conception of depathologization seeks primarily to remove GID from 
the DSM on the basis of social destigmatization. Her position exemplifies of a steadfast 
declassificatory depathologization. This genre of trans depathologization aligns most closely with 
demands made by US-based gay activists in 1974 to remove “homosexuality” from the DSM-II 
(American Psychiatric Association 1974). In her 2011 lecture, Park spoke to the specter of losing 
access to covered care with the eradication of the diagnostic code: “Very few transgendered people 
are getting hormones paid for and even fewer are getting SRS [sex-reassignment surgery] paid for 
anyway, so the ostensible ‘loss’ of coverage by embracing this concept of transgender health will be a 
small one for our community. In my view, the gain will more than offset such a loss” (Park 2011). In 
an earlier magazine interview, she riffed on an activist refrain: “I don’t have a gender identity 
disorder. Society has a gender identity disorder…I think [GID] should be abolished. And I think it's 
disabling for the trans community and that it only serves to pathologize transgendered people”110 
(The Gully 2002: paragraph 23). According to this logic, if medicine produces a pathologized 
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population through its diagnostic sorting, a depathologizing gesture requires divestment from this 
the classificatory frame of a “pathologizing” diagnostic model.  
Declassificatory depathologizationists give primacy to concerns about social stigma over and 
above questions of infrastructure and access to care. Thus it is not a surprise that its proponents 
have come into conflict with other depathologization activists. Critics argue that declassification 
would inevitably result in demedicalization, and would lead to markedly stratified access to care 
(since access would wholly depend on ability to pay or pursue legal recourse). As such, many—
including Mark, a New York activist and attorney—have decried this form of depathologization as 
“privileged,” arguing that it fails to comprehend the power dynamics within which low-income and 
other marginalized trans people attempt to access care (Mark Interview, January 15, 2016). Other 
advocates and activists have expressed concern that, despite the roots of such a position in social 
models of disability, declassificatory depathologizationists trepidation about stigma relies on a 
disavowal and reification of mental debility as dehumanizing. Significantly, no participants in my US 
sample took a fully declassificatory position, but its predominance in broader debates led many to 
carefully articulate why they reject total declassification. In Argentina, participants pointed to the 
Gender Identity Law’s health care provisions to demonstrate how declassification could be coupled 
with consent-based care as a means of formal and legal depathologization that still attends to access. 
 
Medicalized depathologization 
This genre of depathologization takes the pragmatics of access as a starting point, and 
partially sidelines concerns about stigma. Medicalized depathologization not only assumes but also 
anticipates the infrastructural constraints of health care. As one presenter I observed at a trans 
health conference commented, ‘Philosophically and politically, the diagnosis feels stigmatizing. But 
in the health care system we have, everything has to have a diagnostic code—even a well visit.” 
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Mark (Interview 2016:5) similarly commented:  
I always just think, well none of the stories we tell to the law accurately reflect who we are. We create these 
narratives to fit into the [existing] power structures to redistribute better opportunities for survival. So I just 
have a really hard time with the trans community sort of getting up in arms about the idea that we might be 
considered disordered or [that] being trans is a disability or …a mental illness when all of these things only 
have the meaning that we ascribe to them[.]  
 
Here, depathologizationists separate the bureaucratic biomedical necessity of diagnostic 
classifications from political subjectivities. As Mark (Interview 2016:5) asserted, “[T]he entire 
medical and psychiatric paradigms are incredibly problematic and are used in the most problematic 
ways. So my approach…is always going to be in the lens of what’s going to do the most to increase 
access to care that people need.” Medicalized depathologizationists thus take as given that 
biomedicine has been and will continue to be a stratifying, pathologizing, and normalizing 
institution. As a result, they have little interest in tinkering with diagnostic classifications. It is not 
that they see these as performing accurate or adequate work, but rather their concerns that processes 
of diagnostic revision may open up debates that tend to destabilize already tenuous modes of access.  
 Medicalized depathologizationists are most likely to make explicit links to disability activism. 
Following up on his point about mental illness and disability having only the “meanings we ascribe 
to them,” Mark (Interview 2016:5) commented, “So if having a disability means that the world 
doesn’t understand or accommodate your needs, then that’s precisely what [being trans] should be 
understood as…So I don’t love the ‘Oh get us out of [the DSM].’” As an attorney, he is also 
adamant that in the U.S. disability protections offer superior legal strategies than equality claims. 
Mark and other medicalized depathologizationists thus regard diagnoses—and laws—as imperfect 
and reductive, but ultimately as pragmatic instruments for achieving access for those who otherwise 
would not gain it. Their instrumental utility, however, is of course contingent on the particular 
medical and legal infrastructures in which diagnoses circulate. 
 Another key point for medicalized depathologizationists is their assertion that trans people 
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who are also subjugated along lines of race, ethnicity, class, disability, and/or immigration status 
(among others) are least likely to benefit from efforts to destigmatize diagnostic classifications or 
practices. For example, the shift from Gender Identity Disorder to Gender Dysphoria (the latter as a 
“distress-based model”) is not likely to be applied in institutional settings such as prisons or 
immigration detention facilities where “distress” generally does not register as requiring the 
intervention of medical administrative intervention (Hanssmann 2016:125–26; Strangio 2012).  
Medicalized depathologizationists further assert that doctors, attorneys, and other actors 
adjudicate gender non-normativity vis-à-vis people being legible as properly productive citizens.111 In 
short, they view diagnostic and biomedical practices as wedges. Bifurcating biomedical practices 
such as diagnosis split trans people into two groups: one which might be recognized as recuperable 
into citizenship, and the other outside of or excluded from citizenship.112 The former group, 
according to medicalized depathologizationists, are admitted into citizenship contingently, while the 
latter becomes subject to increased barriers to entry. Simply revising diagnostic classifications is 
inadequate, they argue, because they would be applied in radically different and highly stratifying and 
marginalizing ways.  
 Thus, for medicalized depathologizationists, concerns about social control and subjugation 
are never simply or even predominantly enacted in the power field of biomedical practice. They are 
less concerned with scientific or representational accuracy, and focus instead on effects. As Strangio 
(2012:paragraph 3-4) writes: 
For many people, especially trans people of color and low income and incarcerated trans people, the 
diagnosis of Gender Identity Disorder has become a tool to resist medical and other forms of state 
control… [F]or incarcerated transgender individuals, the availability of a GID diagnosis creates an 
important framework for meeting Eighth Amendment and statutory requirements for challenging the 
deliberate indifference of prison medical staff.  
In other words, at the same time diagnoses are subjugating, they may also be contingently employed 
strategically by trans people and advocates. 
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 Medicalized depathologizationists with whom I spoke articulated concerns about centering 
gender non-normative subjects usually marginalized or excluded from recognition and care. 
However, in my study samples, addressing such marginalization through medicalization was unique to 
activists in the U.S. Mark (2016:19), for instance, had not heard about Argentina’s Gender Identity 
Law.113 When I shared with him its depathologizing provision, he said, “That would never work 
here.” While he described his politics as being in line with this move, he commented that the US 
health care system would not accommodate distributing resources in accordance with desire rather 
than pathologization. In the US, he explained, a more equitable distribution of care could only 
possibly be enacted by engaging biomedicine on its own pathologizing terms. In a sense, this 
approach embeds a broader politic of care without illness into an extant pathologizing diagnostic 
regime, while also reading normalizing diagnostic classifications against the grain. 
 
Revisionist psychiatric depathologization 
Like medicalized depathologizationists, revisionist psychiatric depathologizationists are also 
largely concerned with pragmatic forms of access, but are more likely to tinker with diagnoses. Issues 
of stigma are also somewhat more prioritized in this group’s practices compared with medicalized 
depathologization’s square focus on infrastructure and access.  
After fielding much controversy concerning the GID diagnosis, in 2008 the American 
Psychiatric Association convened the Work Group on Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders 
(WGSGID) to develop recommendations for its revised publication of the DSM-5 (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013). Some individuals appointed—mostly mental health providers and 
researchers—had ties to trans activists and advocates.114 The group eventually struck a compromise 
among the demands three major constituencies: declassificatory depathologizationists, old-guard 
defenders of the Gender Identity Disorder diagnosis, and activists concerned with access to care. As 
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a result, Gender Dysphoria became the revised diagnosis in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013). Fiona (Interview, January 11, 2016), a mental health provider in New York, 
reflected that the new diagnosis is “no longer a [classic] transsexual model. They’re talking about 
gender diversity.”115 Thus, much like declassificatory depathologizationists, revisionist psychiatric 
depathologizationists center the notion of wellness over psychiatric pathologization. They implicitly 
critique psychiatry’s normalizing power as they recast gender non-normativity as human diversity 
instead of pathological deviance. For such actors—many practicing mental health providers—it 
remains possible to undertake these changes within the realm of mental health and biomedical 
practice. 
Like declassificatory depathologizationists, this group prioritizes the declassification of 
“pathologizing” diagnoses. Like medicalized depathologizationists, they foreground the importance 
of coding structures for health care access. However, some ambivalence remains about the 
unanticipated consequences of psychiatric diagnosis—even in “depathologized” forms.116 Fiona 
(Interview, January 11, 2016) commented: 
I think the community and people certainly outside of mental health think that it’s some kind of pathology that 
mental health people are imposing where really it’s just like this is a coding book for billing. It’s so incidental.  
Most therapists I know who do this don’t even like using gender diagnosis. Now that we have so many 
insurance companies paying for things and they want a gender diagnosis more people will end up with one. 
Who knows what impact that’s going to have on their future care.  We know it could be bad, right?   
 
Revisionist psychiatric depathologizationists ultimately strive to retain a psychiatric diagnosis only for the 
explicit purpose of retaining access to care, rather than maintaining an investment in defining gender non-
normativity as a psychiatric illness. Some of the same people involved in revising the DSM are also 
active in developing a diagnostic classification within the ICD that dwells outside the chapter on 
mental health disorders (see Chapter 1). Nonetheless, striking the compromise that produced 
Gender Dysphoria to replace Gender Identity Disorder in the DSM was largely sufficient for 
revisionist psychiatric depathologizationists. It met their objectives of both facilitating access to 
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health and removing the individually-based term “disorder” from the diagnostic classification. In this 
regard, diagnoses can work instrumentally, as for medicalized depathologizationists, but they need 
not be subjugating. 
 
Depsychopathologization 
Some depathologizationists, however, were unimpressed by the changes resulting in the 
altered Gender Dysphoria diagnostic classification, objecting specifically to its placement in the 
DSM. In shifting from a disorder- to a distress-based diagnostic model, they argued, little had 
changed in that it remained a psychiatric diagnosis. Depsychopathologizationists seek covered 
gender-confirming care without any reliance on a mental illness diagnosis. Like declassificatory 
depathologizationists, they strive for the elimination of a psychiatric diagnosis, and like medicalized 
depathologizationists, they train their attention on facilitating infrastructural access to care. This 
group also shares significant overlaps with revisionist psychiatric depathologization activists, but is 
more emphatic in rejecting psychiatry as the site for diagnosis.  
For activists involved in Stop Trans Pathologization International (STP), 
“depsychopathologization” has become a potent call to action. For STP (2012) and other 
depsychopathologizationists, psychiatrization refers to the “practice of defining and treating 
transsexuality under a mentally disordered label.” Instead, STP favors establishing a “non-
pathologizing” mention in the ICD-11. Significantly, this position shifted as STP grew from a 
relatively small group of activists in Spain to an informal transnationally-linked collaborative.117  
Presently, STP and other activists, as well as health care providers (Drescher et al. 2012), 
presently aim to develop a non-psychiatric medical diagnosis. As part of this effort, a committee 
associated with the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health (ICD-11), now in its 
full revision process, is addressing how to represent a diagnosis that defines and describes being 
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trans in a “solely medical” non-psychiatric manner. Some participants called this a “neutral 
diagnosis.” As with other conditions that one must “fight to get,” (Dumit 2006) this diagnostic 
objective relies in part on the authorization of “medicine” as a potentially politically neutral terrain 
through which to diagnose and receive diagnoses, while psychiatry remains in the domain of 
speculation, moralization, and stigmatization.  
In addition to the move away from psychiatric classification, more transnationally-focused 
depsychopathologizationists were also interested in contesting what they view as US epistemic 
dominance—or what one activist called “psychiatric imperialism.” While the DSM has garnered 
much attention and controversy among trans advocates and activists in the US, certain 
depsychopathologizationists focus instead on the ICD as a more transnationally salient target. For 
example, Global Action for Trans* Equality (GATE), an NGO based in Buenos Aires, New York, 
and Bangkok, became involved at the inception of the ICD-11 revision process, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. While many of the US-based providers I interviewed were only marginally aware of this 
process, many had caught wind that there was a non-psychiatric diagnosis in development. 
Argentina-based providers were generally much more aware of this shift taking place through the 
ICD, though they also generally tracked the DSM changes. 
Some depsychopathologizationists recognized the fine line between rejecting psychiatric 
imperialism and exacerbating the ongoing devaluation of people with mental illness. Antonio 
(Interview July 25, 2015)—the Argentinian activist involved in the ICD revision process (also 
discussed in Chapter 1)—notes that the WHO implored members of the working group to 
relinquish the position that the problem of stigmatized trans existence lies in the fact of the 
psychiatric illness per se. In debates about how to articulate an argument for moving the diagnosis 
outside the ICD’s mental illness chapter, the group eventually strove to make this argument without 
rehashing the stigmatization of mental illness more broadly. As Antonio (Interview July 25, 2015) 
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explained, one activist who attended a panel during which the WHO presented their work said, “We 
are not ill. We are human beings.” He laughed sardonically when he reported this unintentionally but 
pointedly deprecating comment, which presumes that mental illness is synonymous with exclusion 
from humanness.  
The WHO working group eventually argued that the stigmatization of mental illness remains 
a problem that requires work. Relative to their trans depsychopathologization-centered project, they 
assert that moving the proposed diagnosis of Gender Incongruence outside the mental health 
chapter does not comprise a reactionary disavowal of mental illness, but rather a bid for enhanced 
diagnostic accuracy.  
Antonio (Interview July 25, 2015) also noted that Argentina’s Gender Identity Law is caught 
in a similar conundrum in its disavowal of mental illness. He commented, “now, the law in 
Argentina has caused a complicated effect because it depathologizes. This means that people do not 
have to go through a process of psychiatric evaluation, but at the same time, what the discourse of 
depathologization produces is that it explicitly reinforces the stigma about mental illness and 
suffering” (Antonio Interview July 25, 2015).   
In their strong demand for depscyhopathologization, these arguments also recall gay and 
lesbian depathologization paradigms. However, while gay and lesbian activists refuted psychiatric 
normalization, they lacked a distinctive impetus to remain engaged with biomedical practice. Trans 
depsychopathologizationists yoke the rejection of mental illness to demands for access to biomedical 
infrastructure through a different diagnosis (or through a law that removes the necessity of diagnosis 
for access to care, as in Argentina). In so doing, they assert that “self-determination” and 
“autonomy” must be at the center of the provision of trans health care. 
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Consent-based depathologization 
This genre of depathologization reflects elaboration of some tenets of self-determination 
articulated through depsychopathologization. However, it moves away from diagnostic frameworks 
and towards contract-based models of elective care (while striving to maintain access to coverage). 
While definitions range broadly, informed consent in the realm of clinical medicine can be defined 
as “the core notion that decisions about the medical care a person will receive, if any, are to be made 
in a collaborative manner between patient and physician” (Applebaum, Lidz, and Meisel 1987:12). 
With regard to trans health, informed consent models generally require a disclosure of risks 
associated with treatment or procedures rather than “an in-depth mental health evaluation and 
referral” (Deutsch 2012:140). To the extent that this genre of depathologization involves diagnoses, 
they are generally negotiated between patients and providers. In general, consent-based 
depathologizationists aim to enhance the agency of patients in accessing care and to prevent 
“paternalistic” dynamics of care (Caplan 1988). The contractual emphasis of informed consent 
models is increasingly regarded far more favorably than what advocates and activists call the 
“gatekeeping” practices of trans health that comprise the pathologizing diagnostic model of care.  
Talia (Interview, August 3, 2013), the New York nurse practitioner whose comments opened 
the chapter, commented on her clinic’s process of developing a clinic-wide protocol based on 
informed consent: 
[W]hen we wrote our informed consent protocol…part of what we wanted to do is not make people…jump 
through a bunch of hoops. [T]he whole purpose of [our] protocol was to make sure people had factual, high-
quality, evidence-based information upon which to make their decision and that they had the cognitive ability 
to make a decision which most people do if they’re already consenting for their medical care for everything 
else, they should be able to do this…So there was no gatekeeper anymore. It was really all up to that person to 
make that decision with guidance to make sure they understood what the consequences may be versus benefits 
versus unknowns.   
 
Talia’s (Interview August 3, 2013) experience describes one example of how informed consent-
based projects aim to produce a collaborative model of treatment between health care providers and 
patients. For consent-based depathologizationists, informed consent models contrast with 
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paternalistic diagnostic models that require psychiatric diagnosis, psychotherapy, and adherence to a 
specific trajectory of gender transition. However, Talia (Interview, August 3, 2013:8) also 
emphasized that informed consent models of care often fail to fit into diagnostic infrastructures:  
Talia: In my day to day, I never use [Gender Identity Disorder]. I never have to. I used to in a rare once in a 
while because a surgeon would require me to write a letter that said a person was diagnosed with GID so he 
could do the surgery.  So I would tell the patient, like I’m going to have to put this in this letter but I’m not 
diagnosing you with this. 
Author: So it’s in the letter, not the chart?118 
Talia: Yeah. Which I suppose wouldn’t be good if the surgeon ever looked at the chart.” 
 She emphasized that this was not without its risks, given the possibility of being charged with health 
care fraud—a common concern among health care providers who refuse what they see as 
pathologizing diagnoses. 
In Argentina, no such risks exist, as the Gender Identity Law installed informed consent at 
the level of the nation, requiring only “expressed desire” on the part of trans people to obtain 
gender-confirming medical treatment. Discussing his transnational depathologization work, Antonio 
(Interview, July 25, 2015) expressed that he would have preferred Argentina’s current approach to 
be the transnational standard: no diagnosis, and treatment based on self-referral. But he viewed the 
U.S.’s decentralized and rigidly diagnostic structure as making this unattainable. He said US-based 
insurance schemas structure the need for diagnosis.119 In his mind, this “force[s] the rest of the world 
to accept a pathologizing category.” He described this as “US psychiatric imperialism,” and 
suggested that it prevented more sweeping changes to trans health as a transnationally standardizing 
field. This distinction accounts for why Antonio can move rather seamlessly between 
depsychopathologization and consent-based depathologization. In his transnational work, he 
advocated a “non-pathologizing” biomedical diagnosis, while in his activism within Argentina, he 
took a strong informed-consent position. While these positions are not incompatible, the former is 
more strongly constituted by diagnostic rather than contractual infrastructures. 
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In general, consent-based depathologization departs from dominant standards of trans 
health care by radically de-emphasizing assessment and diagnosis, and instead advancing “patient 
autonomy” and “informed choice.” Informed consent advocates assert that this model ensures that 
gender non-normative people have the information they need (about the effects of hormone 
treatments or surgeries, for instance) to make considered and self-determined care decisions that 
best fit their needs.  
 
Coalitional depathologization 
While comprising a less distinctive strategic position, coalitional depathologizationists insist 
on foregrounding the stratifying elements of diagnostic classification. Like medicalized 
depathologizationists, they center on how diagnostic practices segment trans subjects into 
“deserving” or “undeserving” categories of care recipients (e.g., Aizura 2006; Irving 2008; Spade 
2011; Strangio 2012). Further, they refuse to separate pathologization, racialization, sexualization, 
and valuation, instead advocating “self-determination” and “bodily autonomy” as embedded in 
broader transformative and redistributive politics. Moreover, they assert that economic and 
racialized stratifications and relations of power both constitute and are reproduced by the force field 
of biomedical practice (e.g., Araneta and Fernandez Garrido 2016; Arkles 2009; Berkins 2008; 
Fernandez, D’Uva, and Viturro 2004; Sylvia Rivera Law Project n.d.). This genre of 
depathologization thus comprises a more strictly epistemological position that seems to operate in 
tandem with strategic or pragmatic positions. But it also inevitably and strongly informs how 
advocates and activists define problems and imagine solutions, regardless of the specific form of 
depathologization that they adopt.  
People with this view of care without illness frequently compare differing modes of 
embodied autonomy. For instance, several respondents made common-sense links between gender-
 146 
confirming care, access to safe and legal abortion, coverage for in vitro fertilization and other 
reproductive technologies, freedom from forced sterilization, and the prevention of surgeries on 
intersex infants. Some respondents also mentioned how disability and euthanasia are connected to 
trans health, paralleling the central clinical relevance of patients’ life conditions over and above 
diagnosis- and prognosis-driven care.  
From this perspective, trans health is simply one among many forms of care that need not 
require a treatable illness. Even more important for this group, trans health is only one among many 
forms of care that places the subject of care—not the provider—at the center of decision-making.120 
Coalitional depathologizationists insist that racialization, sexualization, class, and other forces of 
marginalization shape the power relations between providers and patients to such an extent that 
“autonomy” requires far more than providers simply choosing to conduct their work differently. It 
is this position that distinguishing this group from other depathologizationists. Here, “self-
determination” (autodeterminación) becomes a mode of demand that seems to invokes distinctive 
power relations that exceed those that presently shape institutions such as biomedicine. “Gender 
self-determination,” in this regard, links to other modes of collective self-fashioning that explicitly 
reject the terms of a universal subject of care or rights.121  
Coalitional depathologization activists thus view pathologization as far exceeding the realm 
of gendered or sexualized difference, and link depathologization efforts to a range of other desired 
social, political, and economic transformations. They orient around what Cathy Cohen (1997:444-
45) calls “transformational politics,” or “a politics that does not search for opportunities to integrate 
into dominant institutions and normative social relationships, but instead pursues a political agenda 
that seeks to change values, definitions, and laws which make these institutions and relationships 
oppressive.” For instance, Ana (Interview July 31, 2015:18), a travesti activist in Buenos Aires, told 
me that she was fighting not just for depathologization, but against criminalization and abbreviated 
 147 
life chances, “and in favor of real economic, political, and social justice.” Samantha (Interview 
January 9, 2016:6), a New York attorney and activist commented that she does not view biomedicine 
as a site of liberation. Rather, she sees it as an area where racialized, classed, gendered, and 
sexualized hierarchies are starkly instantiated. As such, she views depathologization as a way to 
intervene in the ideologies and practices that produce and stabilize these ranging and thickly 
interrelated hierarchies. Silvia (Interview, August 9, 2013), another New York activist, was skeptical 
about detaching depathologization activism from broader racialized class struggles. For her, care 
without illness was not a political endpoint, but was rather continuous with political and economic 
redistribution and revolution. She explained: 
Trans health was the starting point for beginning to think a lot about what it would take to turn back the tide 
on neoliberalism, to significantly increase taxation on the wealthy, to rebuild and expand the social wage, and to 
transform the provision of social services by this state into being more democratic, dignified, honoring the self-
determination of particularly African-American communities and immigrant communities, and queer and trans 
people, and sort of rebuild [what a] democratic, egalitarian welfare state could look like (Silvia Interview, 
2013:2). 
 
Silvia distinguished LGBT freedom and rights projects from trans health activism, saying that while 
the former tend to be concerned primarily with issues of privacy and/or or non-discrimination, the 
latter can bring about the conditions to engage in class struggle. Specifically, she described how trans 
health advocates and activists must enter into explicit engagements and make demands on 
institutional infrastructures in ways that LGBQ advocates and activists do not need to take up. 
[T]rans health on a very clear level requires infrastructure of either the state or the market, [and] unlike LGBT 
freedom, where you could say, ‘what we want is to be left alone in our bedrooms,’ trans people require the 
actual acquisition of a material good that cannot be produced in one’s own home…So it forces advocates and 
trans people into struggles around state provision and struggles around the shape of marketized and 
commoditized healthcare (Silvia Interview, 2013:3). 
 
Ana (Interview 2015:14) took a similar stance, describing travesti politics as necessarily aligned 
with racialized class and labor struggles. We talked at a Buenos Aires restaurant. She criticized what 
she viewed as the racialized and classed subordination of travesti activists on the part of mainstream 
gay and lesbian rights organization. Gesturing to our server as he walked away from our table, she 
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explained that travestis have more in common with him than with the well-off leaders of these 
organizations. For her, depathologization links to “proletarian struggle.” Addressing biomedical 
pathologization without also mobilizing against economic marginalization and violence would be 
insufficient from this vantage point.  
Ana was working with public hospital-based clinics in the lower-income outskirts of Buenos 
Aires on consultorios inclusivos –“inclusive” or “trans-friendly” clinic days. She appreciated the fact that 
Argentina had diagnostically depathologized access to gender-confirming care. But pathologization, she 
said, went much further than just medicine (Interview 2015). Consultorios inclusivos were specifically 
reserved for low-income trans people and travestis, as well as trans* and non-trans* sex workers, and 
people seeking abortions—which, while illegal, are often performed (e.g., McReynolds-Pérez 2017). 
Consultorios inclusivos aimed to connect patients with supportive providers and to insulate people from 
harassment that often occurred in standard waiting rooms. Ana asserted that the providers staffing 
these clinics needed to reject not only the pathologization of transness, but also medicine’s broader 
racialized and classed pathologization. She did not think that clinic days would fundamentally shift 
the stratified dynamics of medicine, but she saw them as microcosms within which the possibility of 
a broader vision of depathologization could be materialized.  
At one of the consultorios inclusivos that I visited, I spoke with a doctor named Adán. He 
worked in a clinic in one of the conurbanos—one of the districts in the province of Buenos Aires just 
outside of the city proper. I had spent most of the day in the clinic as I waited to speak with him. 
Every once in a while, Adán rushed out and delay our interview by another hour. As I waited, I 
spoke with the patients there. Chairs were arranged in a circle, and patients chatted and passed 
around snacks. In the afternoon, someone celebrated a birthday.  
Auyero (2012), in his ethnographic work on state bureaucracies and welfare programs in the 
Buenos Aires conurbanos, reflects on this extended form of waiting. Arguing that people become 
 149 
“patients of the state,” he suggests waiting as a form of social control. In a similar vein, Victoria Pitts-
Taylor (2011) calls this “waiting to death.” The wait was certainly long, but it did not seem 
immediately to have the stultifying effect that Auyero and Pitts-Taylor describe. This sense of “clinic 
as community” is one that accompanies both feminist and queer health formations. Without 
romanticizing this view or rehashing the notions of “good medicine/bad psychiatry” on which it 
partially relies, it was still difficult to ignore the fact that people seemed more or less content to be 
waiting there with each other. This—as well as the “structure of feeling” (Raymond 1954) that more 
generally accompanies the “trans friendly clinic”122—emerges largely as a collective sense of relief at 
the possibility (however minimal) of being able to access previously unattainable forms of facilitating 
the conditions of life and well-being. Of note here is the fact that this clinic is currently in danger of 
closure, having been swept up in the cuts to public medical programs in President Macri’s 
neoliberalizing national policies since his election in late 2015 (Página12, 2016). 
 While I did not directly ask people in the consultorio inclusive why they were there, some 
volunteered that they had come for gender confirming care. Others were also there for a range of 
standard medical problems, even though they had to wait longer than on a regular clinic day. But 
they said they preferred to talk with Dr. Adán, and they liked the waiting room at the consultorio 
inclusivo anyway. I finally talked to Adán—a Marxist and physician—about an hour and a half after 
the clinic was set to close. He shared some of the other reasons that patients had come, including 
one who was seeking misoprostol for a pharmaceutical abortion (Adán Interview, July 24, 2015).  
Abortion is illegal in Argentina. Yet, as one trans activist told me half-jokingly, they are now 
easier to access than gender-confirming care. Previously, abortion had only been accessible to 
wealthy people who could pay steep fees to private doctors. But in the past decade, feminist and 
lesbian organizing had made pharmaceutical abortion widely accessible. Adán described how his 
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work was informed by collaborations with this network of feminists (see also McReynolds-Pérez 
2017), as well as by his partnerships with travesti and trans* groups and organizations.  
 Coalitional depathologizationists are generally critical of revisionist politics that hold stable 
power dynamics between states, markets, providers, and trans people. New York activist Silvia 
(2013: 4) commented: 
A lot of trans advocates are very preoccupied with how legal categories don’t include people or something.  
That’s deeply baffling to me that we’re not talking about socialism, that we’re not about class war…that we’re 
talking about how the state categorizes people. It’s like that isn’t actually that big a deal compared to poverty.  
The state could treat trans people just fine and we’d still all be dying of AIDS. 
 Silvia, Ana, and Adán, like several other respondents, saw depathologization as an important 
strategy for trans health. However, for them, contesting depathologization was not simply about a 
resistance to the normalizing forces of biomedicine or the state. Instead, they focused on its 
potential to contest wider power relations, and bind trans health activism to a broader Marxist 
praxis. When I asked Silvia (2013:9) about the end goals of trans health advocacy and activism, she 
responded, “Maybe it ends when we have a respectful, self-determined provision of medical services 
to trans people provided in a system of universal single-payer healthcare with a democratically 
controlled worker state.  Maybe.” 
 
NEGOTIATING DEPATHOLOGIZATIONS 
Returning to the positional and project maps (Figure 5 and 7), I provide two ways to view 
what is at stake for a range of depathologization advocates and activists. Both show how 
simultaneous and sometimes competing concerns about infrastructure, access, and stigma are in play 
in trans depathologization and the varying positions that are taken in its negotiation. Taking a 
primarily stigma-focused approach, declassificatory depathologization activists, for instance, center 
questions of representation. As a result, they target what they see as devaluing elements of the 
diagnostic classificatory system as “stigmatizing.” In contrast, infrastructure-focused medicalized 
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depathologization are far more concerned with how to mitigate the structuring effects of stratified 
health care provision. They thus focus on how to address the inequities of biomedical infrastructures 
by adopting the lexicon of medicalization, even though it generally belies their broader political 
commitments. Consent-based depathologizationists work to reterritorialize the site of interaction between 
providers and patients from the frame of diagnostics to that of the contract. In so doing, they work 
(where and when possible) to maximize access to care while ostensibly mitigating stigma. 
Depsychopathologization and revisionist psychiatric depathologizationists also attempt to take seriously 
the effects of stigmatization without compromising on the question of access. Each aims to change 
the name, the placement, and/or the descriptions of diagnoses to maintain access to care 
infrastructures without abandoning classifications altogether. Coalitional depathologization, while a more 
diffractive position, ultimately focuses somewhat more on infrastructures. However, it tends to 
understand biomedical infrastructures as intimately intertwined with a range of other infrastructures, 
and views its interventions as targeting ranging infrastructural sites: biomedical, economic, racialized, 
geopolitical, and so on. In each case, depathologizationists fashion a political diagnostic practice, and 
they then tailor varying strategies of depathologization to the ways they define the problem of 
pathologization. 
 The divergences between declassificatory depathologization, coalitional depathologization, 
and revisionist psychiatric depathologization illuminate some of the central debates between 
revisionist and transformational depathologization. Declassificatory depathologization envisions an 
abandonment of diagnostic frames altogether, in favor of a demedicalized but generally market-
based model. Many coalitional depathologizationists instead envision mobilizing a redistributive 
politics combined with an imperative of “self-determination” that would also likely arise outside of a 
diagnostic framework. Attentive to the stratifying forces of the private market, however, coalitional 
depathologization is defined in contrast to advocates of declassificatory depathologization.  
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Revisionist psychiatric depathologizationists, in contrast with coalitional and declassificatory 
depathologization, view (if with some trepidation) psychiatric diagnostic frameworks as sufficiently 
elastic to enable access without disrupting dominant infrastructures of care. Medicalized 
depathologization and depsychopathologization is positioned more centrally along this continuum. 
While each genre is varyingly suspicious of diagnostic frameworks and while each may be 
accompanied by long-term political visions that do not rely on them, certain genres of 
depathologization focus on instrumentally mobilizing diagnostic frameworks. Medicalized 
depathologizationists strategically focus on DSM-based diagnoses as tools for access, while 
depsychopathologizationists focus on the ICD. These strategies rely on at least a provisional notion 
of either biological determinism or the “neutrality” of biomedicine in contrast with psychiatry 
(discussed in Chapter 1). 
In all of these distinctive manners, trans health activists, advocates, and activist-providers 
engage the conundrum of “care without illness” by proposing or seeking changes in pathologizing 
diagnostic models of care. They seek arrangements of care in which trans people can opt for 
biomedical interventions without coercion, red tape, prior authorization, or even diagnosis. In a 
concrete sense, people undertake these objectives by tinkering with, shifting, or reimagining 
infrastructures that enable care without illness—each with distinct objectives, targets, and foci.  
These varying interventions thus manifest in a range of infrastructural shifts and innovations 
(discussed in Chapter 1). Some are informal (such as providers’ practices of “creative coding” for 
Endocrine Disorder-NOS), while some are implemented through formal changes to diagnostic 
classifications, guidelines, or standards.123 Some are oriented to an urgent present, like medicalized 
depathologization, while others focus on bringing about a certain kind of future (like declassificatory 
depathologization and coalitional depathologization). Across different genres of depathologization, 
advocates and activists also attend to varying sites and scales of intervention: administrative 
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regulations, expert committees, diagnostic classifications, treatment guidelines, clinic or medical 
system policies, and occasionally (though increasingly) national laws.  
All of these positions and genres are in conversation, and to some degree, those who assert 
certain positions or mobilize within certain genres (however contingently and provisionally) counter 
what they view as the shortcomings of other positions and genres. These may converge in certain 
campaigns or political projects that are capacious enough to resonate with a range of positions.  
 
CONCLUSION 
While depathologization comprises a certain epistemological commonsense in transgender 
studies, elaborating precisely how it is articulated and instantiated in practice matters. This chapter 
examined different frameworks of depathologization. I argued for greater attention to the 
continuities between feminist women’s health and contemporary trans depathologization (see also 
Hanssmann, 2016). Feminist health infrastructures have suffused the development of trans health 
formations (e.g., trans health clinics or community-developed care guidelines). Moreover, they 
provide a stronger analogy for care without illness than gay depathologization frameworks. Trans 
depathologization also refigures and at least ostensibly renders more horizontal clinical relations of 
care, characteristic also of disability scholars’ and activists’ analyses of biomedicine as both 
imperative and subjugating.  
Regarding technologies and practices of trans depathologization (e.g., use of clinical 
informed consent guidelines rather than diagnostic classification), I argue that these too require 
attention as they take shape contingently in varying infrastructures and regulatory landscapes. My 
example here was the adoption of a legally mandated informed consent regime in Argentina, which 
seems both to facilitate broader access to care and to raise questions about the requisite conditions 
for such practices of consent (see also Casper and Clarke 1998).  
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Overall, my findings both corroborate and stand in contrast with the few extant studies of 
the broader politics of trans depathologization. For instance, Sekuler (2013:15) maintains that France 
produced itself as a “forward-thinking and rights-protecting nation” by depathologizing trans health. 
However, he argued that it did so by producing a “pre-modern and rights-neglecting non-French 
‘other’” (Sekuler 2013:15), thus unwittingly enrolling depathologizationists into the “racial policing 
of the French nation-state” (Sekuler 2013:27). Like Sekuler, I found that some genres and positions 
of depathologization engaged the power relations of destigmatization in ways that retrenched 
racialized and classed hierarchies. Others, however, adopted a care politics that expanded 
depathologization as a political diagnostic that far transcended trans health. Their view of medicine 
as only one of many institutions, infrastructures, and systems that instantiate broad forms of 
stratification in fact bridges trans pathologization and racial policing as paired problems, rather than 
pitting one against the other. 
The objectives and foci of trans care without illness vary among advocates, activists, and 
providers. For coalitional and consent-based depathologizationists, depathologization constitutes a 
political imperative and a collective process of autonomy. In contrast, for 
depsychopathologizationists and medicalized or revisionist psychiatric depathologizationists, 
depathologization involves expanding, changing, or strategically using biomedicine to better meet 
the needs of trans people. For declassificatory depathologizationists, the main objective is 
destigmatization and recuperation into the embrace of “the normal.” Last, for coalitional 
depathologizationists, depathologization is one means of addressing distributive justice, and is 
intertwined with broader projects that address power and subjugation. By elucidating these varying 
genres and positions of trans depathologization, as well as the relations between then, I 
demonstrated a range of different investments in trans health, each of which is accompanied by 
distinctive political, representational, and infrastructural objectives. 
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Depathologization as not only strategic interventions into health care but also political 
diagnostics thus foreground questions about care politics and their embeddedness in the relations of 
clinical, surgical, psychiatric and other forms of care. The distinctions among depathologizationists’ 
positions and strategies reveal how differing politics of normativity, distribution, and autonomy 
profoundly shape how activists imagine depathologizing projects. Given the tendency in both 
transgender studies and medical sociology to collapse difference among depathologizationists and 
health-based activists, this dimensionalizing work reveals the immense range of politics that 
constitute and ground trans and other health activisms.  
In sum, this chapter asks how care politics are both fashioned and revealed by activist 
practices of forging relations—infrastructural, professional, confrontational, historical, hierarchical, 
horizontal, collective, and strategic, among others. And indeed, it is through such processes that 
political objectives substantively materialize. As such, depathologization is not only a defiant rebuke 
of the pathologizing dimensions of medical practice, but also a particular set of orientations and 
demands that reshape—or at times retrench—extant relations and politics of care.  
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CONCLUSION: CIRCULAR REVISIONS 
 To conclude, I return to the theme of “revision.” Revisions proliferate and condense 
in several major shifts that emerge as distinctive features of trans health: 1) from pathology to 
difference; 2) from individual to social; and 3) from choice to need. None are complete, nor are they 
wholly distinct from each other. Yet the shifts remain consistent across multiple geographic sites and 
widely ranging situations of practice.  
Each shift materializes quite differently depending on where and how it is developed, 
elaborated, and institutionalized. Various combinations of actors (both human and non-human) 
work to accomplish these new processes of materialization through distinct actions, objectives, and 
strategies, and are situated within different infrastructural landscapes and political fields. Yet amidst 
this vast variation, trans health is consistent in its emergence as a set of correctives. Activists 
position these correctives across varying scales, from diagnostically attending to erroneous 
conceptions of transness to rebuffing the geopolitical dynamics of U.S. imperialism.  
It is precisely this variation—in the midst of the consistency of the “corrective”—that I 
theorize as transmutable care. Problems of standardization, among others, produce space for the 
proliferation of various “trans healths.” Transness is not singular, and the well-documented 
complications and failures of smooth travel and commensurate standards in care more generally also 
hold for trans health (e.g., Lakoff 1996; Livingston 2012). Nonetheless, trans health differs in that its 
plural forms are remarkable in their range and volume, and in the profound distinctions among their 
objectives, politics, and practices. This is true not only between geographic sites—such stark 
differences also emerge between sites of practices within each geopolitical location I studied: between 
the community clinic and the private hospital; the street protest and the courtroom; and across 
studies of disease burden and population biographies. This is in part due to the expanding set of 
actors involved in the broad revisions of trans health: not only do a wider range of providers now 
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define its scope, so too do activists, advocates, policymakers, changing classificatory systems, and 
shifting regulations.  
Yet even amidst this lack of standardization and commensurability, trans health certainly 
travels—and with astonishing speed. During my five years of research, a plethora of programs, laws, 
medical centers, and revision processes unfolded, not only in New York City and Buenos Aires, but 
much more broadly. Professional organizations grew and proliferated transnationally. Some of these 
have even begun to institutionalize trans health through credentialing and training programs. Today, 
transnational politics and infrastructures matter a great deal in just how trans health moves and 
instantiates, and mobility in this regard is caught up in complex currents of capital as well as those of 
knowledge.  
   
REVISION AND CIRCULARITY 
In 2014, Tierra Violeta Cultural Center—where Agustina García later portrayed the 
multilayered perils of racialized and classed subjugation among travestis—hosted a community 
seminar on depathologization. Led by an activist, the seminar explored “[t]he process of reform and 
revision of the ICD-10 as an historic opportunity for trans activism” (Centro Cultural Tierra Violeta 
2014). Yet its tone was strikingly ambivalent: it described this revision as reflecting the 
“emancipatory struggle of depathologization,” but conceded that “the very terms of that 
emancipation are also in dispute.” (“El proceso de reforma y revisión de la CIE-10 representa una oportunidad 
histórica para el activismo trans comprometido con la despatologización como lucha emancipatoria –aunque los 
términos mismos de esa emancipación estén también en disputa.”) (Centro Cultural Tierra Violeta 2014)  
The course’s description continued in this vein, asking what it is to “depathologize.” For 
some activists, it asserted, to depathologize is to grant access to rights and care without the need for 
diagnostic requirements. For others, it means eliminating diagnoses and “subvert[ting]…the 
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medicalized ordering of bodies” (“la subversión del orden medicalizado de los cuerpos”) (Centro Cultural 
Tierra Violeta 2014). The catch in these different variants, it explains, is that each carries a risk in its 
relation to biomedicine. To put too much distance between trans*ness and biomedicine may be risk 
losing access to its modes of care. To fail to put enough distance between such subjectivities and 
biomedical regulation may perpetuate harmful biomedical ideologies (Centro Cultural Tierra Violeta 
2014). The description thus likens depathologization’s objectives to a “Möbius strip,” and situated 
this conundrum as a framing question for the seminar.  
 This geometrical circularity of the Möbius strip seems also to mirror the 
transformative circularity in trans health’s partial emergence out of transsexual medicine. As politics, 
practices, implications, nominal diagnoses, and objectives of contemporary trans health formations 
have shifted, the infrastructures on which it runs remain much more limited in their flexibility. Even 
in the case of “gender incongruence”—arguably the most substantively “depathologized” diagnostic 
classification, by many accounts—the implication remains that some notion of gendered 
“congruence” remains as its counter. This problematic is taken up in a range of critiques centering 
the gendering technologies of colonialism and slavery to the biologizing techniques of medical 
practice (e.g., Spillers 1987; Stone 1992; Stoler 1995; Davis 2015).  
In this dissertation, I have focused on how the infrastructures that matter to trans health 
encode these knowledge technologies and politics, and thus remain at some level inescapable. I also 
discuss how activists rework notions of “risk” and “population” to produce different accounts of 
what is at stake in trans health: not the pathology of the psyche, but rather the varying and 
differentially violent social hierarchies within which gender non-normative people dwell. These 
partial transformations can never quite leave behind the elastic scaffolding assembled through the 
techniques of power that organize health formations in general. And indeed, the transformations 
that accompany biomedicalization (Clarke et. al 2003; 2010) scarcely leave an “outside” from which 
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to contest medical power. Rather, activists engage in what Murphy (2012:29) calls “counter-
conduct” to shift the politics, hierarchies, and terms of medicine without precisely resisting or 
divesting from its commitments. Trans health, as such, takes on the properties of the tail-eating 
serpent (Mehem or Ouroboros): recreation through return, or transformation through absorption.  
 
FINDINGS 
At the outset of my dissertation, I asked what trans health is—what is has been, what it is 
now, and from whence emerges. I also asked what actors and collaborations have been involved in 
its present instantiations, what currents it travels through (or fails to), and what politics are fashioned 
in its practices. Finally, I asked about the possibilities that it enables or effaces. Throughout my 
investigation, I have found that my primary question—what is trans health?—is the most elusive to 
answer. This is in large part due to its diffractiveness, its stratified and stratifying currents, the rapid 
pace of its shifts, and its distinct expressions and infrastructural embeddings across geopolitical 
times and spaces. Certain features of trans health are consistent, but such consistency inheres mainly 
in its malleability—or at least its perpetual state of being “under revision.”  
As such, I draw from Mol (2008) to reflect less on what trans health is, and more on what 
practices, people, things, politics, and processes it incorporates and mobilizes. In so doing, I found 
that these were also highly mobile and multiple. Even stories about the historical conditions of its 
emergence seem itinerant. While people tend to regard transgender health as a more humane 
successor to transsexual medicine, this also reflects engagements with feminist health infrastructures 
and imperatives, with the knowledge-making practices of HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, and 
with the politics of disability activism, among others.  
Present instantiations of trans health reenact all these relations, often implicitly, through 
their practices and varying commitments. I explored an example of such historical elision through 
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analyzing trans depathologization. Scholars, providers, and activists alike position this transnational 
movement as following a path cut by U.S. gay and lesbian depathologization activists in the 1970s. 
While these are ineluctably connected, these links are partial. As a story about social movements, this 
account rehashes teleological trajectories of “progress” that represents trans politics as only and ever 
following victories of gay (and to a lesser degree, lesbian and other queer) politics. It also places a 
pin on global the map, geographically locating the origins of transnational trans depathologization 
movements in the U.S. Yet as I have shown, activists draw from a multitude of social movement 
blueprints that existed well beyond queer forms and U.S.-centered politics.  
It is this conceptual and geographic expansiveness that makes it challenging to identify the 
various people and things that enact trans health in a broad sense. Nonetheless, my research shows 
that activists, advocates, and providers interact with each other as well as with classificatory systems, 
infrastructures, regulatory guidelines, and forms of knowledge to assemble and reassemble trans 
health. While historical accounts have traditionally placed activists and providers at loggerheads, my 
dissertation proposes three things: 1) that present modes of trans health have skewed towards 
collaboration and negotiation; 2) that the borders between “activist” and “provider” has become 
increasingly permeable; and 3) that diagnostic classifications, health financing procedures, and 
regulatory landscapes have become shared objects of intervention among activists and providers.  
Forms of trans health practice travel in part through such classifications and regulations, but 
do not do so smoothly. In fact, it is often the failure of infrastructural features to “fit comfortably” 
in different places and within distinct practices that motivates processes of revision. I explored 
varying problems of “ill-fit” across dimensions of geopolitics, infrastructure, and site of practice. For 
example, Mark (2016) said of the Gender Identity Law’s possibility in the U.S., “That would never 
work here.” Further, Alejandro argued that the pathologizing terms of trans health, even 
transnationally, are primarily shaped by the terms of health care financing—which he emphasized 
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was not inevitable (as Argentina had managed to dispose of such diagnostic practice). For travesti 
activists from across Latin America and the Caribbean, it was only with the addition of the asterisk 
after “trans” that the term could even be conceptualized as mobile, and this came with a cognizance 
of the geopolitical power relations that required its uptake. Finally, I showed how competing 
paradigms of knowledge, meaning, and practice were negotiated through such relations of power, 
both within and between the two sites under study. While such processes often retrenched or reified 
extant stratifications and modes of valuation, they also occasionally produced fissures in hegemonic 
practices, or brought about partial reversals of these dynamics. 
These experiments have, at some level, reconfigured some of the relations of care that 
organize trans health practices. Even more than drawing on “community experts” to amend what 
trans health is, increasing collaboration between activists and providers has resulted in shifts in how 
the problems of transness are defined, and in what capacity biomedicine is made useful. Specifically, 
gender non-normativity-as-pathology as such is gradually fading from view. Instead, the problems of 
transness to which biomedicine can respond are increasingly deemed social and relational: 
“transphobic society” becomes the problem and, alongside it, the stratifications that materialize and 
uniquely imperil trans life and health.  
The “turn outward” in trans health from individually-focused to socially-focused came early 
in its genesis. This situates it within a broader set of transformations in biomedicine, whereby the 
dynamic (and inequitably resourced) “environment” becomes the primary site of capacitation or 
limitation. Epigenetics, social neuroscience, and health disparities research are only a few expressions 
of these shifts. As in the case of these fields, trans health is embracing a notion of the “social 
environment” rather than the unit of the “individual” as problematic. This methodological and 
political shift is one that activists and some providers have welcomed, and it is eminently changing 
the diagnostic, regulatory, and clinical practices of trans health.  
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Yet such a turn is accompanied by a set of embedded presumptions, elisions, and collapses 
that yet again reproduce some of the very stratifications they strive to address. As I have 
demonstrated, epidemiological accounts—materialized in population biographies—foreground the 
racialized, classed, gendered, sexualized, and to some degree abled devaluations that lead to 
abbreviated lifespans for certain gender non-normative subjects. In so doing, though, they also 
perform an erasure of such differences in the production of the “trans population.” While the 
encoding of stratified differences within these methodological interventions has sometimes directed 
an implicit focus on these dynamic and combinatory modes of subjugation, it does not necessarily 
have this result. As Haritaworn and Snorton (2013) argue, for example, such elisions may even have 
the opposite effect: “trans of color deaths” are instrumentalized into legalistic strategies that 
ultimately overwhelmingly protect and invest in white trans subjects and trans whiteness.  
In addition, many institutionalizing forms of trans health at least presumptively embed the 
possibility of producing a “properly” gendered—and therefore, properly productive—citizen-
subjects (e.g., Irving 2008; Spade 2011 [2015]). While there has been a partial departure from 
“passability” as a requirement for and major goal of gender-confirming care, the varying logics of 
biomedical “fixing” seem to remain a persistent undercurrent in present forms of trans health.124 
Such modes of intervention are mobilized within distinct political fields, and thus produce “trans 
citizens” differently—but almost invariably, there are winners and losers in the ambit of formal state 
inclusion and biopolitical investment (e.g., Spade 2011 [2015]; Najmabadi 2013, Hsu 2013, Snorton 
& Haritaworn 2013). 
Finally, emergent forms of trans health rarely stray far afield from the established norms, 
lexicons, and boundaries of biomedical practice (even in its more “outward” view). This, too, is 
evidenced in the very impetus to route understandings of state and interpersonal violence, racialized 
immiseration, and labor politics through the language of “health.” At some level, this may be a 
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strategic enfolding: health care, after all, maintains a flexibility to marshal scientific authority and at 
the same time leverage ethical and/or political demands (e.g., Fassin 2012; Roberts 2012). At 
another level, however, this reflects what Aizura (2012: 146) describes as “an attempt to contain and 
domesticate [gendered] indeterminacy.”  
In my empirical work, the persistent forcefulness of varied health infrastructures (medical, 
legal, classificatory, technological, and so on) continually pull trans health’s formations towards the 
status quo of biomedical practices and away from the unruliness of that which they work to stabilize. 
Writing against these currents of containment, Stryker and Aizura (2013:7) assert, “[w]ildness, even 
more than cultivation or care, should characterize the health of our gender ecologies.” While some 
activists (and many fewer providers) would welcome such a lack of closure when it comes to the 
uncontainability of gender multiplicity, few outwardly claim such a “politics of unruliness” 
(Khannaet al. 2013) as their objective. The domain of health and medicine may flex, but wildness—
or at least the desire for it—would scarcely align with its practices. Even in the face of formidable 
difficulties with standardization and classification (with which trans health providers are intimately 
and persistently familiar), practices of coordination remain the reflexive response in organizing 
practices of care. Trans health politics and formations certainly proliferate, but such proliferations 
remain bounded. 
While such currents of containment and boundedness run through present forms of trans 
health, I have also shown that its practitioners—activists and providers alike—view health as a site 
through which politics (as well as care practices) can be refigured and refashioned. Activists and 
providers have worked to do so through a variety of techniques: coding creatively, developing 
regulatory interventions to redistribute resources, fashioning methodological innovations, and 
forging coalitions well beyond the realm of health and medicine. Some respondents were more 
insistent than others on the relevance of concerns beyond medicine that comprise “health.” 
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Coalitional depathologizationists, for example, viewed health politics as wholly inseparable from a 
broader set of politics concerning subjugation, racialization, class and labor politics, migration, etc. 
Yet even those actors were impelled to navigate the proper terms of biomedicine, however 
apprehensively.  
I have proposed the concept of “transmutable care” to describe the proliferative dynamics 
that spring from increasing relations of collaboration and coordination among multiple actors, 
particularly activists and providers vis-à-vis trans health. These dynamics take shape in classificatory 
and regulatory realms, instantiating distinctively depending on where and how they gain traction. 
Transmutable care is partially enabled by trans health’s reckoning with its own situated 
particularities. As practices of negotiation slowly come to predominate, revision becomes the norm 
rather than the exception. Trans health thus perpetually cedes space for practices to morph and 
adapt to the multiplicity demanded by varying actors, infrastructures, sites of practice, and politics 
that pull continuously at its stabilizing efforts. However, the spaces within which multiple practices 
and politics can convincingly be defined as “trans health” are far from limitless, and even the 
openness that presently exists in emergent formations may not persist. Nonetheless, these dynamics 
demonstrate the elusiveness of stability in processes of field formation, and the point that 
contestation emerges through cooperation and collaboration at least as much as it does through 
antagonistic conflict. 
In Chapter 1, I discussed the dynamics of transmutable care through shifting practices of 
classification, describing how diagnostic classifications previously formed polarized and polarizing 
sites of dispute between trans people and health care providers (Stone 1992; Meyerowitz 2002). I 
argued that presently, diagnoses comprise sites of negotiation and collaboration manifesting in 
continual cycles of breakdown and revision. Taking up recent theorizations of the clinic as a site of 
knowledge production (e.g., Mol 2003; Nelson 2011; Latimer 2013), I showed how these dynamics 
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are brought about not only through pressure exerted by activists, but also through providers 
encountering the enduring failures of classification in practice. I showed how trans activists are (in 
limited ways) invited to contribute to processes of diagnostic revision, and certain “trans-
supportive” providers bring the concerns of activists to the fore as working groups make 
classificatory decisions.  
Focusing on the DSM and the ICD, I described how classificatory failures and shifting 
understandings of transness have over time repackaged gendered pathology as difference. Further, I 
described how this has enabled a turn to “distress” or “incongruence” that established the 
“environment” within which trans people exist—rather than a psychopathological state—as a crucial 
element of diagnostics. I demonstrated how such classificatory failures manifest in a less formalized 
mode in the identitarian intervention of “trans*” in Latin America and the Caribbean. In both 
formal and informal capacities, I discussed how concerns about practices—from health care 
financing regulations to stigma prevention to accessing funding streams—shaped such naming 
practices. Building on STMS theorizing on classification and infrastructure, I argued that these 
negotiations are only secondarily concerned with ontologies, and are organized more resolutely 
around what can be enabled or mobilized by certain classifications.  
Chapter 2 began with the “turn outward” that accompanies the shift away from individual 
psychopathologies to “social environments.” I discussed legal and regulatory projects in Buenos 
Aires and New York City that framed trans health access as an issue of structural inequity through 
what I called “statistical citizenship.” I argued that activists and advocates brought about these 
changes by combining conventional epidemiological thinking with politically-inflected narratives in 
order to reconfigure notions of “risk.” These new “population biographies” produced a 
simultaneous notion of a trans collective and a trans population, and they operated at a multitude of 
registers to bring about regulatory and other material shifts. I mobilized insights from studies of 
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race, gender, sexuality, and citizenship alongside STMS reflections on biopolitics and 
biomedicalization to analyze the stakes and potential effects of marshaling political claims through 
the figure of the “trans population.”   
In Chapter 3, I returned to the question of diagnosis, but this time through the lens of “trans 
depathologization” movements. I argued that trans depathologization projects are widespread and 
varied, and that this is due not only to histories of gay depathologization, but also to intersections 
with feminist health and disability activist histories. I suggested that many—though not all—forms 
of depathologization are tied together by the impetus to retain access to care without resorting to 
notions of illness, infirmity, or debility. I called this “care without illness,” and demonstrated how it 
is conceptualized and instantiated in distinct ways across different actors, sites of practice, and 
regulatory landscapes. Drawing on and extending theorization of care politics, I show how 
depathologization regimes have shifted the attention and objectives of trans health to at least 
partially reconfigure the relations of care encompassed in its practices. 
 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Overall, my analysis engaged the present dynamics of trans health to tell a story about 
contestations and transformations of health care practice. This story does not begin and end with 
the audacity and subsequent abdication of medical authority, nor with the extraordinary triumph of a 
social movement. It does not presume that changes in trans health have emerged solely through 
legal or organizational changes, or through structural dialectics. Rather, this story engages a complex 
set of forces, currents, and emergences—representational, methodological, political, economic, 
infrastructural, and geopolitical—that both reproduce and reconfigure stratified practices of care. 
Tracing the emergence of trans health provides an important instance of how health care formations 
grapple with politics of difference. As the “transgender tipping point” begins to recede into recent 
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history, these analyses are relevant not only to trans health futures, but also to shifting commitments 
in health care and other biomedical practices more broadly. 
In this regard, I suggest that trans health’s turn toward “environmental” dimensions of trans 
life—and the reductiveness that remains embedded in this turn—resonates with a series of 
biomedical transformations looking to “environments” for answers about stratification. While the 
newfound relevance of social realms would seem to promise to (re)politicize biomedicine in 
different ways, these reformulations often retrench the very stratifications they strive to 
problematize (Rollins 2014; Bliss 2012; Pitts-Taylor 2016). In this dissertation, I provide an empirical 
account of how these retrenchments may take shape—even in the midst of creative methodological 
refigurations. 
This work also speaks to present political economic transformations in the U.S. and 
Argentina grappling with distributive questions of health care in increasingly privatizing economies. 
My focus on the public provision of care thus foregrounds questions of both resource distribution 
and infrastructure. In addition, my reflections on how trans health is debated through questions of 
economic efficiency, national obligation, and/or taxpayer burden are highly relevant to wider 
reflections about distributive politics and state-subsidized care infrastructures.  
The transnational scope of my project contributes to empirically-grounded research in trans 
studies, which to date remains overwhelmingly situated in the U.S. Looking to both Argentina and 
the U.S. not only contributes an account of how trans health instantiates very differently across two 
geographic sites, it also enables an engagement with geopolitical dimensions of trans health. The 
growing investment of states and nations in trans subjects is a rich area for study and a generative 
site for future research.  
While this study sought to provincialize U.S. formations of trans health, it remains entangled 
in the knowledge economies that privilege U.S. accounts of transness and gender non-normativity. 
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Given its historical trajectory, neither U.S.-based trans studies nor U.S.-based trans health (both 
configured as ostensibly “global) are likely to shed their ethnocentrism. I therefore suggest that 
mobilizing the theoretical and methodological commitments of transnational feminism—in what 
might be called “transnational transfeminism”—offers one means of taking up trans studies 
differently.  
One of the major directions I have identified for future research emerged out of my 
ethnographic work. In speaking with providers and activists, I found that the domain of 
reproductive health—specifically abortion, but also contraception, childbirth, and reproductive 
justice—arose repeatedly in discussions about trans health. While this was not a surprise, I was 
struck by how these were defined in relation to each other. At times, the links between trans and 
reproductive health were positioned as self-evident. At other times, these domains of practice were 
described as wholly distinct. What might account for these different understandings of the relations 
between reproductive and trans health? How do these accounts range, and along what lines? What is 
enabled or effaced in understanding them as tightly linked on one hand, and disconnected on the 
other? 
Another area for future research is an examination of how labor politics—especially the 
specter of sex work—play into questions of both trans health and criminalization. While I touch on 
this lightly, my ethnographic data point to the critical importance of building a thorough account of 
how both labor and criminalization shape the landscape of politics and health. These dynamics 
appear vividly in the push to get trans women on PrEP, the racialized and classed politics of public 
space that disproportionately imprison trans women of color in the U.S. and travestis in Argentina, 
and the political deal-making that would seem to offer up citizenship in exchange for the 
abandonment of sex work. How do labor politics and processes of immiseration link trans people’s 
relations to health and medicine? How are these dynamics attended to, made sense of, and expressed 
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in processes of health care provision? How do “health” and “work” converge, especially vis-à-vis 
trans health, and how does biomedicine attend to this relation? 
Another area for further study is standardization. While I attend closely to classification, the 
proliferation of protocols and guidelines of care, as well as the institutionalization of trans health 
through professional organizations (e.g. WPATH 2013) and legal recommendations (e.g., Yogyakarta 
Principles 2007) still necessitate a thorough analysis of how trans health grapples with standards. 
Classification and standardization are of course closely connected, and theorizing standards 
comprises another important dimension of infrastructure studies. Nonetheless, a fuller discussion of 
standards per se would contribute to a richer understanding of the currents at play in trans health’s 
shifts and contested proliferations. Specifically, such explorations should ask how standards connect 
with classifications in the infrastructures within which trans health is embedded. They would 
examine both the successes and failures of institutionalization to account for how standards are 
fashioned, negotiated, and revised. Through empirical framing, they might examine how the situated 
uptake of standards aligns with or departs from ostensibly “universal” standards. 
Concepts of “human rights” lie at many edges of this dissertation. Many of the major 
consistent shifts enabled by trans health have been realized through appeals to human rights. 
Indeed, this may account in part for Argentina’s distinct uptake of trans health, given its national 
investments in international human rights law in response to its particular history of violence and 
political repression. Transnational forms of trans health have been built in and through 
infrastructures of AIDS/HIV treatment and prevention. Here in particular, the specter of human 
rights discourse suffuses the politics of health. While research that links “treatment activism” to 
global flows of development capital has been taken up in the medical social sciences (Patton 2002; 
Nguyen 2010; Biehl 2007), these reflections have not yet pursued the field of trans health. A 
burgeoning literature exists through which to engage human rights critically, and trans framings of 
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human rights would be a generative site through which to take up questions of what human rights 
regimes enable and foreclose.  
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS   
 While medicine has been producing and “working on” gender non-normativity for 
well over a century, the emergence of trans health is a relatively recent phenomenon, appearing 
unevenly in the first decade of the 21st century, and proliferating transnationally. As an assemblage, it 
has taken shape through a convergence of varying historical and contemporary health formations 
including transsexual medicine, feminist health, disability activism, and HIV/AIDS treatment and 
prevention. It has emerged in different ways in different sites, due in part to different infrastructures 
in the systems on which trans health runs. These distinctions produce both transnational and local 
differences in what trans health looks like. The low-income community clinic, the prison, the plastic 
surgery suite, the private therapist’s office, and the hospital-based program instantiate different 
iterations of trans health, each with differing—as well as stratified and stratifying—effects.           
In part, trans health emerges through a series of inadequacies and revisions. Pathologization 
is gradually falling out of failure, the focus on the “individual” is insufficient, and exclusion from the 
domain of “medical need” is no longer convincing. As trans health has confronted these failures—
often producing new forms of knowledge through the flexible terms of patient engagement, 
insurance reimbursement processes, and diagnostic revision—trans health has also moved beyond 
the confines of the clinic, taking up positions fashioned through activist protests, editorials, blogs, 
and community-based studies. While such positions may previously have constituted the “outside” 
of clinical practice, today they are becoming enfolded with in it. The distinguishing shifts of trans 
health’s field formation condense in foregrounding depathologized difference, identifying inequities 
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in the environments within which trans people exist, and the medical “necessity” of gender 
confirming care (which works to bring about changes in the distribution of biomedical resources. 
These changes should not be overstated. Trans health remains in significant flux, and even 
within the metropolitan spaces I studied, certain providers engaged in practices more closely 
resembling transsexual medicine.  Yet the novelty and incompleteness of the shift indicates all the 
more strongly the effects of collaborative orientations on reconfiguring the very terms of trans 
health and medicine. I have suggested we might view the emergence of trans health not as solely a 
struggle between provider and activists, but rather as an unfolding of biomedical reckoning with 
itself. Providers, scientists, activists, advocates, and policymakers are asking how “environment” 
matters in trans lives. This resonates in debates in neuroscience and genomics as well as trans health. 
Here, biomedicine—unevenly and unsteadily—confronts the terms of subjugation, and begins to 
shift its focus away from “innate” or “inherent deficiency” models.   
Yet as it does so, biomedicine also turns to some of the same tools (such as “populations”) 
that produced these models in order to “fix” them. Thus, trans health may be reinventing itself as a 
new form of difference management that persistently rearticulates and reproduces various forms of 
stratifications. In contrast, as it engages in its perpetual cycles of breakdown and revision, trans 
health may alternatively continue to generate openings for providers like Sonya or activists like Ana, 
who work across multiple domains and forms of practice to refashion a new politics of care and 
distribution. Regardless, the field is caught up in dynamics that far transcend the ostensible 
boundaries of its practice: transnational politics, political economies, and labor politics, etc.  
To conclude, there is no singular “trans health.” This is no surprise as health care formations 
are ineluctably varied. Yet trans health seems surprisingly sudden in its widespread instantiation, and 
unusually open in its cycles of breakdown and revision. Its emergence provides a site for a multitude 
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of analyses about trans embodiment, stratification, infrastructure, classification, negotiation, 
transnational politics, and shifting dynamics of power.  
Trans health, in its different forms, is not foreclosed in the sets of practices it has to date 
bundled in its field formation. As such, this is a generative (if vexing) time to interrogate the 
conditions and stakes of its emergence. Its varied instantiations present opportunities to ask more 
broadly how biomedicine might otherwise engage stratified difference, even as it appears to be 
headed towards retrenchment and containment. Thinking with trans health offers strategies to think 
through health care dynamics at their most palpably politicized—vividly bringing to the surface the 
complex and conflicting politics that comprise biomedicine and trans people’s lives more generally.   
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 NOTES 
                                                      
Prologue Notes 
 
1 I use the term “trans” with much apprehension throughout the dissertation. For reasons I will discuss in the following 
chapters, the term does not always travel as smoothly as some would assert. “Trans” also produces a set of collapses 
and oversimplifications that I aim to resist in these analyses. Nonetheless, “trans” remains a unifying object of trans 
health—even in sites that explicitly resist its ostensible universality (Valentine 2007). I join other trans studies scholars 
(Aizura 2006; Bhanji 2012) in mobilizing “trans” as a category under erasure (in other words, read this term 
henceforth as “trans”). When applicable, I use the terms that my study respondents mobilize, such as “trans*” or 
“travesti.” None of these terms is hierarchically positioned in relation to the others, nor is one strictly separate from or 
reducible to the others. 
2  I use the term “gender confirming care” here for several reasons, despite some reservations with it. Language 
encodes politics, and it is impossible to describe the set of biomedical and other practices involved in forms of health 
care that facilitate particular forms of gendered embodiment and enactment without making political claims in so 
doing. “Gender confirming care,” though, is increasingly used by providers, activists, and advocates in New York. 
This description does not focus solely on surgery (like “sex-reassignment surgery”), not does it imply that transition is 
a solely medical process (like “transition-specific care”). Unlike “gender affirming care,” “gender confirming care” is 
also used in regulations that govern such forms of care for non-trans people (such as gynecomastia surgeries for non-
trans men). Using this term was thus a strategic choice for advocates who made a case that Medicaid was engaging in 
discrimination when it covered gender confirming care for non-trans but not for trans people (Spade 2015 [2011]). In 
Argentina, language tended towards “comprehensive care for trans* people” (salud integral de las personas trans*), 
including hormone prescription and use (hormonización) and “body modification surgeries” (cirugías de modificación 
corporal). Some providers, activists, and advocates in Buenos Aires used the term “health care related to processes of 
body modification” (“Atención de la salud en relación con procesos de modificación corporal”). This is not dissimilar from 
“gender-confirming care,” though it centers the term “body modification,” which in English tends to have 
associations that focus on artistic modifications (tattooing or piercing, for example). Using “gender confirming care” is 
less than ideal, however, as it seems to stabilize and reify an “internal gender” that would be externally confirmed 
(which may be the case for some, but not all, people who pursue these procedures and regimens). 
3  These practices are enormously varied, and including and number or combination of surgical procedures to remove, 
implant, or construct (many would say “reconstruct”) gonads, organs, body fat distribution, cartilaginous or skeletal 
structures (facial feminization or masculinization surgeries), or genitals. They also many include the administration 
and/or use of varying hormones (such as testosterone, estrogen, or progesterone) and/or anti-androgens in different 
combinations, quantities, and forms. People might obtain these through formal prescriptions or through other routes. 
In addition to these, people may seek perimedical procedures such as electrolysis or laser hair removal, or engage in 
voice training therapies. Psychiatric or psychological counseling are also often included within trans health practices. 
4 Medical anthropologist Eric Plemons (2010) suggests that transsexualism (and perhaps trans health) produces a 
generative site through which to think about bodies as social and medical objects. Diagnosing “feelings” to perform 
medical intervention on the body, he argues, vexes the modernist mind/body split, troubling the way socially gendered 
bodies are taken up as medical objects. He describes how tensions between visibility practices and “invisible” 
connections (between feelings and treatable bodies, for example) can be “institutionally bridged” to make available 
certain subject positions through medical expertise and discourse (Plemons 2010:320). 
5 Injecting silicone, sometimes called “pumping,” describes the process of injecting industrial-grade silicone into 
muscles and soft tissues such as breasts, hips, buttocks, and the face. The objective of such practices is to change (and 
usually “feminize”) body shape. Scholars have framed silicone injection—which is associated with a number of 
potentially fatal health effects—as a problem related to the lack of affordable surgical options for body modification 
and transformation (e.g., Aizura 2014). 
6 Many people use the “cis” or “cisgender” to describe people who are not transgender. While it is also an inadequate 
term, I use “non-trans” in this dissertation to trouble what I view as the stabilizing tendencies of “cis.” For more on 
the issues involved with this terminology, see Enke (2012). 
7 I have written elsewhere about racialized, classed, and gendered dynamics of these trainings that shape and are shaped 
by medical pedagogy (Hanssmann 2012). 
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8 This refers to the phenomenon of health care providers attributing a range of illnesses, injuries, or ailments to a 
patient’s being trans. “Trans broken arm syndrome” refers to a reported instance of a provider asserting that a 
patient’s broken arm was likely related to hormone therapy.  
9  With regard to indigeneity, the trainings occasionally discussed Two-Spirit people, but tended to do so in an 
ahistorical or cursory manner. None to my knowledge engaged Morgenson’s (2011) description of Two-Spirit 
organizing as a critique of how settler colonialism shapes non-Native formations of gender/sexuality. With regard to 
transnationality, the rare trainings that engaged gender non-normativity outside of the U.S. often did so in a highly 
reductive manner that Stryker (2006:14) calls “around the world in eighty genders.” 
10 For example, the American Psychological Association (Anton 2008; 2009) and the American Medical Association 
(2008) adopted resolutions in favor of insurance coverage for gender confirming care and other provisions in support 
of trans health’s expansion. 
11 The concept of “social worlds” draws from symbolic interactionist sociology, and draws significantly from the 
Straussian tradition of social worlds/arenas analysis (Strauss 1978:119-128). This treats social worlds as a conceptual, 
mobile, and permeable grouping of people and things that generally coordinate around specific kinds of action, in 
particular sites, and often through shared technologies. For Strauss, debate and negotiation takes place between 
subworlds within each social world, and he describes these as “arenas.”   
12 I employ the “North/South” mapping of the world to align with how informants have to date discussed the relations 
of transnational work within the collaboratives under study. This brings with it a set of politics about splitting up the 
world that is somewhat distinct from those mapping geopolitics through the East/West, or 
developed/developing/undeveloped schema (among others). While each of these performs various levels of 
reductiveness and erasure, the “North/South” mapping—alongside resonating with informants’ descriptions—best 
aligns with what I presume to be the geopolitical dynamics of power as materialized through late capitalist forms of 
economics and politics best known as “neoliberalism.” 
 
Introduction Notes 
 
13 In 2015, businessman and former Buenos Aires mayor Mauricio Macri was elected as President of Argentina. Running 
on a neoliberal agenda to integrate Argentina into the international market, Macri was the first anti-populist (anti-
Peronist) President popularly elected in Argentina in many years. At the time of writing, Argentina is rife with debates 
about privatization and the cost of public infrastructures. Public programs are on the chopping block, including 
LGBT-specific public health programs. These are ostensibly up for closure because of cost, rather than direct 
objection to the content of the programs—but commentators are skeptical about this reasoning (Página12, 2016). 
14 This turn of phrase comes from the subtitle of the U.S. film series, “Unnatural Causes” (2008), which asks “Is 
inequality making us sick?” 
15 Theoretical engagements of care appear across disciplines and interdisciplinary formations: philosophy (e.g., Heidegger 
1927), feminist sociology (e.g., Hochschild 1983 [2012]) medical social sciences (e.g. Redfield 2013), and feminist, 
cultural, and ethnic studies (e.g. Hua 2011) and STMS (e.g. Vora 2015, de la Bellacasa 2011; 2013; Murphy 2015). In 
this dissertation, I draw from a broad set of literatures, but focus on the mobilization of care within feminist STMS. 
My conceptualization of the “figure of care” is indebted to discussions in Lawrence Cohen’s 2011 “Care” course at 
UC Berkeley in the fall of 2011.  
16 The history of transsexual medicine continues to be largely undocumented and rife with methodological challenges, 
such as the secrecy with through which such work was pursued. Historians Meyerowitz (2002) and Stryker (2008), 
among others, have worked extensively with archival material to document histories of these emergences. Swarr 
(2012), Dutta (2012), Cohen (1995), Najmabadi (2013) and others have conducted situated work to identify medical 
practices among “gender liminal” (Roen 2001; Swarr 2012) subjects in South Africa, India, and Iran, among other 
particular geographic locations. A number of scholars extend Stoler’s (1995) reflections about sexuality’s construction 
in and through colonial knowledge production to foreground trans health’s historical emergence through medico-
ethnographic and colonial medical encounters (Aizura 2010; Palmer 2014). These and related texts form a burgeoning 
field of historical and contemporary inquiry regarding transnationality, gender non-normativity, and biomedicine. 
Continued exploration is merited and necessary. 
17 The CDC is presently revising their National HIV Surveillance System to collect specific information about 
transgender people, and is advising state and county health departments to do the same. Until recently, statistics about 
trans women and HIV prevalence and incidence were not disaggregated from those tracking the category of “men 
who have sex with men,” or so-called MSM.   
18 This draws on perspectives from various legal studies fields, including Critical Race Theory (CRT) (e.g. Harris 2006; 
Delgado and Stefancic 2001), which examines how racialized subordination is legally encoded by interrogating its 
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conditions of emergence and operation. This field (along with law and society, Latino critical race theory, and others) 
presumes that laws are not necessarily operationalized in such a way that they perform the work they claim to 
perform. Spade (2011[2015]) has broadly applied CRT, alongside Foucauldian analysis, to the field of trans politics, 
law, and activism. 
19 The landmark inaugural issue of Transgender Studies Quarterly (2014) is an ambitious survey of the field through a set of 
keywords authored by contributors. While certainly in conversation with the question of biomedicine and psychiatry—
contributed keywords include biopolitics, depathologization, disability, psychoanalytic, sick, and surgery, for example—“trans 
health” or “health care” do not appear. The concept of clinical care is of course engaged through the prev iously listed 
and other keyword passages, but it remains relatively undertheorized as such.  
20These analyses pertain to diagnostic classifications (such as Mol’s (2002) study about enacting diagnoses), and also link 
up with a robust literature in gender and sexuality studies about the iterative practices of materializing or “doing” 
gender West and Zimmerman 1987; Butler 2010). I do not intend to imply that such practices of materializing 
classifications are wholly instrumental—indeed, many times they would seem to defy what stands as logic or reason. 
Instead, I aim to foreground how the very leakiness and instability of classificatory processes become things or 
processes that are possible to “work on.”  
21 The multiple infrastructures of concern in my study involve public health provision and financing, as well as federal, 
state, and provincial laws governing health care distribution beyond private insurance coverage. Argentina’s health 
system is a partially universal health care system, which offers subsidized care through public hospitals to people 
without private or worker-based insurance. The three-tier system does not require low-income patients to pay, though 
its services are not always robust and there are long waits for care. The Argentinian Gender Identity Law required 
coverage for gender confirming care across the nation, including in public hospitals. New York State’s Department of 
Health lifted a 16-year-old categorical exclusion of gender confirming care from Medicaid coverage. Criteria for 
Medicaid coverage ranges by state. New York enrolls a greater number of low-income individuals than do some 
Medicaid programs, but not all low-income people qualify for Medicaid. The lifting of New York’s exclusion did not 
guarantee “access,” but it brought an end to the long standoff between trans health activists and state bureaucrats, and 
reorganized some of the formal arrangements in the state with regard to the public provision of gender confirming 
care. There are many other public infrastructures of care in the fragmented health system of the U.S. (prison health 
care, local and state programs, etc.). I focus on Medicaid because it is one of the most widely recognized public 
systems (beyond Medicare) and because it is in the midst of changes when it comes to coverage for gender confirming 
care. 
22 I have chosen not to focus centrally on the classifications associated with criminalization, as others have analyzed 
these dynamics (Spade 2011[2015]; Snorton & Haritaworn 2013; Gehi & Arkles 2007; Yarbrough 2015). However, it 
remains an area for future exploration to attend to how classifications produced through criminal law (e.g., laws 
governing vagrancy and/or sex work) intersect with classifications produced in and through trans health (especially 
“depathologized” classifications).  
23 While the STMS literature critiquing scientific neutrality is robust, these analyses have tended to center on scientific 
and technological practice and processes far more than clinical practice. While there are notable exceptions to this, the 
“M” in STMS is less thoroughly analyzed in the field, despite the close relationship between the biosciences and 
clinical practice (hence the term “biomedicine”). My analyses will draw from critiques of scientific as well as 
biomedical neutralities from STMS (e.g., Latimer 2013). 
24 Exceptions include Namaste (2000), Spade (2011), and Valentine (2007), although only Namaste undertakes a 
sustained theorization of health care. 
25 Braiterman (1998) is one of several exceptions, as is the special issue of Sexualities (1998) within which his article is 
published. In the late nineties and early 2000s, travestis became an important object of study for “global sexualities” 
scholars, often to reflect on the presumptive separation between gender and sexuality. When scholars like Braiterman 
(1998) focused on health, rarely did scholarship take up consideration of issues outside of HIV or silicone injection.  
26 “Travesti” is a term of gendered and sexualized embodiment and enactment embraced by many trans-feminine people 
in varying parts of Latin America. The occasional translation of the term to “transvestite” is somewhat confusing, 
since in the US and Europe this connotes a distinct set of embodied practices and subjectivities usually associated with 
“cross-dressing.” I will discuss the particular mobilization of “travesti” as a term of classed, racialized, sexualized, and 
gendered identification and political organizing in Argentina in Chapter 2.     
27 Kulick, with Lancaster (1998) edited a special issue of Sexualities called Transgender in Latin America: Persons, Practices and 
Meanings. While analyses of travestis have often focused on Brazil and Mexico, the tendency towards positioning gender 
non-normativity in Latin America as a phenomenon in the ambit of “machista” culture prevail across these accounts. 
28 Mol (2002), Latimer (2013), and Nelson (2011) are among the exceptions to this general current in STMS. 
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29 Jordan-Young (2010) describes how the methodological presumptions of such studies markedly embed social, 
political, and cultural notions of gendered and sexual difference, and thus empirically produce the differences they set 
out to measure. 
30 Here, Clarke et al. (2003;2010) build on Colen’s (1986) concept of “stratified reproduction,” later taken up by 
Ginsberg and Rapp (1995) to signal how “some reproductive futures are valued while others are despised.” (1995:1)  
31 I also attended a trans health conference in Philadelphia with several providers from New York City. I also conducted 
early pilot field work in the Bay Area. While I do not draw on these data, they form some of the background of my 
analyses. In addition, while not part of the city of Buenos Aires proper, I visited some of the outlying areas of Buenos 
Aires. These are among thirteen districts that are a short distance from the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, but are 
administered by their own municipal governments. Nevertheless, there is extensive daily travel and exchange between 
the city and these outlying areas.  
32 I am indebted to Adele Clarke for these insights. 
33This draws theoretically from Foucault’s (1994 [1975]) genealogies, Deleuze and Guttari’s (1983) “minor literatures”, 
and the methodological/theoretical foci on marginal knowledges in subaltern studies (e.g., Spivak 1988; Chakrabarty 
1992; 2000).   
34 These forms of health are differentially available and of ranging quality both in terms of basic health care practice and 
gender confirming care. 
 
Chapter 1 Notes 
 
35 In the prologue, I distinguished between “activists” and “advocates,” describing trans advocates as paid professional 
who work on behalf of individuals or groups. In her recent book of leftist organizing, McAlevey (2016) contrasts “advocacy” 
methods of social change with broad-based, cross-class “organizing.” Here, advocacy projects emphasize working on behalf of 
broader groups of people, holding stable an elitist relation of power. I draw on this distinction, especially to foreground the 
classed, gendered, and racialized stratifications constituting elite professionalism that at some level enable advocacy. 
However, I do not draw so rigid a distinction between advocates and activists, as there is significant slippage and 
permeability between “activists” and “advocates” in trans health. Many trans health advocates identify themselves as 
activists, and indeed became advocates through previous grassroots activism. Further, many unpaid activists are invested in 
advocacy models of social change rather than large-scale organizing models. As such, it is difficult to differentiate clearly 
between these groups. I do so when the distinction is important or evident. Otherwise, I tend to use the language of 
“activism,” since this is how most people I interviewed and observed describe themselves. 
36 The passage of the Gender Identity Law eliminated the need for diagnosis prior to gender confirming care, so trans 
classifications are not required to do work in the same way they are in the U.S. As a result, classificatory debates have 
become far less important for Argentinian actors. Nonetheless, some Argentinian activists are focused on 
transnational trans health care formations, and thus remain invested in classificatory discussions. In addition, 
regardless of the law’s passage, some providers have continued to use psychiatric classifications in practice. Therefore, 
classifications are far from irrelevant in Argentina, but their importance is less central. 
37 See Chapter 2 for a detailed analysis of some of the multiple processes involved in producing a “trans population.”  
38 Notable exceptions include Thompson and King (2015), Spade (2015[2011], and Singer (2006). 
39 Valentine (2007) and Meyerowitz (2002) significantly assert that the very distinctions that separate “sex,” “gender,” 
and “sexuality” as discrete domains—a theorization that is central to both trans health and certain conceptualizations 
of transness in general—emerge from sexology. Other scholars reflect on how medical power is articulated through 
sexuality, nation, race, and imperial/colonial relations, which manifests not only in medical practice, but also in subject 
formation and identitarian arrangements (Foucault 1990; Stoler 1995; Somerville 2000; Terry 1999). 
40 The notion of retrospectively (and often anachronistically) interpellating historical subjects as “transgender” is 
circulated through texts like Feinberg’s (1996) Transgender Warriors: Making History from Joan of Arc to Dennis Rodman. The 
41 The fact that these individuals are professionals—an anthropologist, and attorney, and a psychologist—is important 
given the fuzzy distinction between and frequent conflation of what might be called “grassroots activists” and 
“professional advocates.” Often, self-identified trans activists draw on professional networks and practices through 
which to route activist agendas (whether or not they are technically paid as “trans advocates”). Yet professional status 
comes to matter in the production and circulation of knowledge in the emergent knowledge economies of trans 
health. 
42 The presentation is reprinted in full on Dallas Denny’s website  
    at http://dallasdenny.com/Writing/2014/04/23/the-language-of-gender-variance-2001 (accessed April 19, 2017).  
43 This builds on Hall’s (1992) analysis of “the West and the rest.” 
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44 Recently, trans people have begun circulating anecdotes on social media using the hashtag #TransHealthFail. These 
include videos and other posts describing uncomfortable, degrading, and sometimes dangerous interactions with 
health care providers. 
45 Here, I run into a classificatory problem that is not dissimilar from that of my respondents. They grapple with whether 
it is “sex” (which they define anatomically or biologically), or “gender” (which they tend to define as one’s social 
and/or psychic identity) that is relevant to medicine and care. I find it difficult to conceptualize these as discrete, and 
thus struggle with how to describe this work without becoming caught in such “biological/social” dichotomies. While 
it is not the primary focus of this project to theorize the relation of “sex” to “gender” (and the relations of these to the 
production of difference in general) it remains embedded in these theorizations. Scholars deal differently with 
interrogating these in relation, and such engagements form a large part of the foundation of feminist, sexuality, and 
queer theory. I draw implicitly on concepts advanced by Murphy (2012); Hartman (1997); Puar (2007); Butler (1990); 
Salamon (2010); Ferguson (2004); and Samuels (2014) among others. 
46 For example, at the U.S. Professional Association for Trans Health (USPATH) symposium in Los Angeles in 2017, 
Kenneth Zucker’s talk caused much controversy. Zucker is a prominent psychiatrist whose position on gender 
normativity as pathological has raised ire among both activists and providers, though he remains very engaged in 
revision projects. At the symposium, activists interrupted Zucker’s talk to question his presence and reject his stances 
on trans health. This was followed by a highly politicized debate among providers and activists about the place of 
“pathologizing” providers in trans health, and resulted in an apology being published online by USPATH. The 
apology was removed soon thereafter (Chang 2017, personal communication).  
47 This mental health treatment process is often at least partially shaped by guidelines of care, the most popular of which 
is published by the World Professional Association of Transgender Health (WPATH). Up until the last revision, these 
standards recommended that therapists require trans patients to undergo a period of “real-life experience” (RLE), 
previously referred to as a “real-life test” RLT). This was an extended period of time—usually between six months 
and two years (and sometimes more)—during which people were expected to live in the “desired sex” without any 
medical intervention (Levine 2009). Levine (2009:186), a psychiatrist, describes this as a “fixture” in the “management 
of gender identity disorder,” but strongly argues against its use. In arguing this case in the International Journal of 
Transgenderism, he points out that no clinical studies had ever been published on its efficacy. Describing this discovery 
as “unnerving,” he recommended that revised guidelines of care eliminate the RLE requirements. The 2012 revision 
of the WPATH standards dropped this guideline. 
48 While I have used “trans” elsewhere, I include the asterisk when specifically describing gender non-normative 
formations in Argentina, given that most of the activists and some of the providers with whom I spoke increasingly 
tend to use this terminology. 
49 The Medicaid exclusion for gender confirming care was lifted in March of 2015, following a class action lawsuit that 
was filed against the State of New York by a group of attorney advocates (Department of Health, New York State 
2015). Prior to this, codes with the DSM’s “Gender Identity Disorder” diagnosis (now “Gender Dysphoria”) would 
be rejected for reimbursement.  
50 Some of these debates assert that there is less distinction between this than previously assumed. This converges with 
recent turns in mental health professions to “biologize” certain “conditions.” This is presumed to “reduce stigma,” in 
addition to “scientizing” psychiatry (See Pitts-Taylor 2016). 
51 Cohen-Kettenis is a Dutch psychiatrist and researcher who has been a longtime member of WPATH. Drescher is a 
U.S. psychiatrist and psychoanalyst who has long advocated against the pathologization of gay identities in psychiatry, 
and who has worked as a provider-advocate in favor of trans depathologization. Meyer-Bahlburg is a professor of 
clinical psychology in the U.S., and studies intersex and gender dysphoria, often focusing on hypotheses pertaining to 
brain chemistry. Friedemann Pfäfflin is German psychoanalyst and retired university chair of forensic 
psychopathology. 
52 See, for example, Edelman (2011). In New York until 2014 (Hayoun 2014), the possession of multiple condoms could 
be grounds to arrest a person for sex work solicitation. The 2014 ban against the use of condom possession as 
evidence animated much discussion among respondents in my fieldwork. 
53 As an ethnographer, I signed up as a contributor, and was prompted to disclose any potential conflicts of interest. One 
of the questions included asked if I or members of my family have been diagnosed with any of the conditions on 
which I might comment. I checked the box. 
54 For example, Sonya (2013) described how some of her patients—particularly low-income trans women of color, as 
well as trans men of color—came to her after having had a difficult time accessing gender confirming care. At times, 
this had to do with the economic constraints imposed by public financing infrastructures not subsidizing gender 
confirming care, and other providers not being willing to work around Medicaid exclusions. Other times, she 
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explained, it had to do with what she saw as the racist tendency to diagnose people with other forms of “disruptive” 
mental illness and thus to refuse or delay treatment.  
 
Chapter 2 Notes 
55 “Travesti” is mobilized in a specific way in Argentina, although people tend to identify with the term in other parts of 
Latin America (e.g. in Mexico, Chile, and Brazil). In general, travestis do not refer to themselves using the language of 
“transgender,” though they politically ally with people who do. “Travesti” is generally applied to and used by working 
class, trans-feminine people, typically racialized as non-white, and often rural-to-urban migrants from the provinces. 
Significantly, many travesti organizations in Buenos Aires were initially formed in the 1990s to resist police violence and 
criminalization, especially related to how public spaces were regulated vis-à-vis sex work (Fernández et al. 2004). 
56 This acronym stands for Asociación Travestis, Transexuales, y Transgéneros de Argentina or the Association of Travestis, 
Transsexuals, and Transgender People of Argentina. 
57 It was not always clear from publications whether only travestis or also trans men or trans women who do not identify 
as travestis were included.  
58 In Argentina, activists argue that “trans” does not fully incorporate gender non-normative subjects, particularly travestis 
who as a group are central to these social movements. As such, they often append an asterisk (trans*) to signal the 
multitude of gendered positionalities incorporated by its reach. Latin American activists proposed this intervention in 
the early 2000s, and intended it specifically as a critique of the presumptiveness of global North funding agencies, who 
were newly investing funds in global HIV prevention for trans women (defined as such) as a “high risk population.” 
Later, in the U.S., the asterisk was also adopted, but in a distinct manner: ostensibly to broaden the “umbrella” of the 
trans descriptor to include non-binary and other gender non-normative identifications that people did not explicitly 
describe themselves as “transgender.” This latter use of the asterisk has become controversial through a series of 
online debates about its use and inclusiveness (or exclusiveness). I will not detail those here. But to avoid confusion, I 
do not adopt use of the asterisk in this work. Nonetheless, I am cognizant that “trans” remains a somewhat reductive 
way to describe gender non-normative social movements, particularly in Argentina, and aim generally to describe 
travestis specifically.  
59 I do not wish to overstate the equivalence of these legal and regulatory provisions; Argentina’s national law and New 
York State’s regulatory change differ across scale, process, and implementation. Furthermore, Argentina’s Gender 
Identity Law implemented a series of legal changes that far exceed its provision about public financing to support 
hormone administration and surgeries related to gendered enactment and embodiment. Nonetheless, given the 
resistance—especially in the U.S.—to public programs supporting gender confirming care, these were important 
symbolic and material shifts.   
60 This phrase has been used by a variety of social movements in Argentina, including reproductive health activists, to 
contest what they define as marginalizing policies, institutions, and laws. It effectively invokes the nation’s transition 
to democracy following the military dictatorship, and implicitly defines subjugating conditions as vestiges of illiberal 
regimes (Morgan 2015).  
61 Legal scholar Dean Spade (2011[2015]) asserts gender classification, as a site of persistent state surveillance, regularly 
catches gender non-normative people through their failure to fit a particular set of standards (e.g., conveying a 
gendered enactment or embodiment that comports with the gender marker on one’s legal documentation). Spade 
shows—in the case of the U.S., but also relevant in other locales—that people who are marginalized along lines of 
race, class, sexuality, disability, and others are among those who most regularly come into contact with varying and 
more coercive forms of state administrative practices (e.g., welfare programs, prisons, or shelters). As a result, easing 
regulations for gender reclassification, for Spade and others, makes available a potential buffer in these interactions. 
While Spade is not particularly interested in “recognition” as an outcome, gender reclassification laws are often framed 
in these terms. 
62 One study (ATTTA and Fundación Huésped 2014) estimated a 35 year life expectancy for trans people, while another 
(Borgogno with REDLACTRANS 2009) study estimated a 40 year life expectancy for travestis.  
63 In 1998, New York State’s Department of Health issued a regulation excluding all forms of gender-confirming care 
for Medicaid reimbursement (New York State 1998). Citing concerns about safety and efficacy, New York State’s 
Medicaid program refused all forms of coverage and reimbursement for surgeries, hormones, and services for mental 
health in support of gender-confirming care.  
64 Accessed 4/20/17 at www.srlp.org/class-action-lawsuit-against-new-york-dept-of-health-on-behalf-of-transgender-
new-yorkers-proceeds/?shared=email&msg=fail 
65 In population health research, these are modes of research recruitment that are not necessarily generalizable to the 
broader population. They might be spatially or programmatically defined (e.g., trans people at a specific clinic) or 
 205 
                                                                                                                                                                           
recruited in another manner that would be considered non-random for the usual purposes of research. Many are based 
on internet-based surveys, and there is some contention among public health researchers what might comprise 
“random sampling” when it comes to this form of research subject recruitment. Random sampling is considered a 
“gold standard” in population health research because researchers understand it to produce less error and therefore 
more generalizability of results. 
66 In population health, “prevalence” refers to the number of cases compared with the total number of people studied. 
“Incidence” refers to a probability of occurrence, represented as a proportion or a rate.  
67 Social epidemiology—a subfield that focuses largely on broader structural phenomena and their effects on health—is 
an important exception. Nonetheless, it, too tangles with epidemiology as a broader field over appropriate and 
legitimate methodologies. 
68 I include scare quotes here to frame “community” as a problematic. I will not include a detailed critique of formations 
of community, but concur with Joseph’s (2002:xxii) concerns that notions of community often “elide and repress 
differences[.]” I use “community-based” to describe studies because this is the language mobilized by researchers. I do 
not want to obscure the power differentials at play in such collaborations among those designated as “experts” and 
those whose expertise lies in “community membership.” Nonetheless, varying other power dynamics within these 
relationships remain underexplored and underemphasized in simply designating them “community-based.”  
69 Malta’s Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics (GIGESC) Act (Caruana 2017), which was 
passed into law in 2015, is the most similar to Argentina’s Gender Identity Law in structure, as it pairs legal document 
change, depathologization (discussed in Chapter 3), and the development of infrastructure for access to gender-
confirming care. Other laws or proposed laws have also been modeled after part of Argentina’s law, but have not 
necessarily coupled legal classification regulations with both depathologization and health care access as part of the 
same law (e.g., Colombia, Denmark, and Chile). 
70 Surgery was not explicitly a requirement, but was de facto necessary, since a state-employed medical panel was first 
required to assess that people’s bodies comported with the gender which they wished to claim on their National 
Identity Document (called the documento nacional de identidad, or DNI).  
71 Based on scholarship in the US, even when gender reclassification guidelines and policies exist, they are only 
contingently and inconsistently followed. While it is generally useful to keep in mind that laws and regulations are not 
always enacted as expressed, most of the respondents with whom I spoke in Buenos Aires thought that these 
guidelines were generally being followed. They described what they thought were some provincial and regional 
variations. Nonetheless, with legal support through governmental agencies such as INADI (The National Institute 
Against Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Racism [Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación, la Xenofobia y el Racismo]), 
most respondents who addressed this question thought that people were able to change their names and gender 
markers with relative ease. 
72 Despite its legal passage, however, the regulation and implementation of the law lagged for three years. Regulatory 
language was only issued with the 2015 arrival of a new health minister, Daniel Gollán, in Argentina. Gollán replaced 
Juan Luis Manzur, who some respondents claimed was personally opposed to the provisions of the law. While this is 
not empirically substantiated, several respondents speculated that the lag was in some regards a political rather than 
administrative. Ultimately, the regulations produced were rather vague and difficult to implement, causing a fair 
amount of confusion among providers, patients, and reimbursement offices alike about what procedures and 
treatments were to be covered.  
73 The bill was passed by Argentina’s lower house of Congress (the Chamber of Deputies) in late 2011 by a vote of 167 
in favor and 17 against (with seven abstentions). It later passed the Senate with 55 votes in favor and zero against 
(with one abstention and 12 absences). It is not within the scope of this project to demonstrate the reasons for such 
strong legislative support—which is certainly unusual among lawmaking bodies across the world. Nonetheless, 
respondents and commentators I interviewed in Buenos Aires speculated about the significance of the law’s appeal to 
human rights rhetoric, and specifically to Argentina’s legally enshrined “right to identity” (initially formulated after the 
dictatorship to re-establish kinship ties for children of the disappeared stolen during the Dirty War). This is a topic 
that certainly merits more study in terms of “coattail effects.” 
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74 Argentina’s health care system comprises two major forms of insurance: private and employment-
based. For the 37.9% of people in Argentina without insurance (INDEC 2010), tax-funded public 
hospitals provide primary as well as specialty care. The Ministry of Health oversees all of these. In 
the U.S., scholars have pointed out that health coverage for gender-confirming care among private 
and large public employers has become more robust in the recent past, while Medicaid policies 
seem to have been eroding (Spade 2010), similarly to HIV care (Darling 2016). 
75 The CHA, founded in 1984 just after the military dictatorship, remains an active coalition of mostly leftist activists. 
Many members are also self-identified Communists or Marxists, and the organization tends to take political positions 
that are somewhat less influenced by mainstream “rights” politics and tend to privilege, to some degree, economic 
conditions in ways that other organizations do not consistently center. They contrast to some degree with more 
“mainstream” organizations, such as the Argentina LGBT Federation or FALGBT (Federación Argentina de 
Lesbianas, Gays, Bisexuales y Trans, n.d.), an NGO founded in 2006 and member of the the International Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA, n.d). 
76 This translation from politicized community resource to government-issued health care guide reflected a curious 
retention of Capicüa activists’ scholarly and political affiliations, reproducing the original bibliography complete with 
citations of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, B. Paul Preciado, and Gayle Rubin. Interestingly, while the Capicüa guide 
was mentioned in the government-published guide, it was not cited in its bibliography. 
77 This point is discussed by Steven Epstein (1996), Phil Brown (1987; 1992) and others. It also relates more generally to 
social science and STMS studies of lay knowledge and scientific expertise (e.g., Collins and Evans 2007).  
78The 1988 Anti-discrimination Act, Act No. 23,592. Argentina. The Autonomous City of Buenos Aires presented similar 
legislation last year, which passed (Ley 5,261, La Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires). María Rachid, General Secretary 
of the Argentine LGBT Federation (FALGBT) and a Buenos Aires legislator, helped to draft both pieces of 
legislation. 
79 See Matthew Smith (2016) “Will This be the Year Argentina Approves a New Anti-Discrimination Law?” The 
Argentina Independent, May 4th. 
80 The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a marked increase in trans activism in the US in general, and health was a salient 
domain within which this unfolded. Around the same time, gender-confirming care for trans people was increasingly 
defined by some policymakers as a problem of both ethics and cost. State auditors, legislators, and insurance 
commissioners seemed to take increasing note of public expenditures. Spade’s (2010) interview with several Medicaid 
advocates documents some of the controversies leading to states adding exclusions for care. This recent history of 
publicly subsidized gender-confirming care for trans people in the US is not well-documented outside of legal and 
activist scholarship.  
81 The line between health care professionals, attorneys, trans-identified and supportive non-profit workers, and 
(typically unpaid) activists was often mobile and blurry. 
82 Accessed 4/20/17 from www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/program/update/2015/2015-03.htm, New York 
State Department of Health, New York State Medicaid Update (2015) 31(3), March. 
83 Plemons (2017) discusses how surgeons who do facial feminization surgeries (FFS) locate trans women’s faces as 
particularly central as embodied sites of sexing/gendering, and describes how FFS is thus central to practices of 
gender confirming care. The vast majority of the surgeries and procedures that New York deemed “cosmetic” affected 
trans women rather than trans men, resulting in a gender-stratified de facto exclusion that was scarcely more expansive 
than the initial de jure exclusion. Furthermore, while coverage for genital surgeries was made possible by the law, low 
reimbursement rates and the lack of expert providers made such expensive surgeries nearly impossible to access. 
84 Again, travesti in Argentina and other regions of the southernmost region of South America comprise a loose social, 
economic, and political group. As Vek Lewis notes in an interview with Viviane Namaste (2011), identification with 
travesti identity is intimately tied to local economies and politics, municipal and national laws and surveillance practices, 
and varying flows of intercity and inter-region migration. Lewis also points out its potential misalignment with “gender 
identity,” given its frequent articulation through object choice in erotic desire (citing Valentine on “transgender”). 
Furthermore, travesti is defined, embodied, and enacted in a wide range of ways in Argentina and throughout the 
Spanish-speaking Americas.   
85 “Travesticides,” or “travesticidios” in Spanish, is a reconstruction of “femicides” (“femicidios”) formally criminalized 
and/or informally protested in Argentina and in various regions of South America, Central America, México and 
beyond. Jill Radford and Diana Russell (1992) advanced the concept of “femicide” to describe gendered violence and 
murder, describing it as “the killing of women by men simply because they are women” (Radford and Russell 1992: xiv), 
other feminist scholars have extended the concept. Argentina has federal legislation specifically addressing gendered 
violence, but activists complain that it has not been budgeted for or implemented substantively. A movement 
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organized under the banner “Ni Una Menos” (#niunamenos, meaning “Not One More,” in which the feminized 
“one” implies “not one more woman”) undertook coordinated protests in the summer of 2015. One Ni Una Menos 
organizer commented to a reporter (Rogers 2015), “Our country’s laws are beautiful and divine, but they’re not 
applied.” A prominent trans activist, Lohana Berkins (2015) published an opinion piece in the leftist paper Página 12, 
at the height of the coordinated Ni Una Menos protests in June of that year, asserting that “travesticide is also 
femicide” (el travesticidio también es femicidio). Feminist organizers of the nationwide protests were mixed in their 
reception to the presence and claims of travesti who asserted their inclusion in this coordinated movement, with some 
expressing concerns that travesti concerns were distinct. The political implications of femicides in Argentina is 
important to consider not only for the feminist and coalitional claim that travesti are making under the Ni Una Menos 
banner, but also because femicides are frequently linked in media reporting to sexualized and reproductive struggles 
around abortion, pregnancy, and sex work. Media frequently mention gendered intimate partner violence that occurs 
in response to women who are pregnant or intending to get an abortion, as well as violence against sex workers by 
their johns.  
86 The monologue was delivered in Spanish, and the translation is mine. 
87 Ni Una Menos, which translates to “Not One (Woman) Less” is also a loosely organized social movement. Its activists 
organize demonstrations and use the Twitter hashtag #NiUnaMenos to protest the murders of women. Such violence 
is typically also classed and racialized, although this is not always expressly articulated in protests. Ni Una Menos is 
described on its website as a “collective shout against macho violence” (“un grito colectivo contra la violencia machista”). (Ni 
Una Menos, n.d). During demonstrations, which frequently occur following gendered murders or violence, activists 
shout, “Basta de femicidios,” or “No more femicides!” In my research, it was clear that travesti murders were contested 
as femicides for many Ni Una Menos activists. As a result, travestis,many of whom were already active Ni Una Menos 
activists, specified “no more travesticides” (“Basta de travesticidios”) in response to violence against travestis and trans 
people. This became a rejoinder to both the exclusionary definition of feminized violence adopted by some Ni Una 
Menos activists and to the perpetrators of violence against travestis. 
88 Travesti and transgender identity differ along several important axes, but converge through certain forms of advocacy 
on various scales. While there is a frequent slippage between “trans” and “travesti,” and while “travesti” is at times 
seemingly incorporated by transgender’s “umbrella”, the particularities of travesti subjectivities at times subsume other 
forms of trans or gender non-normative embodiment or enactment. Violence—specifically its relation to policing and 
sex work—comes to stand as the unifying experience of gender non-normativity, though few middle- or upper-class 
trans Argentines are similarly, or at least as regularly, exposed to its effects. Trans men in Argentina also contend that 
they encounter differing types of violence.  
89 This resonates with Deborah Gould’s (2009:3) assertion that “feeling and emotion are fundamental to political life” 
and to social movements producing and working towards “political horizons.” Focusing on ACT UP and AIDS 
activism, she looks to affect as central rather than peripheral to the organization and action of social movements. 
These reflections inform my positioning of “epidemiological rage” in relation to furia travesti. 
90 This notion draws on Ludwig Fleck’s (1976) early engagements with the importance of shared communities of 
knowledge, or “thought collectives,” and their corresponding “thought styles.” These do not necessarily gesture to a 
shared set of beliefs, but rather what is thinkable—as well as what is impossible to think—for a particular (often 
professionalized) group. 
91 Aizura similarly discusses the imperative to theorize “value and racialization alongside necropolitics” and the 
sometimes contradictory dynamics that are produced within the articulation of trans femininity, labor, and exchange 
(Aizura 2014:133). 
92 Accessed 4/20/17 from www.wsj.com. 
93 Accessed 4/20/17 from www.transadvocate.com/fact-check-study-shows-transition-makes-trans-people-
suicidal_n_15483.htm 
94 This law’s passage was also facilitated by an anti-sex work rhetoric that was taken up by both state actors and (at least 
conditionally) by some travesti activists. The scope of this project does not allow for an in-depth analysis of these 
dynamics, but this is a generative site for future research. 
 
Chapter 3 Notes 
 
96 The Medicaid exclusion was in fact lifted in March of 2015, following a class action lawsuit that was filed against the 
State of New York by a group of attorney advocates (Department of Health, New York State 2015). Prior to this, any 
procedure code with the DSM’s “Gender Identity Disorder” diagnosis (now “Gender Dysphoria”) would be rejected 
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for reimbursement. “Endocrine Disorder” because a standard workaround during this time, since it raised fewer flags 
for hormone treatment reimbursement.  
97 Sennott (2010), Burke (2011), Pyne (2011), Suess (2015), Suess, Espineira & Walters (2014), Kreig (2013), Sekuler 
(2013), and Puar (2015) are among those turning attention to this topic.  
98 “Depathologization” is not always the specific term under or around which groups organize, but refers to a mode of 
health activism that contests the terms on which certain bodies, social practices, subjectivities, or conditions are 
viewed as pathological or non-normative. These movements might seek to redefine sexed bodies or processes as 
healthy and non-pathological, for instance, in the case of feminist health activists who historically and presently strive 
to contest what they view to be the medical notion that the female body is inherently inferior, problematic, or ill (e.g., 
Ehrenreich and English 1973; Martin 1987; Murphy 2012). Relatedly, reproductive justice activists contest how racism 
shapes care provision as part of a broader social landscape, and how practices like forced sterilization are in part 
enacted through racialized pathologization (Luna 2009; Ross 2006; Silliman et al. 2004). Disability activists explicitly 
use the term “pathologization” with more frequency, and centrally critique notions of the “norm” in health care and 
medicine. They frame the “norm” as the falsely naturalized state against which people with disabilities are viewed to be 
ill, pathological, or deficient (Charlton 2000; McRuer 2006; Schweik 2009; Thomson 1997).  
99 An international coalition, Stop Trans Pathologization (www.stp2012.info), boasts a sweeping regional reach of 
member organizations throughout Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America and Oceania. Among these 
was the Spanish Network for the Depathologization of Trans Identities, which launched a campaign called “Stop 
Trans Pathologization 2012.” This grew out of social media and Internet correspondence with a variety of 
transnational partners. This collaborative subsequently merged into the International Campaign to Stop Trans 
Depathologization (STP).  
100 In this regard, some depathologization activists compare medical care for trans people with that of pregnant people. 
For example, Krieg (2013:41) argues that both conditions are quotidian variations on standard human existence that 
may require biomedical care.  
101 “Medicalization” signals an important set of debates in medical sociology and beyond, initially articulated and 
elaborated in the 1970s. Generally positing that social problems or forms of difference are defined increasing as 
medical problems, these arguments held particular import at their inception for scholars of disability and gender. 
These critiques have traveled well beyond the confines of sociology. STMS-informed interventions have suggested 
that present social dynamics might be theorized less through medical control or dominance, and more through broad 
social and political shifts that suffuse and transform life vis-à-vis biomedicine (Clarke et al. 2010).  
102 Related to medicalization but not identical to it, studies of pathologization foreground the production of the norm in 
medicine and beyond (Burke 2011; Garland-Thomson 1997; Stoler 1995). 
103 “Stigma”—although presently part of the contemporary vernacular—was initially theorized by Erving Goffman 
(1963:3)  in the early 1960s. Defining this as an “attribute that is deeply discrediting” and as a “spoiled identity” that 
“disqualifie[s people] from social acceptance,” he emphasizing the social relations, within which certain elements of 
identity are scorned, devalued, or rendered undesirable. 
104 Trans depathologization projects differ from those undertaken by earlier gay depathologization activists in the US, as 
they do not seek demedicalization. Rather, trans depathologization strategies today draw from feminist and disability 
critiques—often implicitly—to reject definitions of gender non-normativity embedded in pathologizing diagnostic 
models of care while simultaneously demanding access to infrastructures of supportive clinical care. 
105 Here, Clarke (2005) builds on symbolic interactionist engagements with social worlds, commitments, perspectives, 
action, and negotiation (e.g. Strauss 1978). “Arenas,” in this regard, are both “discursive sites” and “conceptual 
frames” (Clarke 2005:38) through which to analyze collective actors and action. These comprise part, though by no 
means the whole of situational analysis. 
106 While trans depathologization is deeply indebted to feminist activism, advocacy, and scholarship, the relations 
between these fields of practice have somewhat contentious histories. In the US and to a large degree in Argentina, 
there remain palpable antipathies towards trans and travesti people on the part of certain individual feminists and 
feminist organizations. This may manifest in exclusion from social and political participation (generally, participation 
of transfeminine people from feminist “women only” spaces and projects). 
107 Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1978) described these as medicine’s “exclusionary” and “expansionist” currents. For 
some people—namely, wealthy white women—medical establishments encourage entry into medical management “in 
a variety of non-sick situations” (p. 49), while for others—primarily women of color and working class women—the 
“sick role” is out of reach, and “pathology” is addressed as a social, economic, and most significantly moral problem. 
These apparently conflicting modes of social control, they argue, are indeed two sides of the same coin. 
108 This notion of a norm as discontinuous with a population standard calls forth Canguilhem’s (1966 [1991]) discussions 
in The Normal and the Pathological about the imperative for medical practice to differentiate between the statistical 
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average and the norm. He writes, “in dealing with biological norms, one must always refer to the individual because 
this individual, as Goldstein says, can find himself ‘equal to the tasks resulting from the environment suited to him,’ 
but in organic conditions which, in any other individual, would be inadequate for these tasks. Laugier, Goldstein 
asserts that a statistically obtained average does not allow us to decide whether the individual before us is normal or 
not. We cannot start from it in order to discharge our medical duty toward the individual. When it comes to a supra-
individual norm, it is impossible to determine the “sick being” (Kranksein) as to content. But this is perfectly possible 
for an individual norm” (Canguilhem 1991 [1966]:181). This “individual norm”—which is, he argues, the norm of 
pathology—takes shape within a specific social and biological environment, but is nonetheless not likely to fit with the 
statistical regularity of the non-medical sciences. In this regard, the “abnormal” is not necessarily equivalent to the 
“pathological.”  
109 Trans and disability studies as well as activism, maintain a somewhat vexed relationship in the U.S., and to a large 
degree also in Argentina. Puar (2015) describes how the 1990s exclusion of transsexuality from the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) in part set the scene for trans ambivalence towards engaging disability. She also notes the 
curious schism between trans and disability studies’ trajectories, describing their often unarticulated resonances as well 
as their general omission of engagements with racial difference.  
110 “Disablement” is far from an incidental connection here, given transgender’s peculiar and troubled relation to 
disability. Barry (2013) discusses the historical exclusion of transsexuality from the Americans with Disabilities act, 
describing the ADA as “moral code, and people with GID its moral castaways.” As Puar (2015), Strassburger (2012) 
and others point out, trans subjectivities are at times in alignment with though more often disavow such links. This 
was also the case historically, as a large degree of division characterized whether or not activists advocated trans 
exclusion in the ADA. 
111 Scholars such as Aren Aizura (2006) and Dan Irving (2008) have analyzed this particular dynamic as it unfolds within 
trans advocacy and rights discourses, emphasizing that those trans subjects who are most recognizable and/or who 
might be recuperated into a racially, economically, heteronormatively, and “properly” gendered transgender 
subjectivity become idealized trans subjects, while those who fail to fit such requirements are excluded from the 
medical treatment they seek, as well as from social/political spheres. 
112 This “wedge” also echoes the manner in which Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich (1978) describe social control in medicine. 
They argued that medicine is ideological and shaped by classed, racialized, and gendered stratifications. It thus 
operates in distinct ways by exerting social control through what they call “exclusionary” and “expansionist” modes, 
which either denied people admittance to care (exclusionary) or which undertook intimate management of aspects of 
people’s lives that would seem to be beyond the concerns of appropriate medical care for illness (expansionist). 
113 On the whole, many US-based activists were unaware of Argentina’s Gender Identity Law and its provisions.  
114 In a highly polarizing move, the APA also appointed Toronto-based psychologist and sexologist Kenneth Zucker to 
the work group. Zucker is infamous among trans depathologizationists for his use of “reparative” treatments for 
children and adolescents to discourage gender dysphoria in adulthood. He chaired the committee.  
115 The “transsexual model” sought to identify “the true transsexual” as defined in the mid-twentieth century by Harry 
Benjamin and other US- and European-based sexologists (Meyerowitz 2002). It typically excluded a large number of 
potential patients from treatment for reasons such as sexual object choice and physical appearance. This classic mode 
of diagnosis and treatment—while not entirely obsolete—has been sharply critiqued by trans activists, and has been 
expanded into less restrictive modes of diagnosis and treatment. 
116 Consequences may range from concerns about insurance coverage and pre-existing conditions (at least prior to the 
passage of the ACA in the US) to potential problems for trans parents associated with having had a psychiatric 
diagnosis in child custody disputes. 
117 Initially, the Spanish Network for Trans Depathologization focused on the legitimation of gender-confirming care, 
but soon shifted to forcefully confront medical hegemony (Araneta and Fernandez Garrido 2016). As it expanded into 
a transnational network, its focus moved from this broad critique of medical power to instead more narrowly contest 
depsychiatrization. 
118 As noted in Chapter 1, “the letter” refers to the generally compulsory document that a primary care and/or mental 
health care provider (or sometimes both) must provide to surgeons to ascertain trans people’s qualifications for 
surgery. In the US and in many other locales, such documents are required prior to surgery, and stand as an expert 
assertions of the veracity of patients’ claims to transness via a Gender Dysphoria diagnosis. The letter is unnecessary 
in Argentina’s current health care system, given the legal codification of only expressed desire being satisfactory 
grounds for seeking surgical or other forms of gender-confirming care. 
119 The combined effects of the U.S.’s decentralization and diagnostic classificatory infrastructures are thus quite 
powerful. Argentina’s health care system is not wholly centralized, as it is a tiered system that includes a robust private 
market in addition to government-run employment insurance and the subsidized public hospital safety net. However, 
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while both systems are somewhat fragmented, the U.S.’s system is far more so, and it lacks the kind of coordination 
that the Ministry of Health in Argentina provides. So although Argentina’s financing systems also link diagnostic 
codes and specific treatments, there is more flex and play in its system because the Ministry of Health sets standards 
for regulation. It was through the Ministry of Health, for example, that Argentina implemented the financing 
requirements of the Gender Identity Law. Even though rates of uninsurance in the U.S. are very high (and 
disproportionately so among people of color, low-income people, and young people) (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2016), health insurance systems still have an outsized influence of what remains possible in terms of changing 
financing regulations and structures. As Antonio points out, this (combined with U.S. dominance in transnational 
politics) has implications for transnational efforts to standardize trans health, as well. 
120 This is of course linked to various discourses within the institutions of health care, biomedicine, and biomedical 
ethics. For instance, patient-centered care, family-centered care, and informed consent paradigms all center the 
notions of choice, autonomy, and patient-provider collaboration. Yet “autonomy” is not conceived or defined 
identically by those engaging in practices that might fall under any of these rubrics, including those of depathologizationists. 
121 Stanley (2014:89–90) describes “gender self-determination” as a “collective praxis” and a relational articulation of a 
“collective self” that rejects “constriction and universality.” He writes, “Gender self-determination opens up space for 
multiple embodiments and their expressions by collectivizing the struggle against both interpersonal and state 
violence. Further, it pushes us away from building a trans politics on the fulcrum of realness (gender normative, trans, 
or otherwise) while also responding to the different degrees of harm people are forced to inhabit. As a nonprescriptive 
politics, its contours cannot always be known in advance — it is made and remade in the process of its actualization, 
in the time of resistance and in the place of pleasure” (Stanley 2014:90–91). Key to these insights are its claims to a 
non-domesticated multiplicity, changeability, and emergence that positions itself against the stablizing and 
universalizing currents of, for example, biomedical ethics.  
122 The recent film about the Tom Waddell Urban Health Clinic in San Francisco, “Transgender Tuesdays: A Clinic in 
the Tenderloin” (Freeman & Walters-Koh 2012), also traffics in this affective organization. 
123 As mentioned in Chapter 1, informal practices such as “creative coding” are also at times formalized, as when 
LGBTQ clinics adopt policies to diagnose patients with Endocrine Disorder to better facilitate coverage for hormone 
treatment cost. 
 
 
Conclusion notes 
 
124 In her analysis of STS and critical race theorizing, Benjamin (2016:145) expansively considers “the carceral” by 
reflecting on the relationship between “innovation and containment.” Here, she describes “fixing” as at once 
purportedly helping and holding in place (Benjamin 2016:150). This is also relevant to the racialized currents of containment 
in some aspects of biomedical treatment vis-à-vis transness (see Hsu 2013; Najmabadi 2013; Aizura 2009). 
Containment is by no means equivalent to biomedical treatment of transness. But neither are the curative and 
ameliorative impetuses of biomedicine—which weave through its disciplinary relations power—absent from 
discourses of gender-confirming care. I am indebted to Victoria Pitts-Taylor for pointing out Benjamin’s analysis. 
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